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Abstract
Hallsell, Troy Alan, PhD. The University of Memphis. December 2018. The
Overton Park Freeway Revolt: Urban Environmentalism, Historic Preservation, and
Neighborhood Protection in Memphis, Tennessee, 1956-2016. Major Professor: Sarah
Potter, PhD.

This study contributes to our understanding of postwar environmental politics
through an examination of the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park’s (CPOP) grassroots
anti-freeway activism in Memphis, Tennessee from 1956 to 2016. CPOP used
environmental legislation, a lengthy court battle that went all the way to the Supreme
Court, and historic preservation laws to successfully stop the construction of a freeway
through Overton Park. This dissertation argues that CPOP, an organization of white,
middle-class homeowners, worked to both protect the public greenspace of Overton Park
and, paradoxically, to simultaneously preserve their neighborhoods’ white, middle-class
status. Rather than liberal do-gooders, they are better understood as activists with a
variety of complex loyalties. They sought to protect the character and property values of
their neighborhoods by saving a park that primarily benefited white Memphians.
Likewise, they used state resources to combat what they viewed as growing state power.
Ultimately, this study reveals the ways a seemingly progressive battle to stop freeway
construction also served to preserve white space in a black majority city.
This understudied event in Memphis history illuminates crucial questions about
postwar American urban and environmental histories by bringing these two typically
disparate fields together. These literatures ask similar questions about how people
attempted to control and shape spaces in order to improve their environment, but they
rarely consider the possibility that their concerns might overlap. By unpacking the
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broader racial and class ramifications of this struggle against the freeway, I explore how
activists’ definitions of healthy public space privileged their own status as the
stakeholders most invested in this struggle. I also unite the scholarship on historic
preservation with academic works on neighborhood defense and environmental activism
by examining historic preservation’s role in combating freeway construction, mediating
integration, and starting neighborhood-level revitalization campaigns. Finally, this
dissertation will add to the growing scholarship on post-1968 Memphis; it builds upon
the recent trend of analyzing grassroots political activity, but also inserts urban
environmental activism, historic preservation, and neighborhood defense into the
literature.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In a 1970 poem, Memphis resident Agnes Bowe waxed wroth over Overton
Park’s impending destruction. Her poem was a response to proposed freeway
construction through the park. It highlighted the interstate’s potential physical effect on
the environment and the emotional aftermath area residents stood to suffer:
Grim vectors of destruction
Already razing homes beside this oasis
Of green
Have blasted hopes, and broken hearts,
Brought shock, despair, and early death
To trusting citizens1

As an artifact of a larger grassroots freeway revolt, this poem reveals how Bowe and her
fellow anti-freeway activists understood their park: it was a public space integral to
neighborhood health. In Bowe’s eyes, Overton Park provided “life-giving oxygen.” It
was a playground and educational space for children and a rejuvenating site of hope,
faith, and freedom in a fast-paced industrial world. 2 In short, Overton Park was both a
refuge from daily life and a giver of life itself.
Overton Park was (and still is) 342 acres of manicured parkland in the middle of
what would become the Midtown section of Memphis. Created in 1901, it contained a
pavilion (1902), nine-hole golf course (1904), zoo (1905), playground (1908), the Brooks
Museum of Art (1916), the Overton Park Shell (1936), the Memphis Academy of Arts
(1959), and 170 acres of old-growth forest. It quickly became the park system’s “crown

1
Agnes Bowe, “The Rape of Overton Park,” Box 14, Folder 4, The Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park Collection (CPOPC), Memphis and Shelby County Room, Memphis Public Library and Information
Center.
2
Bowe, “The Rape of Overton Park”; Colin Fisher, Urban Green: Nature, Recreation, and the
Working Class in Industrial Chicago, (Chapel Hill: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 9-17.

1

jewel,” a respite for Memphis’ white urban dwellers on the suburban periphery. Couple
these amenities with Overton Park’s easy access by road or streetcar, its physical distance
from low-income white and African American communities along with downtown
industrial sites, and the park became the city’s most popular public space.3
This parkland oasis became home to a fierce battle over freeway construction,
with activists organizing a grassroots anti-freeway campaign and successfully defeating
the State of Tennessee and Department of Transportation in court, thus saving the park
from destruction. Bowe’s poem, then, raises a historical question: in an era when
Midtown’s white residents could tap into one of the country’s largest welfare programs—
federally subsidized home loans—and move to the suburbs with relative ease, why did
they choose to stay and fight the destruction of their park? 4
During the mid-twentieth century, citizens protested new freeway construction all
over the United States.5 Decades of suburbanization, decentralization, and growing

3
Wanda Rushing, Memphis and the Paradox of Place: Globalization in the American South,
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 67-68.

Kenneth T. Jackson, “Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration,” Journal of Urban History Vol. 6, No. 4 (August
1980), 419-452.
4

5

See for example Eric Avila, The Folklore of the Freeway: Race and Revolt in the Modernist City,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Richard O. Baumbach Jr. and William E. Borah, The
Second Battle of New Orleans: A History of the Vieux Carre Riverfront-Expressway Controversy,
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981); Patricia Cavanaugh, Politics and Freeways: Building the
Twin Cities Interstate System, (Minneapolis: Center for Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota,
and Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 2006); Joseph F.C. DiMento and Cliff Ellis, Changing Lanes:
Visions and Histories of Urban Freeways, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013), 143-208; Robert Gioielli,
“’We Must Destroy You to Save You’: Highway Construction and the City as a Modern Commons,”
Radical History Review Vol. 109 (2011), 62-82; William Issel, “’Land Values, Human Values,’ and the
Preservation of the City’s Treasured Appearance’: Environmentalism, Politics, and the San Francisco
Freeway Revolt,” Pacific Historical Review 68 (1999), 611-646; Katherine M. Johnson, “Captain Blake
versus the Highwaymen: Or, How San Francisco Won the Freeway Revolt,” Journal of Planning History 9
(2009), 56-83; Brian Ladd, Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automotive Age, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), 97–138; Raymond A. Mohl, “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities,”
Journal of Urban History 30 (2004), 674-706; Raymond A. Mohl, “Citizen Activism and Freeway Revolts
in Memphis and Nashville: The Road to Litigation,” Journal of Urban History 40(5) (Sept. 2014), 870-893;
Zachary Schrag, “The Freeway Fight in Washington, D.C.: The Three Sisters Bridge in Three

2

dependence on automobiles led Congress to pass the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act,
which originally authorized the construction of approximately 41,000 miles of interstate
highways throughout the country.6 State and federal officials viewed this infrastructure as
a means to connect scattered populations, while local governments and civic elites
believed these highways would funnel traffic from the suburbs into central business
districts and revitalize downtowns across America. 7 Freeway construction in urban areas
usually sparked resistance. And residents made their objections known.
Memphis was no different. In 1955, Harland Bartholomew and Associates
presented the City of Memphis with a major street plan.8 It called for numerous north and
south traffic corridors with an east/west freeway through Overton Park. Urban planners
hoped this route would ease traffic congestion and connect the suburbs of Memphis to
downtown and lands west of the Mississippi River. As planners and engineers placed
Overton Park in the freeway’s crosshairs, Midtown residents circled the wagons.
The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP), a group comprised largely of
white, middle-class Midtowners, formed in response to this proposed freeway

Administrations,” Journal of Urban History 30 (2004), 648-673; and Sidney Wong, “Architects and
Planners in the Middle of a Road War: The Urban Design Concept Team in Baltimore, 1966–71,” Journal
of Planning History 12(2) (2012), 179-202. On the federal government’s response to freeway revolts see
Raymond A. Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation and the
Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973,” Journal of Policy History Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008), 193-226.
6
For the creation of the United States interstate highway system see Tom Lewis, Divided
Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life, (New York: Viking, 1997);
Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, rev. ed., (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1990); and Christopher W. Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History, (Seattle: The
University of Washington Press, 2012).
7

Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001), 249-380.
8
“Proposed Major Street Plan,” Press Scimitar, MPS Morgue Files, Group 63068, Preservation
and Special Collections Department, University Libraries, University of Memphis.
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construction. It was concerned with the environmental consequences of ramming six
lanes of concrete, steel, and high-speed traffic through Overton Park. As a result, CPOP
organized and led a grassroots anti-freeway campaign that brought local freeway
proponents, state planners and engineers, and federal highway administrators to their
knees. It achieved such a feat by taking its struggle all the way to the United States
Supreme Court (SCOTUS), which ruled in its favor in the 1971 case Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.9 This decision tipped the scales in favor of environmentalists
across the country, placing the burden of proof on decision-makers who had to argue the
benefits of environmental pollution and destruction over conservation. Additionally,
CPOP submitted an application to place Overton Park on the National Register of
Historic Places. Its historic designation status in 1978 bolstered CPOP’s resolve and
forced state and federal highway officials to eventually concede defeat.
In the process of fighting the freeway, however, Midtowners also reified the racial
and class characteristics of their neighborhoods, giving us the Midtown, Memphis, that
we know today. Activists challenged the freeway largely using the language and politics
of environmentalism. But their efforts also perpetuated residential segregation by
preserving the areas around the park as largely white, middle-class neighborhoods. While
stopping freeway construction saved the park from ruin, it was Midtown’s many
neighborhoods obtaining historic district designations that erected the final barrier against

Citizens v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See also John R. Porter, “Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review,” Stanford Law Review Vol. 24,
No. 6 (June, 1972), 1117-1133 and Peter L. Strauss, “Administrative Law Stories: Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe,” Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group Paper
Number 05-85, Law & Economics Working Paper Series, Paper Number 267 (Fall, 2004), 1-53.
9

4

racial integration, thus creating a white preserve in the middle of an emerging majority
black city.
This understudied event in Memphis history illuminates crucial questions about
postwar American urban and environmental histories by bringing these two typically
disparate fields together. Urban historians of this period have been preoccupied with the
problem of white flight from city centers to the suburbs, often seeking to explain how and
why metropolitan areas became so starkly segregated during the postwar era. 10 Postwar
environmental history, meanwhile, often considers how people defined and organized
politically to preserve their high quality of life. 11 These literatures ask similar questions

10

See for example Eric Avila, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in
Suburban Los Angeles, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004); Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Kevin
Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2007); Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los
Angeles, 1920-1965, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002); Richard Rothstein, The Color of
Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America, (New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation, 2017); Beryl Satter, Family Properties: How the Struggle Over Race and Real Estate
Transformed Chicago and Urban America, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009); Robert O. Self,
American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003); and Thomas Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Samuel Hays’s Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States,
1955-1985, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) is perhaps the most influential work on
postwar environmental history. He argues that postwar American affluence provided a new understanding
of the environment. America’s increased industrial production, along with concurrent high rates of
employment and rising wages made it possible for people to choose their standards of living. But as the
United States emerged as a postwar industrial behemoth, peoples’ gaze shifted towards industry’s effect on
the environment. It was at this intersection of quality of life and industrial production where Hays laid bare
the roots of postwar American environmentalism: a desire for the “good life,” or the ability to live in a
clean, healthy environment. See also Scott Hamilton Dewey, Don’t Breathe the Air: Air Pollution and U.S.
Environmental Politics, 1945–1970, (College Station: The Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Brian
Drake, Loving Nature, Fearing the State: Environmentalism and Antigovernment Politics before Reagan,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013); Cody Ferguson, This is Our Land: Grassroots
Environmentalism in the Late Twentieth Century, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015);
Robert R. Gioielli, Environmental Activism and the Urban Crisis: Baltimore, St. Louis, Chicago,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014); Mark W.T. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park
and the American Conservation Movement, (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1994);
Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 19451980, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Michael Egan, Barry Commoner and
the Science of Survival: The Remaking of American Environmentalism, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007);
Adam Rome, Bulldozers in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American
11

5

about how people attempted to control and shape spaces in order to improve their
environment, but they tend to talk past one another by looking at different contexts. They
rarely consider the possibility that their concerns might overlap. For example, when
whites fled to the suburban periphery during the mid-twentieth century, they did so to
create an environment that they believed would provide the highest possible standard of
living. Similarly, when people organized for smoke abatement, they also sought to create
a space with a similar quality of life. In each case, citizens sought to remedy their lived
environment from what they understood as a threat to their quality of life. Fleeing whites
saw African Americans as polluting their environment, much in the same way that clean
air advocates understood smog.
This dissertation considers white flight in tandem with environmental activism to
rethink the meaning of both. By unpacking the broader racial and class ramifications of
this environmental struggle against the freeway, I explore how activists’ definitions of
healthy public space privileged their own status as the stakeholders most invested in this
struggle. Yet, definitions of public good were not universal. Following the 1971
SCOTUS decision that stopped the construction of the freeway, the Memphis branch of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) passed a
resolution in support of the freeway through Overton Park. It claimed any deviation from
the proposed route or delayed construction would disproportionately affect black
Memphians by shifting the tax burden on African Americans and low-income residents,
increasing transit times to and from work, and risk destroying Memphis’s only integrated

Environmentalism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Adam Rome, The Genius of Earth
Day: How a 1970 Teach-In Unexpectedly Made the First Green Generation, (New York: Hill and Wang,
2013).

6

neighborhood, Vollintine-Evergreen.12 While not explicitly stated, the NAACP’s support
likely originated from a long-standing, well demonstrated concern: if the freeway did not
go through white neighborhoods, it would be rerouted through black ones.13 As the battle
over freeway construction through Overton Park demonstrates, definitions of public good
were fraught with racial and class meanings about what different spaces mean and whose
needs matter most.
By telling the story of Midtowners who sought to preserve their park, this
dissertation adds to our understanding of city neighborhoods that remained white at a
moment when many whites left for the suburbs. The scholarship on white flight during
the early postwar years tends to focus on whites who fled to the suburbs at the expense of
the residents who stayed behind in inner-city neighborhoods. Much of this literature
depicts white exodus from cities to the suburbs as a straight-line narrative: black people
appeared, and white people fled. Amanda I. Seligman pushes back against this
teleological narrative, arguing that this depiction ignores the many ways in which white
homeowners defended their segregated neighborhoods: mob violence, organized,
peaceful resistance, or legal maneuvering. 14 For Seligman, “flight” was the last step
whites took in response to a series of urban crises.

12

“NAACP gives support to I-40,” Tri-State Defender, September 23, 1972.

13
Raymond Mohl, “Planned Destruction: The Interstates and Central City Housing,” in From
Tenements to the Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America,
John F. Bauman, et al, eds., (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 226-245.
14
Amanda I. Seligman, Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West
Side, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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Much like Seligman’s white homeowners, Midtowners wielded a number of
protective strategies, primarily new environmental legislation. 15 On the surface CPOP’s
use of environmental legislation such as the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act to
hinder freeway construction through Overton Park might just look like capable lawyers
using the tools they have available to win their case. However, within the context of the
1970s, CPOP’s anti-freeway fight reflected citizen pushback against a technocratic state
armed with so-called experts who “knew what was best” for people in Midtown,
Memphis. The drawn-out litigation against the Tennessee State Highway Department and
the Department of Transportation was less an environmental battle and more an assertion
of local control in regard to freeway planning. 16 Put another way, Midtowners—not
highway men in Nashville, Tennessee or Washington, D.C.—knew best. The end result
was not flight to the suburbs, but a stand against “progress.” The Overton Park Freeway
Revolt was unique in that it did not simply get the freeway re-routed through another

15
This dissertation will also build upon the scholarship of white middle-class grassroots activism.
I will deviate from the standard conservative/progressive binary and emphasize Michael Stewart Foley’s
“front porch politics.” In Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s
and 1980s, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), he argues that instead of emphasizing peoples’ politics as
ideologically liberal or conservative, individuals’ “front porch politics,” or politics based on their own
experiences was the driving force behind their activism. Here people responded to events that affected their
daily lives and organized accordingly. For examples of white political activism within the
conservative/liberal binary see Lily Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation
of the Democratic Party, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors:
The Origins of the New Right, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sylvie Murray, The
Progressive Housewife: Community Activism in Suburban Queens, 1945-1965, (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003); and Michelle N. Nickerson, Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Postwar
Right, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
16

See Avila, Folklore of the Freeway; Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public
Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power 1945-1975, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993); Edward C. Banfield, “Don’t Abdicate to the Experts!,” Challenge Vol. 9, No. 4 (January, 1961), 3941; William W. Buzbee, Fighting Westway: Environmental Law, Citizen Activism, and the Regulatory War
That Transformed New York City, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Robert D. Lifset, Power on the
Hudson: Storm King Mountain and the Emergence of Modern American Environmentalism, (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 2014); and Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American
Culture, Society, and Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 2001).
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section of town; it halted the construction of Interstate 40 through the Midtown area
altogether, rerouting it through the northern leg of the I-240 loop.
My work also seeks to explain the creative strategies that activists used to
preserve the racial and class characteristics of their neighborhoods. In particular, they
relied on historic preservation legislation, which emerged in response to the horrors of
urban renewal and sought to protect historic structures in cities across the country. These
laws proved a powerful tool for activists seeking to maintain elite neighborhoods. Yet the
existing scholarship on historic preservation as it pertains to urban spaces does not
approach the topic as an instrument of neighborhood defense or environmental activism.
Early analyses on historic preservation explore its policy origins. 17 More recently,
scholars have provided case studies on neighborhood preservation efforts in order to
demonstrate a neighborhood district’s historical roots and track their successes and
failures as examples for other preservationists. 18 While these studies address the many
reasons why residents sought to preserve or revitalize their neighborhoods by obtaining a

17

See for example James A. Glass, The Beginnings of a New National Historic Preservation
Program, 1957-1969, (Nashville: American Association of State and Local History, 1990); David Hamer,
History in Urban Places: The Historic Districts of the United States, (Columbus: The Ohio State
University Press, 1998); Andrew Hurley, Beyond Preservation: Using Public History to Revitalize Inner
Cities, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); Richard Moe and Carter Wilkie, Changing Places:
Rebuilding Community in the Age of Sprawl, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997); and Stephanie
R. Ryberg, “Historic Preservation’s Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation and Planning in Midcentury
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historic district designation, they stay within the realm of public history by attempting to
commemorate historically vital neighborhoods. By contrast, I seek to unite the
scholarship on historic preservation with academic works on neighborhood defense and
environmental activism by examining historic preservation’s role in combating freeway
construction, mediating integration, and starting neighborhood-level revitalization
campaigns.19
This dissertation will also insert urban environmental activism into the
historiography on Memphis. As of now, the scholarship on twentieth-century Memphis
largely focuses on the reign of the city’s political boss Edward Hull Crump during the
first half of the twentieth century and black politics culminating with the 1968 sanitation
strike and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. 20 While this scholarship focuses on
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perhaps two of the biggest figures to pass through Memphis and the events surrounding
them, it has done so at the expense of the city’s history after 1968. More recently,
scholars began emphasizing Memphis’ 1970s history, with a particular focus on civil
rights and Black Power. 21 By moving away from Crump and King chronologically, these
works steer our attention away from elite figures and top-down political histories and
towards everyday-citizen activism. However, they pay little attention to Memphis’s
environment. This dissertation will add to the growing scholarship on post-1968
Memphis; it builds upon the recent trend of analyzing grassroots political activity, but
also inserts urban environmental activism, historic preservation, and neighborhood
defense into the literature.
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Dissertation Overview
Chapter one explains how the Midtown area developed around Overton Park as
Memphis’s first suburb during the first half of the twentieth century. As a product of the
Progressive Era, Overton Park anchored the development of what would become
Midtown, Memphis, by providing “an antidote to the degeneracy of city life.” Over time,
white Memphians left the downtown area along the Mississippi River and planted their
roots in the city’s first suburb. Midtown emerged as a densely packed and interconnected
social ecosystem whose residents relied on each other and Overton Park to survive. As
new residents to this area, these families developed communal ties with their neighbors
by participating in block clubs that brought schools and churches to their neighborhoods;
held social events like fundraisers and picnics; and organized when necessary to keep
black Memphians out of their areas. Businesses also emerged to deliver grocery, medical,
automotive, retail, and industrial services to Midtown residents and provided jobs within
walking distance of many workers. Recreational outlets like the horse track at the
fairgrounds and movie theaters scattered around the neighborhoods provided an outlet for
Midtowners to blow off steam. But nothing compared to Overton Park. Due to its
amenities and central location it quickly became Memphis’s backyard. On the eve of the
interstate era, the neighborhoods around Overton Park developed into a white middleclass enclave whose racial and class status provided the economic and political
foundation that allowed anti-freeway activists to take on the freeway. To save the park
was to preserve the world they created.
Chapter two demonstrates the national, state, and local forces that brought an
urban freeway to Memphis, Tennessee, forcing white Midtowners to organize in defense
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of their park. At the federal level, highway proponents believed interstate highways were
central to postwar American society: they were key to national defense and fueled the
economy. The state of Tennessee understood interstate highways in a similar light.
However, state highway officials staked the nation’s future on Tennessee’s highway
system. Given the state’s unique location—it sat between the North and the South,
bordered five states and the Mississippi River, and “owned” one of the nation’s busiest
all-weather river crossings over the Mississippi River in Memphis—Tennessee’s
roadways were the lynchpin to the nation’s economy. Yet at the local level, highways
were symbols of democracy. Governmental reform organizations like the Civic Research
Committee staked Memphis’s future on highway construction. While highway
construction in Memphis served national security and economic purposes, it promised
Memphians something bigger; interstate highways provided the means to overthrow
decades of machine politics and reform local governance.
Chapter three explores the politics of the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park’s
(CPOP). First, it looks at the origins of CPOP’s anti-freeway activism. As
“representatives of the family—mothers and housewives protecting children, home life,
and neighborhoods,” CPOP’s female activists organized to maintain control over their
families by protecting what they saw as the nucleus of their community, Overton Park. 22
In particular, the park was integral to children’s development: CPOP activists understood
the zoo and Old Forest as prime educational spaces for children to learn about the natural
world. They also believed freeway construction would heap additional burdens upon
women. From making it physically more difficult to get children to the zoo, to equating
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interstate construction to a sexual assault on women’s bodies, female anti-freeway
activists’ gendered view of Overton Park encapsulated many of their fears: freeway
construction forced women to make additional sacrifices in a male-dominated age of
speed. Second, the threat of losing Overton Park particularly encouraged women to
organize politically. While CPOP consisted of both men and women, women did the
work; they pounded the pavement to circulate petitions, organized rallies, and
corresponded with local, state, and federal officials. In particular, they tapped into a
national network of anti-freeway activists from Dayton, Ohio, to New Orleans,
Louisiana, and environmental organizations like the Sierra Club and Audubon Society, to
wage their successful battle against the State of Tennessee and Department of
Transportation (DOT). The result? A successful legal victory at the U.S. Supreme Court
that provided a landmark environmental decision which they wielded to eventually defeat
the bureaucratic, economic, and intellectual elites, whom they believed sought to usurp
their local and familial control. It was CPOP’s first victory towards creating an island of
white in an emerging black city.
Chapter four adds to our understanding of the decline of post-WWII experts in
American public life by tracking CPOP’s legal strategy against the State of Tennessee
and DOT. CPOP was part of a national wave of anti-expert fervor that sought to maintain
their white space by wresting freeway planning authority away from the roadbuilders and
return it to the people. The public’s confidence in government had been on the decline
since the 1960s. Throughout the 1970s roadbuilders’ previously unchallenged place as
technocratic experts in American society gave way to grassroots anti-freeway activists
who wielded federal legislation and their own technical expertise. Armed with their
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recent SCOTUS victory, CPOP took the State of Tennessee and the DOT to task in the
court of law. Activists’ legal team repeatedly demonstrated to the court that roadbuilders
did not consider alternative routes. Additionally, the passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act in 1969 allowed CPOP to use the route’s 1972 and 1976
Environmental Impact Statements to repeatedly demonstrate that freeway construction
would cause irreparable harm to Overton Park. In 1978, pro-freeway forces even sought
to rewrite a freeway appropriation bill that exempted the Overton Park route from
existing environmental legislation, but it did not get out of committee. From 1969 to
1981, freeway advocates failed to build a freeway through Overton Park; their data ran
afoul of on the ground concerns for a treasured natural and cultural resource and CPOP
who wielded new environmental protections. Freeway planners’ repeated attempts to get
the interstate routed through Overton Park in Memphis was their last gasp at protecting
and exerting their previously unchallenged place in American society.
The final chapter of this dissertation tells the story of the Evergreen and
Vollintine-Evergreen neighborhoods associations, which used the 1966 National Historic
Preservation Act to inhibit freeway construction and launch neighborhood-level
revitalization programs to recreate the white space they almost lost. Evergreen residents
placed their neighborhood on the National Register of Historic Places in the early 1980s
as an additional hurdle in case the State of Tennessee tried to build on the abandoned I-40
corridor that ran through their neighborhood. Similarly, Vollintine-Evergreen residents
placed its neighborhood on the register; the I-40 northern alternate ran directly through
the neighborhood. Each of these neighborhood preservation campaigns activated its
residents to invest themselves in neighborhood-level revitalization. Evergreen lobbied
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city and state officials to amend existing legislation in order to undertake a housing in-fill
campaign to stitch their neighborhood back together after being decimated by the now
defunct freeway construction. Vollintine-Evergreen, by contrast developed a community
development corporation to renovate dilapidated houses for low income Memphians and
created the city’s only integrated neighborhood in the process. In both instances, citizenactivists became their own urban planning experts and revitalized their respective
neighborhoods from the ground up. Despite these victories, the historic preservation
districts they created, and that many other Midtown neighborhoods copied, created a
white enclave in a majority black city.
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Chapter 2: Making Midtown, Memphis, 1898-1955

Introduction
On September 17, 1957, three hundred members representing the Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park descended upon the Memphis City Commission chambers to
protest the construction of a freeway though their beloved Overton Park in Midtown,
Memphis. This outcry was a response to the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads’ (BPR)
publication, the General Location of National System of Interstate Highways, Including
all Additional Routes at Urban Areas Designated in September, 1955, that proposed an
urban freeway around and through Memphis, linking the city with Nashville, Tennessee,
to the east, Jackson, Mississippi, to the south, Little Rock, Arkansas, and St. Louis,
Missouri, to the west and north west respectfully. The soon-to-be-named Interstate-40
would enter Shelby County from the east, running parallel to State Highway 90, and enter
the city of Memphis at the northwest corner of the Shelby County Penal Farm. It would
then run along the south side of Summer Avenue until it met Broad Avenue on its way to
the central business district (CBD) and terminated near Auction Avenue where a
proposed trans-Mississippi River bridge would be built at a future date. 1 Freeway
advocates argued this east/west route would alleviate Memphis’ traffic congestion by
moving residents quickly from the eastern suburbs to the Central Business District
downtown.2 The City Commission sought to approve this route quickly. In an urgent
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Van Pritchartt, Jr., “Expressway Beauty Will Be Shown,” Press Scimitar, May 2, 1955; Robert
Gray, “Foes of Expressway Clamor: Keep Overton Park Intact,” Commercial Appeal, September 18, 1957.
“Memphis,” http://www.ajfroggie.com/roads/yellowbook/memphis.jpg, accessed on October 12, 2016.
2
Robert Gray, “Sweeping Expressway System To Criss-Cross and Loop City Wins Speedy
Commission OK,” Commercial Appeal, September 8, 1955.
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tone, Mayor Frank Tobey stated, “We are going to have to go ahead with this plan just as
soon as Federal funds are available” since he believed an expressway was one of
Memphis’ most pressing needs. 3 While this expressway served local needs, it did so at
the expense of those living in the freeway’s path. 4
Midtown Memphians, however, did not see the east/west route in the same way.
While they directed most of their ire towards the physical destruction freeway
construction would cause the park, their anger revealed an existential crisis. The interstate
would enter Overton Park from the east, running along the existing Memphis Street
Railway trolley line, before swinging southward and exiting the park on the west along
Overton Park Avenue as it plowed through the Evergreen neighborhood on its way
downtown. According to Harland Bartholomew and Associates engineer William Pollard,
the interstate would consume “about 30 acres” of Overton Park, desecrating the area’s
biggest social, cultural, and educational resource—the park was home to a nine-hole golf
course, a zoo, the Brooks Museum of Art, the Memphis College of Art, and
approximately 170 acres of old-growth forest.5 Midtown resident Warren Webb
wondered how a city could grow so big that it “no longer care[d] for simple things,” and
blamed a variety of distant experts for the park’s impending destruction. In his mind,
legislators, planners, and bureaucrats far away in Nashville and Washington D.C. reached
into one of Memphis’ most sacred spaces, and without knowing anything about its
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patient, ripped out its heart. 6 If Overton Park was Midtown’s heart, and the surrounding
neighborhoods its body, freeway planners were about to conduct an invasive and delicate
surgery using a hatchet instead of a scalpel. Webb’s concerns pointed to a perceived
reality, without a vibrant and flourishing park to anchor the community, it would slowly
die. It was the planners’ lack of knowledge about Overton Park and its surrounding
community that sparked an urban revolt against the State of Tennessee and the Federal
government that spanned four decades.

Proposed I-40 route looking west, Box 80604, Memphis Press Scimitar Morgue Files, Preservation and
Special Collections Department, University Libraries, University of Memphis
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Overton Park’s Origins
Overton Park was born out of early twentieth-century Progressivism. Led by a
new breed of civic leaders like Robert C. Brinkley, Robert Galloway, Judge J.B.
McFarland, Robert Snowden, and others, the Greater Memphis Movement emerged
during this period. In response to the yellow fever epidemic of the late 1870s that
decimated the city’s social, economic, and political infrastructure, these Progressives
sought to annex the city’s surrounding areas and extend gas, water, sewerage, and
establish a network of parks. 7 While Memphis’ leaders spoke with one voice regarding
city services, McFarland believed parks were key to city growth. “No city will be greatly
populous or truly great without proper provision for the pleasurable and the esthetic,” he
proclaimed. And with the city’s yellow fever epidemic in mind, he believed “Pleasure
grounds and places of amusement are as much of a necessity to the health and happiness
of a people as pavements and sewers.”8 Thus, Memphis’ progressives moved towards
creating a park commission charged with developing Memphis’ first park system. 9
Prior to the passage of park legislation Mayor John J. Williams sought Frederick
Law Olmsted’s assistance—the nation’s leading landscape architect and creator of New
York City’s Central Park. Williams hoped Olmsted would help him draft enabling
legislation, organize the Park Commission, and design Memphis’ park system. His son
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John C. Olmsted visited Memphis in his stead and toured the city to assess park
development. He identified a large swath of land along Riverside Road south of the city
and Lea’s Woods on Memphis’ eastern periphery as the best two tracts of land upon
which to begin the city’s park system. Olmsted’s suggestions mirrored those already held
by William’s administration since “The concurrence of Olmsted’s opinions with those of
the progressives achieved its desired effect in jelling the support of the public and press
for the development of the park system.”10
In the fall of 1898, Mayor Williams pushed forward legislation that created the
Memphis Park Commission and the city’s first modern park system. 11 After acquiring
Overton Lea’s east Memphis property, the Memphis Park Commission moved quickly to
sign a landscape architect to plan the city’s park system. At Robert Brinkley’s suggestion,
the Commission pursued George Edward Kessler of Kansas City. Born in Dallas, Texas,
in 1862, he studied landscape gardening, botany, and civil engineering at the University
of Jena in what is now the Free State of Thuringia in central Germany. Following
graduation in 1882, Kessler returned to the United States (US) and corresponded with
Frederick Law Olmsted, who introduced him to a job in Kansas. Initially contracted to
develop a private park at Merriam, Kansas, real-estate developer William R. Nelson hired
Kessler in 1889 to plan Kansas City’s public park system. According to historian John
Linn Hopkins, Kessler’s Kansas City plan became a “landmark in the history of
landscape architecture and urban planning—a system of parks and public spaces located
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throughout the city, both large and small, connected by a series of parkways and
landscaped boulevards.”12 Based on his work in Kansas City, the Memphis Park
Commission signed Kessler to a three-year contract and tasked him with redesigning and
redeveloping the public squares and promenade in downtown Memphis; developing a set
of small parks throughout the city; and designing a landscaped boulevard system that
connected the city’s soon-to-be-developed large parks, Riverside Park downtown and
Overton Park in the east. 13

Memphis, Tenn. Park Department, “General Plan of Overton Park,” (1901)
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Overton Park quickly became the park system’s “crown jewel,” serving as a
respite for Memphis’ white urban dwellers on the suburban periphery. 14 It contained
within its 342 acres a pavilion (1902), nine-hole golf course (1904), zoo (1905),
playground (1908), the Brooks Museum of Art (1916), the Overton Park Shell (1936), the
Memphis Academy of Arts (1959), and 170 acres of old-growth forest. In his history of
Memphis, John Preston Young described Overton Park as full of “Rare wild plants, vines,
grasses and flowers spring[ing] up in bewildering luxuriance.” It was so lush with flora
that “one buried in the great wilderness can discern no evidence that despoiling
civilization exists anywhere near.”15 Building on Young’s description, Harland
Bartholomew, in his 1924 comprehensive plan, pointed to the necessity of maintaining
and increasing the number of large parks. He argued these outdoor spaces “should be
highly naturalistic. They should embrace and preserve for the city dweller types of native
topography…They afford the contacts with wild nature so necessary in this age of
confinement and artificiality” and “should offer wholesome retreat from the noisy,
oppressive city.”16 Couple these amenities with Overton Park’s easy access by road or
streetcar, its physical distance from low-income white and African American
communities along with downtown industrial sites, and the park outpaced Riverside as
the city’s most popular public space. 17
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Robert Galloway, realizing the business potential of creating a subdivision
adjacent to this oasis of green, moved towards developing one of Memphis’ first street
car suburbs: Evergreen. While speaking about Kessler’s plan in Kansas City, but
undoubtedly true for Memphis, Hopkins argues “Kessler’s foresight in [his] plan,” and
Galloway’s keen eye for business, “was the realization that civic improvement in the
form of parks and park-like boulevards enhanced the desirability and value of residential
property, thus spurring the economic development of a city and increasing tax revenues
to repay public investment.”18 By establishing the Evergreen neighborhood, Galloway
fostered one of the city’s earliest twentieth-century examples of an urban focal point,
which according to the tenets of the City Beautiful movement “would inspire civic virtue
and loyalty, reduce social disorder, and help [Memphis] achieve cultural parity with [its]
European competitors.”19 By creating this urban focal point, both Kessler and Galloway
set in motion a long and powerful process of place making. Place, however, would not
make itself; it required throngs of Memphians living near Overton Park forming
attachments with this newly developed green space. 20

Midtown Neighborhoods
Midtown Memphis, or the neighborhoods that surround Overton Park, originated
as part of the same Greater Memphis Movement that gave birth to the city’s park system.
Following his election to the Mayor’s office in 1898, John J. Williams quickly moved to
annex the area to Memphis’ east. In 1899, the city extended its eastern boundary to
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Cooper Street, which engulfed Rozelle, Annesdale, a portion of the Cooper-Young
neighborhood, and the incorporated towns of Idlewild, Madison Heights, and Manila.
This territorial expansion was then the single greatest land grab in Memphis’ history. It
increased the city’s square mileage from 12.13 to 16.8 and its population to 98,522. Later
in 1909, the city expanded eastward once more to Trezvant (now East Parkway),
absorbing the rest of Cooper-Young and raised the city’s population to 128,331.
Memphis absorbed the rest of what would become Midtown in 1929—the area’s
approximate borders included Vollintine Avenue to the north, East Parkway to the east,
Southern Avenue to the south, and Cleveland Street to the west. 21 These series of moves
laid the groundwork for the extension of water, gas, sewer, and transportation
infrastructure to Memphis’ eastern border to encourage residential and commercial
expansion and development. What resulted was the rise of Memphis’ street car suburbs.
Historian Stephanie Bower argues three intersecting factors gave rise to the
streetcar suburb. First, was the development of a “park system that created scenic
expanses of woods and fields at the edge of the city.”22 By plotting and subdividing lots
next to Overton Park, Robert Galloway and his fellow real estate developers tapped into
Memphians’ desire for a rural and agrarian past within a modern industrial society.
Kessler’s wide boulevards, tree lined parkways, and an “artfully contrived natural
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setting,” was, in the words of Wanda Rushing, “an antidote to the degeneracy of city life,
and a substitute for the familiar domestic gathering.”23 An advertisement for Finley W.
Faxon’s subdivision in Evergreen sold the neighborhood to people who prized “beautiful
and attractive surroundings as well as the comforts and conveniences of the city.”
Additionally, the Summer Speedway (renamed North Parkway in 1910) proved a big
draw for potential residents who enjoyed racing horses during their leisure time. This
speedway was a one mile stretch of dirt that ran in between the two paved driveways
reserved for regular horse and buggy traffic along Overton Park’s northern border. Real
estate developers recognized its value quickly. Faxon’s Speedway Terrace, a new
subdivision in Vollintine-Evergreen just north of the speedway, traded in its proximity to
this well developed, and quite expensive, amenity. 24
Midtown’s growth also depended upon the rise of real estate professionals,
Bower’s second factor. Historians credit Robert Galloway with leading the development
of Evergreen and what would become the Midtown area. He was, however, one of many
individuals that sought to profit upon Overton Park. In her study on Chicago suburban
development, Ann Durkin Keating points out that real estate developers recognized early
on suburbanites’ need for city services. 25 For example, Martha Nunnally recalls that in
1910 when the Rozelle area was under development, builders “were using the newest
things in the construction.” They laid out improved—and later paved—roads and
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outfitted new homes with electricity and indoor plumbing. 26 In nearby Annesdale Park,
developers also constructed concrete curbs, paved sidewalks, and installed gas lamps to
illuminate the neighborhood at night. Belvedere Boulevard even had a storm-water
culvert installed to keep the roads from flooding. 27 Following annexation, the city took
over responsibility for maintaining Rozelle and Annesdale Park’s streets and ensured its
residents tapped into Memphis’ electrical grid and sewer system.
Real estate developers used spectacle to advertise their new developments. In a
full-page article adorning the Commercial Appeal’s arts section, developers H.W.
Brennan and E.L. Boyle revealed their residential vision to prospective homebuyers in
Memphis. An artist’s rendering of their development, Belvedere Boulevard, depicted a
3,300ft boulevard stretching from Union Avenue south towards Central Avenue lined
with shade trees on its eastern and western sides. Interspersed between the grass covered
partitions dividing the street stood water fountains, pushing the city’s crystalline artesian
well water several feet into the air. Erected at the neighborhood’s east and west terminus
stood a white stone entryway signifying to a potential buyer that this was indeed a
“beautiful view.”28 Not to be outdone, the Annesdale Park developers held a watermelon
festival to mark the neighborhood’s opening (located to the southwest of Belvedere
Boulevard) and sale of its lots. The company chartered the Union Avenue streetcar line to
ferry interested buyers and their families from downtown to the subdivision. Upon
arrival, developers treated the spectators to several speakers, music from Arnold’s Band,
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and distributed fifteen wagonloads of watermelon—each adorned with the company
logo—to those in attendance. Despite the festival’s seemingly broad appeal, Caruthers
Ewing clearly stated who belonged in this neighborhood. “No impoverished nor plebian
foot could trespass on the sacred precepts in the future” and claimed that no man “could
become an owner of one of these lots unless he could…build a white stone mansion.”
Annesdale Park soon became home to Memphis’s most elite residents. The subdivision’s
developers created the idea that Annesdale Park was a beacon on a hill; it was so grand,
so beautiful, so perfect, that even the alley connecting Peabody and Harbert Avenues was
called “paradise.”29
The final factor that led to Midtown’s development was the extension of
transportation systems into its neighborhoods. In 1910 Robert Galloway and W.P.
Chapman convinced the Memphis Street Railway Company (MSRC) to extend its Poplar
Avenue line from downtown into the Evergreen neighborhood. This trolley line went
north on Dewey (now Evergreen) to Galloway and connected with the Raleigh Springs
line, which ran through Lea Woods before heading north to Raleigh Springs. With this
route, commuters could catch a ride on Poplar Avenue, Evergreen, or Galloway for their
destination downtown or to the north, with only a short walk home. 30 The Cooper-Young
extension brought dual benefits to the neighborhood. The MSRC increased passengers’
safety by constructing a “subway” beneath the Union Railway and Nashville,
Chattanooga, and St. Louis line at Central Avenue. The Commercial Appeal claimed the

29
“The Annesdale Park Company,” Commercial Appeal, October 13, 1903; “The Annesdale Park
Company,” Commercial Appeal, October 14, 1903; “Watermelon is Opened,” Commercial Appeal,
October 15, 1903; Magness, Past Times, 253.
30
Bette B. Tilly with Pat Faudree, Yesterday’s Evergreen, Today’s Mid-Memphis, (Memphis:
Metropolitan Inter-Faith Association, 1980), 13, 34.

28

depressed trolley line would eliminate a “death dealing” grade crossing. Second, trolley
service into Cooper-Young turned the neighborhood into a popular social and
commercial center. During horse racing season at nearby Montgomery Park (now the
fairgrounds), trolley cars arrived packed with spectators. Given the neighborhood’s
increased accessibility, by 1915 the neighborhood became a commercial hub, home to
two grocery stores, two doctors, a pharmacy, shoe repair shop, a barber shop, along with
light industry such as coal yard and an auto company.
As late as 1938, MSRC operated eight transit lines that serviced the
neighborhoods around Overton Park. For example, the Poplar-Peabody line ran a “U”
shaped path from the Poplar Avenue and Cooper Street intersection west through the
central business district, and back east on Peabody Avenue towards Cooper Street. If
downtown was not one’s desired destination, residents could catch an extension line that
took them into the city’s far eastern periphery. Cooper-Young resident Longstreet
Heiskell believed the “streetcar line changed the [neighborhoods’] whole atmosphere.”
Everything anyone did was in connection to the trolley. 31 These three factors, the
planning and development of Memphis’ park system with Overton Park at the center, the
extension of city services into new residential developments, and the extension of and
suburbanites’ increased ridership on Memphis’ suburbanites fueled Midtown’s growth.
Midtown reflected its residents’ aspirations. The United States Census Bureau did
not release tract-level data for Memphis until the 1950 census. This lack of data makes it
very difficult to determine who began to populate the neighborhoods around Overton
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Park. However, based on qualitative information, we can make an educated guess as to
who moved to this area from the turn of the century to 1950. According to historian
Becky M. Nicolaides, property ownership provided a path to independence for people
with meager incomes. 32 In the Rozelle neighborhood, homeowners typically purchased
lots on credit since few had enough cash to buy a plot of land outright. For example,
when the Dowdy family moved to the area in 1923, they made a small down payment and
paid thirty-five dollars a month over the next ten years for their house on Kyle Street.
Other families often bought a lot, built two rooms, and added on the home as they could.
As a result, a hodgepodge of styles developed. Additionally, to remain economically
stable, families added outbuildings such as greenhouses to grow their own vegetables to
feed their families or sell the surplus for money. While not as common, cows, a source of
milk and manure for vegetable production, roamed the neighborhood grazing on grass
and shrubs.33 Rozelle residents turned “their property into a veritable suburban
homestead” to survive.34
Conversely, the neighborhoods along North Parkway were home to the city’s
elite. The luxurious homes in Evergreen along North Parkway best demonstrate the
wealth concentrated in this area. For example, at the southeast corner of Hawthorne and
North Parkway sat 1924’s most unusual home. This structure had a brick exterior with a
colorful tile roof and a swimming pool in the basement. The lower level also contained a
dancing room, game room, servant’s room, and a four-car garage, while the main floor
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featured a ballroom, living room, dining room, breakfast room, five bedrooms, and three
baths.35 Never to be outdone, Evergreen’s own Robert Galloway, erected Paisley Hall—
known as the “most pretentious residence in the city”—on Overton Park Avenue.36
Named after his father’s hometown in Scotland, this three-story 25,000 square foot
mansion sat upon an entire city block. While its overall value is unknown, following a
fire in 1917, area newspapers reported Galloway insured the interior for $100,000. 37
Taken together the neighborhoods around Overton Park were home to aspiring
homeowners and the city’s elite.
While the Midtown area was home to people in search of self-sufficiency and
luxury, it mostly reflected its residents’ middle-class aspirations. Nothing demonstrates
this more than the area’s most ubiquitous home style, the bungalow. 38 Much like the
development of Overton Park and the surrounding neighborhoods, the bungalow was the
architectural manifestation of the progressive movement. It was an outright rejection of
the Victorian era: “simple, informal, and efficient.” As historian Clifford Edward Clark,
Jr. points out, the bungalow’s most conspicuous feature was its wide, low-pitched roof
usually connected to a front porch that spanned the width of the house. The roof further
broadened the home by constructing overhangs that shaded the windows, giving it a cozy
feeling. Much like the Greater Memphis Movement, its design brought people closer to
nature. The front porch inserted the home into its natural surroundings. One architect
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called the bungalow the “ideal home for the lover of out-of-doors…a house whose
atmosphere is…that of the woods and fields.” Additionally, architects and builders used
natural, roughhewn materials so it would blend into its site. Perhaps even more integral to
the bungalow’s design was its construction. Many came pre-fabricated; simply purchase
and ship the material to your lot and you, or a construction crew, could put your new
home together. The combination of design, access, and affordability opened suburban life
to younger and upwardly mobile families. Ultimately, the bungalow was a vehicle for
expanding middle-class housing to those with moderate incomes, and typically unable to
move to the suburbs.39
Black Memphis’ geographical footprint expanded with its white neighbors. By the
early twentieth century, black Memphis developed much differently than other southern
urban areas like Atlanta and Richmond. While both cities contained easily identifiable
black enclaves, Memphis’s black population occupied twenty-eight percent of the city’s
residential land at a rate of twenty-one people per acre. Nearly every census tract
contained some black residents. Despite this reality, city planners did not take up an
exclusive racial zoning policy following the publication of Harland Bartholomew’s 1924
master plan. Instead, city leaders let racial separation happen “naturally.” Given the glut
of undeveloped land to the east of the central business district, which existed thanks to
the city’s aggressive annexation plan from 1899 through 1919 and the subsequent
housing boom between 1922 and 1930, white Memphians steadily migrated to these
newly developed areas. Thus, the city saw a seventy percent increase in black
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homeownership between 1910 and 1920 as black residents occupied formerly white
neighborhoods. As historians Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser point out, “As long
as black population growth could be accommodated through infiltration into older
neighborhoods to the north and south of Beale Street and inside the parkway perimeter,
white Memphians saw no need to depart from their traditional reliance on natural zoning
to ensure racial separation.” Despite this “natural zoning,” Midtown residents were evervigilant in protecting their newfound middle-class status.40
Throughout Midtown’s development, its white residents sought to protect their
communities from outsiders. In her study on turn-of-the-century housing in Chicago,
historian Margaret Garb points to white homeowners banding together to keep African
Americans out of their neighborhoods under the “banner of preserving property values.”41
In 1926, Stonewall residents—a neighborhood on the western edge of the Evergreen
development and named after the stone walls demarcating its entrance on Poplar
Avenue—turned a suspicious eye towards a large swath of undeveloped property in the
middle of their upscale subdivision. Wary of black residents in the area, Sam Williamson
approached the Memphis Park Commission and asked it to purchase the land “in order to
prevent the sale and use of the property for Negro tenement homes.”42 The Commission
agreed to purchase the land, but only if Evergreen residents raised half the purchase price.
They did, which led to the creation of Williamson Park. By 1935 the Jackson Boulevard
Civic Club, reportedly “the largest civic club in Memphis,” boasted proudly of its
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accomplishments. According to its brochure, it was responsible for extending the Jackson
Avenue trolley line into its neighborhood, founding the Vollintine School, and perhaps
most importantly, it “defeated [a] movement to erect [a] Negro College” within its
borders.43
While community block clubs organized to keep their neighborhoods white, real
estate developers used restrictive covenants ensure racial homogeneity. As historian
Thomas Sugrue points out on his study of postwar Detroit, these covenants included
prohibitions on commercial activity, rental units, signage, multi-family dwellings, and
“the purchase and occupancy of homes by racial and ethnic minorities.” By prohibiting
non-whites from owning or occupying property in newly developed subdivisions through
these covenants, developers and home owners all but guaranteed federal backing of home
construction and the creation and retention of high home values. 44
This pattern played out in Midtown during the 1940s. For example, on the north
side of the Vollintine-Evergreen area, real estate developer Ben P. Dlugach added
approximately nine lots to his Avalon View Neighborhood along Avalon Street near the
intersection of Brown Avenue just north of the Vollintine School. Built into the
subdivision’s initial plan was a restrictive racial covenant. “No race or nationality other
than the white race shall use or occupy any building on any lot except that this covenant
shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race or nationality
employed by owner or tenant,” the covenant demanded. To hold property owners to task
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in the event anyone violated this covenant, their neighbors could sue area residents to
prevent them from selling to a black family “or to recover damages or other dues for such
violation.”45 While this covenant was to remain in effect from February 12, 1941 until
January 1, 1967, the Supreme Court invalidated this practice with its 1948 decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer. By 1940 black Memphians continued to live all over the city,
however Midtown residents and developers’ segregationist practices pushed black
residents north of Jackson Avenue along what would become Vollintine-Evergreen’s
northern border and south of Poplar Avenue, especially along the Southern Railway
tracks on the south end of the Cooper-Young neighborhood.46 Early in Midtown’s
history, its residents used legal and extralegal means to keep their neighborhoods white.
On the eve of the interstate era, the neighborhoods around Overton Park
developed into a white and solidly middle-class enclave. By 1950, white Memphians
overwhelmingly populated Midtown—53,556 compared to the area’s 4,421 black
residents. It was also a well-educated part of town as 14,310 of its residents were high
school graduates with 11,035 completing at least three years of college; nearly 5,000 of
which held a college degree. Compare this to the city’s educational median at 9.7 years of
school, and its residents’ occupational choices become clear. Most people worked in
white collar trades: 4,893 held management positions, 4,276 were professionals, the bulk
of the jobs fell into clerical at 7,830 (with women occupying most of these), and skilled
workers came in at 3,017. The combination of high educational attainment and career
choices correlates with a median income that outstrips the city average at $3,118 to
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$2,351. Even though more people rented homes as opposed to owning them—likely due
to the dearth of postwar housing opportunities—Midtown home values stood almost
thirty-two percent higher than the city median: $11,796 to $7,965. 47 Midtown’s racial and
class status provided the economic and political foundation that allowed anti-freeway
activists to take on the freeway.

Creating a Community
Midtown’s physical development led to its residents forming attachments with
their neighbors, neighborhoods, and Overton Park. This process was relatively easy given
the area’s homogeneity. As a group of largely white middle-class homeowners (or at least
those of middle-class aspirations), they united around turning the Midtown area into a
community. Residents developed block clubs to bring much-needed municipal services to
their neighborhoods; they conducted their daily business in the commercial
establishments near their homes; and spent their leisure time in Midtown itself. On the
eve of the interstate era in the early 1950s, Midtown residents developed a deep sense of
place, of responsibility.

Social Organization
Throughout the first half of the twentieth-century, Midtown’s smallest form of
social organization, the family, developed in the home. In his memoir about growing up
in 1950s Memphis, Dan Conaway reflects on visiting his grandparents’ house near
Overton Park for Sunday dinner. Conaway remembers the family history lessons. It was
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at one such dinner where he learned about “some Victorian urge no one could explain to
me,” where his great-aunt dressed his father up in girls’ clothes. “On special occasions,”
Conaway writes, his father “would board the elevator in the Peabody Hotel wearing his
dress, flourishing his cane and puffing on a cigarette filled with an herbal concoction.” At
these same dinners, Conaway first heard the word “ruckus” from his great-uncle Yank.
Recalling fondly, Conaway claimed that “no matter how innocently Yank’s stories began,
they all ended in a ruckus.” Yank would spin yarns about Boss Crump’s voting fraud,
being rowdy at the racetrack, and unscrupulous encounters with Irishmen in the Pinch
district. When Yank was not around, Conaway’s father would round out the stories: there
was the one about Yank felling the mule in the coal yard, Yank knocking a man through a
plate glass window at Sears and Roebuck, and Yank fighting his way out of an alley on
Beale Street. Despite Yank’s shenanigans, he would escort Conaway and his brother to
Overton Park, where they rode a small ferris wheel and merry-go-round as he stood by
watching. For such an iconoclast, rabble rouser, and ruckus-maker, Conaway felt secure
in his uncle’s presence. Which makes sense, Yank was family after all. 48
For every tight knit family relishing the security of 1950s America, there were
preceding generations trying to hold it all together. For example, in 1911 Walter
McCallen, a widower with three young children, lived with his parents at 2092 Oliver
Avenue in the Cooper-Young neighborhood. Following his wife’s death, he leaned on his
sister Katherine to help raise his children. His family’s support sustained him through this
difficult transition. By 1920 McCallen appeared to have recovered from his first wife’s
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death; he remarried, rented a house around the corner from his parents at 972 Nellie Bly
(later Cox Street), and worked as an insurance agent. During World War II, households
returned to their old ways as rationing took hold in support of the war effort. Residents
responded to shortages by creating Victory Gardens in their backyards. Some people
planted vegetables while others opted to keep chickens and goats as sources of protein.
One resident recalls a thriving farmers market in the neighborhood, where people sold
their excess goods or purchased vegetables and livestock. The family may have been
what got people through difficult times, but it was in the home was where this support
took place.49
The home was also the physical space where families forged relationships with
their neighbors. Early in Cooper-Young’s development, Captain C.L. Harris’ home at the
corner of Cooper Street and Young Avenue lorded over what would quickly become the
neighborhood’s commercial hub. Even though it sat upon three acres of land surrounded
by an iron fence, neighbors enjoyed walking by and speaking with Captain Harris. While
the contents of these conversations are unknown, Harris likely served as a conduit for
neighborhood goings on. With up to four generations under one roof and family members
holding important positions in the neighborhood—his son-in-law was a doctor—Harris’
home was a one-stop-shop for community information. Homes also provided
opportunities for families to entertain strangers. Dan Conaway writes of a vagabond
named Jack that visited his grandparents, and “in the best tradition of southern
houseguests, stayed for months.” Jack bonded with Conaway’s grandparents over bridge,
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“the preferred social activity,” and reportedly grew very close to Dodo, Conaway’s
grandmother. The two developed an intimate relationship; Jack was deaf and
communicated via notes. Conaway imagined “the two of them exchanging first odd bits
of information, then private codas of appreciation, finally admissions of things that may
well have been as unavoidable as they were illicit.” While Conaway’s memory of his
grandmother’s relationship with a stranger was taboo in comparison to Harris, one thing
was certain: the home was where people forged the most intimate of relationships. 50
Stepping away from the family, the most active form of social organization in the
neighborhoods surrounding Overton Park were block clubs. In her study on Chicago
block clubs, Amanda I. Seligman argues they organized in response to a perceived deficit
of municipal services to address symptoms of urban problems. As voluntary
organizations with shallow pockets, they were not capable of addressing root causes.
Block clubs identified issues and defined goals they could accomplish on their own, such
as picking up trash on the side of the road. However, they sometimes fixed problems that
fell under cities’ purviews. In these instances, block clubs pressed local governments for
municipal services. But fixing local problems does not alone explain why people
organized block clubs; residents also sought to be a part of a community. As a result,
social events like dances and carnivals were part of a block club’s responsibility.
Seligman argues that “when block club members worked together on common goals, they
were operating from a special relationship; they were acting as neighbors.” These actions
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amounted to the creation of a tight knit community organization that united to protect
home values and improve their residents’ quality of life. 51
The Evergreen Club formed in 1909 to bring churches and schools to the
Evergreen neighborhood. Recognizing the community’s need for a church, it brought
Evergreen Presbyterian to the area in 1916. It was as an ecumenical church serving
people of all faiths, bridging the gap until a more diverse set of churches formed. As one
of the first religious institutions in the neighborhood, its membership grew rapidly.
Quickly outgrowing its original location on the southeast corner of Autumn Avenue and
Dickinson Street, the church purchased 9.7 acres across from Southwestern in 1947 and
began holding services in 1950. Reflecting its growth, the new sanctuary sat 1,000
congregants and contained the church’s offices. It also had classrooms and a 500-seat
fellowship hall. By 1953, the church provided kindergarten education with a steady
enrollment of thirty students per year. By the 1970s, the church became closely
intertwined with the larger Vollintine-Evergreen community, offering a mothers’ day out,
summer reading program, summer recreational program, a food pantry, clothing closet,
and served as the Metropolitan Interfaith Association’s headquarters.52
The Evergreen Club also brought the Snowden School to its neighborhood. The
club pressed the Memphis Board of Education to build a school for Evergreen’s children.
Brinkley Snowden agreed to donate the land for construction if the Evergreen Club could
prove the neighborhood had at least one hundred seventy-five school age children; a task
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made easier by including “some fifteen or twenty gypsy children camped at the present
site of Southwestern.” The Board of Education built the school at the northeastern corner
of North McLean Boulevard and North Parkway in 1910, which became one of the best
schools in the city. It added to the original structure over the years to keep up with the
area’s growing population. Six classrooms were added in 1913, a cafeteria and
auditorium in 1939, a 7,000-square foot multi-purpose space was added in 1955, and a
new gym in 1957.
Snowden Elementary developed into a community center. In the early 1920s,
Snowden’s principal A.C. Nute developed the school’s performing arts program.
Snowden’s fifty-children “Kiddie Band” performed music for their classmates, while an
interpretive dance troupe performed for their parents. The school later staged this “folk
festival” across the street in Overton Park where five hundred students “tripped across an
outdoor stage of natural beauty…in a lovely series of interpretative dances” in front of an
audience comprised mostly of proud mothers. Taken together, the Evergreen Club’s
organizational efforts to bring a church and school to a growing community demonstrates
how block clubs were integral to bringing foundational communal institutions to a
growing area. While Evergreen Presbyterian and the Snowden School were the tangible
results of civic organizing, clubs still had the responsibility of ensuring the area’s
continued growth.53
Following the Evergreen Club’s example, new block clubs emerged to bring city
services to their burgeoning neighborhoods. The Rozelle Civic Club first originated “to
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promote civic improvements whenever and wherever needed within the bounds of its
territory.”54 The club maintained committees that focused on neighborhood improvement
such as streets, lights, public safety, health, and sanitation. 55 For example, in February
1930 Rozelle Civic Club’s “Streets and Lights” committee undertook actions to improve
streets throughout its neighborhood. 56 It wanted the city to pave Lamar Avenue, improve
Southern Avenue, and add drainage along McLean Boulevard.57 By November 1931, the
committee chair met with City Commissioner Kruger to voice the Rozelle Civic Club’s
concerns. Kruger promised prompt action. 58 On the north side of Midtown, the Jackson
Boulevard Improvement Club followed suit but with mixed results. While it got the city
to repair a light on Barksdale Street and place “no parking” signs on the west side of
Watkins Street from Jackson Avenue to Snowden, it failed to secure an addition to the
Vollintine school and used its own money to replace signage along Jackson Avenue.59
Midtown area block clubs also fostered community by organizing social
functions. While scholarly debates swirl around the efficacy of community building and
its long-term results, people on the ground believed gathering for fun was a surefire way
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to increase individuals and families’ sense of belonging.60 Formal gatherings like parties
or carnivals were popular ways “to encourage cordial and social intercourse among its
members.”61 For example, the Jackson Boulevard Improvement Club sponsored a dance
for its members and their friends and family at the Vollintine School auditorium. While
the dance’s location likely stemmed from a practical decision such as its low cost and
availability, the Vollintine School held a special place in residents’ hearts—one of the
club’s first achievements was bringing this school to the neighborhood. 62 Therefore, the
club held most of its communal functions at the school or the adjacent playground.
However, gathering alone did not foster a sense of community, the labor required to put
on a communal event brought people together by working towards the same goal. Later
in the year the Jackson Boulevard Improvement Club organized a carnival at the
Vollintine school’s playground. As the organizers intended, the event would have
something for everyone. The club broke the tasks into several different committees: boys’
and girls’ baseball, divided into junior and senior divisions; a storytelling league; and for
those of age, an adult beverage committee tasked with procuring wine. After the carnival
wore out the park’s facilities the club members repaired the damage by placing a new
awning over the sand boxes and lowered the baseball diamond’s grade. 63
Working together to organize social events may have brought the larger
community together, but club organizers still had to get people through the door and to
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participate in the drudgery of running a block club. Both the Rozelle and Jackson
Boulevard club meetings followed a standard script. They began with a welcome from
the club president, followed by old business (if any), then committee reports, new
business, and occasionally a guest speaker. While the minutes do not reveal the
conversations and debates among members about the issues at hand, they do speak to the
methodical and deliberative nature of neighborhood governance. These meetings may
have been interesting, but there is nothing in the minutes to suggest they were fun. One of
the most popular ways for Midtown block clubs to encourage people to attend meetings
was to provide entertainment. For example, following the Rozelle Civic Club’s June 1929
meeting, members “enjoyed a vocal selection by Miss Sarah Holman with Mrs. Holman
as accompanist followed by a very humorous lecture by E. P. McCallum, both of which
were very much enjoyed by those present.”64 Additionally, civic clubs offered prizes to
the men and women with the best attendance record. These efforts led to consistent
participation among their members, with 200+ people attending regularly. Not a bad
return for a one-dollar investment per year. 65
Lastly, block clubs tried to shape the greater Memphis area in its image. At the
Rozelle Civic Club’s May 29, 1930 meeting it invited Hardwig Peres to speak to its
members. On this evening, he “made a very able talk on the prohibition question.”
Agreeing with his tee totaling message, the club motioned to draw up a resolution
favoring the “strict enforcement” of the 18th amendment. The motion carried. 66 On
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January 22, 1931, the club passed a resolution calling for the Memphis Board of
Education to include a textbook on the “study [of] character building” in the upcoming
curriculum for “each and all of the public schools.” While the parents of this community
could mold their own children, the Rozelle Club sought to push their influence outside of
Midtown and shape all of Memphis’ students in their image. They were so pleased with
themselves that after the meeting club members leaned back in their seats with
refreshments in hand and listened to the night’s entertainment: a ladies’ quartet with Mrs.
Boulware and Mrs. Hutchinson singing “negro spirituals” in blackface.67

Businesses
Early in Midtown’s history, daily business became a way in which residents and
business owners depended on each other for daily necessities and economic stability. As
Midtown neighborhoods grew in the early twentieth-century, businesses came to the
people. In Rozelle, farmers and gardeners from outlying areas descended upon the
neighborhood to peddle their fruit, vegetables, chickens, squirrel meat, and guinea eggs.
Before refrigeration, ice men delivered blocks of ice to people’s homes. For homes
without plumbing, the “honey wagon” would go door to door cleaning outdoor privies.
Much like calling a big man Tiny or Slim, the term “honey wagon” was an ironic play on
words given how “odiferous” one of these traveling wagons could become. 68 These doorto-door entrepreneurs would slowly give way to permanent business establishments as
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commercial centers within Midtown’s many neighborhoods sprang up to serve its
residents.
During the early twentieth-century, the central business district was home to the
bulk of the city’s services. However, Memphis’ suburbanization provided space for
commercial developments to emerge in Midtown neighborhoods. 69 The Cooper-Young
commercial corridor is the best example of a neighborhood business district springing up
to serve the surrounding community. For the community’s medical needs, Dr. L.R. Polk
opened his practice at the corner of Cooper Street and Felix Avenue; he even rented the
back of his house out to a dentist. What began as Summers’ Pharmacy, selling
“Summers’ Little Liver Pills” and “Summers’ Witch Hazel and Almond Cream,” and
despite changing ownership many times from 1917 to 1974, the corner of Cooper and
Young housed a drugstore to satisfy the neighborhood’s pharmacological needs. In 1917,
“Memphis Maverick” Clarence Saunders opened his fifth Piggly Wiggly location in the
neighborhood. Now residents could drop in and pick up a pre-packaged grocery item,
without heading downtown, thus speeding up their shopping experience. 70 A few blocks
off the main commercial strip at 1902 Nelson Avenue stood the Barksdale Bakery where
area residents could purchase coffee rings, butter horns, and cinnamon buns. CooperYoung was also home to Mac’s Variety Store offering “notions and hardware” at
reasonable prices, Walsh Furniture, a barber shop and beauty salon, a Standard Oil filling
station, and Herman’s Café, offering plate lunches and air conditioning. By 1950, the
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neighborhood business association declared Cooper-Young to be “Memphis’ Most
Convenient Shopping Center.”71
To further the city’s eastward expansion, boosters worked with Sears, Roebuck &
Co. to open a mail order regional distribution center and retail store in Memphis. Erected
on the Evergreen neighborhood’s western border, Sears opened its 650,000-square foot
facility in 1927 as the company’s eighth regional hub at the corner of North Watkins
Street and North Parkway, an ideal location given its proximity to highways and the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. This structure led to an additional trolley line as the
city of Memphis spent $100,000 constructing the No. 7 line to Sears’ front door. On its
opening day 47,000 people—approximately 25% of Memphis’ population—visited the
new store, spending their hard-earned money and taking in this architectural and
technological marvel. The city beamed with excitement at the jobs this new facility
would generate, the local taxes it would provide, and the regional goods it would
purchase. As if nodding to city boosters, Sears’ president C.M. Kittle believed “SearsRoebuck’s Memphis store [to be] one of the biggest and most dependable merchandising
institutions, not only in the South, but of the entire country.”72
With such expansive commercial development in Midtown neighborhoods, many
residents worked near their homes. Charles Simmons, who lived on Oliver Avenue in
Cooper-Young, worked around the corner from his job at the Lilly Cash grocery on
Young Avenue. Due to the neighborhood’s proximity to the Southern Avenue railyard,
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many of the conductors, motormen, claims agents, and signal men, made their homes
near the railyard, renting (or owning) several of the shotgun homes on Blythe and Cox
Streets. Located on Young Avenue between New York and Philadelphia Streets, the
Keathley Pie Company became a longtime employer for the Cooper-Young
neighborhood. What began as a family business, baking and selling individual pecan pies
in 1930 out of M.F. and Ruby Keathley’s kitchen, it soon became a national brand. Once
the business moved into the factory, it manufactured up to 11,000 pies per hour. The
Keathley Pie Company employed 160 people at its height, and a local waitress claimed
that “just about everyone in Cooper-Young worked [there] at one time or another.” As
historians Lisa Lumb and Jim Kovarik point out “this pattern of working, shopping, and
living within walking distance was a signature element of life.”73

Recreation
Like Midtown’s commercial options, leisure opportunities developed as the
neighborhoods around Overton Park grew. Turn-of-the-century Midtown was a horse
lover’s paradise. Montgomery Park—a thoroughbred race track located north of East
Parkway across from the Cooper-Young neighborhood—was home to the Tennessee
Derby from 1884 until gambling was outlawed in Tennessee in 1907. Every spring
thousands of racing fans from around the region descended upon the race track to view
one of the nation’s top spectacles. One reporter noted the grandstand was full of
fashionable men and women, and “the clubhouse piazza was filled with wives, sisters,
and relatives…and on the greensward…was a pushing, excited, enthusiastic crowd of
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sports, citizens, and touts galore.”74 Montgomery Park was also an underdog’s dream. In
1901 T.P. Hayes’ Royal Victor upset the field. 75 The following year Abe Frank won by a
neck on 1 to 6 odds.76 By 1902 crowds swelled to 25,000 people and the purse for threeyear olds grew to almost $12,000. Montgomery Park was such a draw that it led to the
Memphis Driving Park for harness racing north of downtown. 77
If horse racing did not suit one’s taste, Midtown offered leisure opportunities
within most people’s budget. Midtown was home to several movie theaters screening
some of the era’s biggest films. In 1926, the Peabody Theater opened to great fanfare in
the Cooper-Young neighborhood. Located along the neighborhood’s commercial corridor
at the corner of South Cooper Street and Nelson Avenue, it was a place for the
neighborhood’s younger residents to escape the stressors of everyday life. During the
1940s, moviegoers could enter the box office foyer, buy a ticket, and grab a roll of Life
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Savers or a Mars Toasted Almond Bar, before taking in a coming of age film like My
Friend Flicka or a musical such as Mister Big. A year later the Ritz Theater opened at the
corner of Poplar Avenue and Evergreen and soon became known for its foreign and art
house films. Midtown’s black residents had fewer options since there was only one
“integrated” movie theater in the area—likely due to the ubiquity of black theaters on
Beale Street. The Rosemary Theater opened in 1929 at the corner of Watkins Street and
Jackson Avenue and served both black and white customers. While black moviegoers
purchased their tickets from the same box office as whites, they suffered the indignity of
entering through a side “colored” entrance and were forced to sit in the balcony. 78
Despite the variety of organized leisure activities, Midtown residents were
creative when it came to low cost, informal recreation. After Tommy Bronson’s family
moved into the Rozelle neighborhood in 1917, they went as far as their front porch for
their entertainment. After the city connected Walker and Lamar Avenues, paved the
streets, and installed stop signs, automobile accidents became increasingly common.
During the evenings, his family sat outside on the porch “to watch the model-T’s [sic]
whiz by, then come to a crushing halt upon meeting another [vehicle] dead on.” For six
weeks each fall, a “gypsie troupe” camped out in their colorful wagons along Pidgeon
Roost Road (Lamar Avenue). During their stay, they put on a medicine show with a
“cure-all doctor, a fierce but brave Indian chief,” and banjo concerts for curious
children.79 Looking back fondly on his childhood in Rozelle, Elmer Eddins enjoyed
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following the iceman around the neighborhood and catching the “snow,” or shavings, the
iceman produced when he cut smaller blocks away from the main ice block.80 During the
Great Depression, James McCallen and his brother would visit with the “men that rode
the rails” in the hobo camps near the Southern Avenue train yard behind his house in
Cooper-Young. While recreational activities like these were available nearly every day of
the week, most Midtowners turned to Overton Park for their low-cost recreation needs.81

Overton Park and Community Formation
Throughout the twentieth-century Midtown residents made Overton Park the
center of their social lives. Overton Park’s importance emerged out of a long tradition of
using park space to create engaged and healthy citizens. In his study on Chicago’s urban
parks, Colin Fisher argues that these were “utilitarian” spaces, broken down into their
respective activity units charged with the duty to mold working class urban dwellers into
good citizens.82 Overton Park, occupied a similar role. The park initially contained a
pavilion—home to lectures, dances, and other events—and athletic fields where team
sports fostered a sense of individual achievement and teamwork. For example,
throughout much of the mid-twentieth century, the Memphis Park Commission, with
women at the helm, ran numerous youth programs in Overton Park such as the end of
summer Playground Festival, which included athletic field competitions and theatrical
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performances. Once opened, the golf course became a place where men could test each
other’s masculinity through skilled competition, establishing close friendships—or
rivalries—while walking nine holes. Midtown youths also came together at the park’s
wading pool, playground, and magnolia trees to socialize with other children. Here they
bonded over feeding a friendly duck, seeing who could go down the slide the fastest, or
climb to the highest branch. 83 The greensward was also a favorite spot for visitors and
residents alike. Sara Hines remembered this open space as a place “where young people
romp with their dogs, throw Frisbees, play baseball, fly kites, or just loll under the
trees.”84
Friends and family also bonded during their visits to Overton Park. Laura
Saunders recalls that during hot summer nights in the 1920s, her father would take her
and her siblings to get ice cream after dinner, and then drive them through the park to
cool off and relax before returning home for bed. 85 The Zoo, located on Overton Park’s
northern border, brought families together to learn about exotic wildlife. 86 Here, throngs
of friends and family would gather and watch in awe as the bears meandered around their
enclosure. Children could also ride elephants. One photograph from the zoo’s early days
depicts five children sitting upon a small pachyderm, with what appears to be the eldest
brother holding on tightly to his sibling thus keeping him safe. Some Midtown residents
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visited the zoo so often they claimed to know all the animals and zookeepers by name. 87
By the 1980s, the Memorial Day 500 race drew record crowds as it pitted the zoo’s
fastest tortoises against one another. And before a family left, they could pose for a
photograph documenting their outing.
The park was (and still is) home to one of the city’s most memorable monuments.
The Doughboy Memorial commemorates Shelby County citizens that served in World
War I. During the years following its instillation in 1926, the memorial became a site
remembrance—especially during World War II—honoring those that served. However,
during the Vietnam War the Doughboy also became a site of protest for anti-war
activism. Regardless of one’s political allegiance, Overton Park’s war memorials brought
communities together to make meaning out of American foreign intervention. 88
Overton Park also drew Midtowners to the park by providing a taste of the far
East within its borders. The early twentieth century proved a high-water mark for
American interest in Japanese exoticism. Following his trip to Japan, in 1914 Robert
Galloway commissioned a Japanese Garden for Overton Park. Located on land adjacent
to the current Memphis Academy of Art, it reflected his vision of Japanese culture. A
large reflecting pool formed the center of the garden, surrounded by numerous thatched
huts and a pagoda. Near the center of the pool stood an island, connected to the shoreline
by a half-moon bridge with a Shinto Torii gateway marking the entryway. Galloway
ordered numerous sculptures around the grounds, which doubled as children’s playthings.
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To cap off its grandeur, he marked the edge of the reflecting pool with plaster cast
flamingos. Residents would stroll around the pond, taking in its serenity, and families
often posed for photographs given its beauty; historian William Bearden notes it was a
highly-photographed attraction. Unfortunately, the garden fell victim to rabid antiJapanese sentiment following Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor. After vandals tore the
garden to ruins, the Memphis Park Commission removed the garden’s remains in 1956
for the Memphis Academy of Art’s new parking lot. 89
As Memphis and the Midtown area grew, so did the amenities housed within
Overton Park. It was home to one of Memphis’ premier outdoor performing arts venues
that provided a physical space for a cross section of Memphis’ population to come
together and engage in the region’s rich cultural heritage. The Overton Park Shell,
designed and constructed as a Works Progress Administration project, provided
Midtowners with an open-air venue for the performing arts. Designed by architect Max
Furbringer to mirror larger amphitheaters in Chicago, New York, and St. Louis, the Shell
was outfitted with state of the art RCA amplifiers, a modern lighting system, and came
equipped with dressing rooms beneath the stage. It’s earliest tenant, the Memphis Open
Air Theater (MOAT) company produced a host of operas, musicals, and stage plays from
the 1930s until it folded in 1952.90 Throughout its existence, MOAT brought hundreds of
thousands of people to Overton Park. During its inaugural season in 1938 approximately
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50,000 people purchased tickets. However, by its peak in 1948 performers like Frances
Greer shattered single-show attendance records and helped push through 24,000
attendees per week. Both singer Anita Bryant and opera soprano Marguerite Piazza also
graced the Shell’s stage on multiple occasions and brought capacity crowds each time.
Perhaps the Shell’s biggest contribution to American music was when it hosted Elvis
Presley’s first ever paid performance in July 1954—did you ever see Elvis before he was
famous? Even as popular music shifted from “respectable” acts like orchestras to rock,
soul, and blues performers such as Black Oak Arkansas, Isaac Hayes, and the Memphis
Blues Festival, the Overton Park Shell was the outdoor venue for performing arts in
Memphis.91
The Shell was also a space where Midtown youths cultivated their talents. During
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Memphis Park Commission provided programming
that taught area children different styles of dance. Reflecting on her participation in this
program, Gwen Vescovo remembered performing with her friends and siblings on the
Shell’s stage: “At the end of the summer, at the Shell, all the City of Memphis Park
Commission dancers came, and each age group had a different dance they did. Rosemary
did the Tiptoe through the Tulips, Diane got to be a ballerina, I did the French dance and
wore a beret.”92 Terry Starr suggests her childhood experiences with the Shell pushed her
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into the music profession. As a child, her father worked as an assistant stage manager for
MOAT. Thus, she spent a sizable portion of her childhood engaging with all the
performances the Shell had to offer. Reminiscing about the Summer Pops Concerts, Starr
spoke about her father taking her to see performances such as Anita Bryant’s
performance. She also learned many of the orchestra numbers since her great-uncle
played under Noel Gilbert, the conductor for the Summer Pops. Starr even performed on
the Shell’s stage: once accompanying the Grahamwood Chorus and again in college.
Taken together, Starr held a special place in her heart for the Shell and Overton Park,
which likely influenced her career path going forward.93
When the Memphis Academy of Arts moved its campus to Overton Park in 1959
it became the metropolitan area’s fine arts education center. The Memphis Academy of
Art grew out of the James Lee Academy during the 1930s. Following World War II, the
Academy saw an influx of students, which overburdened its facilities and its faculty
members—a bigger space was needed. Under Edwin “Ted” C. Rust’s leadership, he
moved the Academy’s campus from its location in an old Victorian home on Adams
Avenue to its current location in Overton Park. This move, and subsequent expansion,
allowed the Academy to recruit recognized artists for its faculty and accreditation by the
National Association of Schools of Design. Upon arrival, the Memphis Academy of Art
added to the park’s appeal. It provided classes and programming for Memphians from
preschoolers to senior citizens. People from all over the city descended upon the park to
learn how to draw, paint, sculpt, and admire each other’s artwork. To draw more people
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to the college, the Academy even threw an annual Christmas Bazaar where faculty,
students, and alumni sold their original work to holiday shoppers. As Jeffrey D. Nesih
points out, the Memphis College of Art’s mission was a “commitment to making visual
arts education widely accessible.”94

Conclusion
On the eve of the interstate era, Overton Park stood at the center of Midtown,
Memphis’ social ecosystem. Freeway construction through the area would not just ruin
Overton park, but threatened to destroy an entire community. After the city emerged from
the yellow fever epidemic, Progressive Era boosters realized that an aggressive
annexation campaign, coupled with the extension of city services such as sanitation and
the creation of a park system, would remedy public health concerns and increase tax
revenues. The neighborhoods around Overton Park developed into an area where white
residents went on the defensive to protect and preserve their newly achieved middle class
status. During this process, a community developed: people joined block clubs to
improve their neighborhoods’ standard of living, shopped at each other’s stores and
businesses, and even spent their leisure time together at the neighborhood theater or
listening to a concert in Overton Park. Midtowners were not about to give up on the
neighborhoods they spent so much time and energy creating. When the interstate
threatened to destroy the space at the center of this community, anti-freeway activists
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fought back because they considered Overton Park as part of their domain. Or as one
chronicler of the park put it, to preserve “Memphis’ Backyard.”95
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Chapter 3: The Fiber that Stitched the Nation Together: Federal, State, and Local
Investments in Freeway Construction, 1939-1956

Introduction
On June 29, 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the 1956 Federal Aid
Highway Act into law.1 With the stroke of a pen, he brought a policy battle that spanned
three decades to fruition. In a February 22, 1955, address to Congress, Eisenhower noted
what was at stake regarding national interstate policy. Living in the Cold War moment,
he claimed interstate highways were crucial to Americans’ safety in case “our key cities”
came under nuclear attack. The nation’s interstate system was woefully underdeveloped
to handle the military necessities of the Cold War. With adequate public investment
however, highways would “permit quick evacuation of target areas, mobilization of
defense forces and maintenance of every essential economic function.” On the economic
front, a national interstate system would improve the nation’s economy. Eisenhower
argued the nation’s highways, as they stood, were in so poor a condition they increased
the cost of operating a vehicle. However, this cost was not borne by the individual driver.
Instead it was built into the price of doing business. As a result, increased highway
transportation costs were “passed on through each step in the distribution of goods” and
“paid ultimately by the individual consumer.” Only by unifying all three levels of
government—federal, state, and local—in support of the largest public works program in
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American history, could the country defend its people and bolster its economy. In short, a
national interstate system was the fiber that stitched the postwar nation together. 2
This chapter demonstrates the national, state, and local forces that made a network
of interstate highways a reality and brought an urban freeway to Memphis, Tennessee.
Much was at stake for the country, Tennessee, and Memphis. At the federal level,
highway proponents believed interstate highways were central to postwar American
society: they were key to national defense and fueled the economy. The state of
Tennessee understood interstate highways in a similar light. However, state highway
officials staked the nation’s future on Tennessee’s highway system. Given the state’s
unique location—it sat between the North and the South, bordered five states and the
Mississippi River, and “owned” one of the nation’s busiest all-weather river crossings
over the Mississippi River in Memphis—Tennessee’s roadways were the lynchpin to the
nation’s defense and economy. Yet at the local level, highways were symbols of
democracy. Governmental reform organizations like the Civic Research Committee
staked Memphis’s future on highway construction. While highway construction in
Memphis, Tennessee served national security and economic purposes, they promised
Memphians something bigger; interstate highways provided the means to overthrow
decades of machine politics and reform local governance. So, in 1956 when the
bulldozers began to rumble and construction workers poured ribbons of concrete,
American citizens and captains of industry gazed in amazement at what they believed to
be a secure and prosperous future.
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Freeway Policy at the Federal and State Levels
Norman Bel Geddes’s Futurama exhibit at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York
City marked a transition away from a state-centered road building bureaucracy and
towards a consolidated bureaucratic regime. 3 As Michael R. Rein argues, the twin crises
of the Great Depression and World War II provided space for highway proponents to
push the old, localized way of road building aside in favor of a modernized method that
responded to national economic and security demands.4 For example, by 1939, the United
States was mired in a decade of depression, fascism and communism were expanding
around the world, war was on the horizon, and radical movements were growing at home.
Futurama “emphasized hope for the future at a time when daily life for many held fear
and uncertainty.”5 The exhibit linked the “problems of the modern world” to traffic
congestion, and congestion was at its worst in the densely packed urban areas that saw a
drastic decrease in its daytime population, failing businesses, blighted properties, and
racialized “others.”6 Over five million visitors gazed upon the model landscape where
they saw “expressway traffic moving at 100 miles per hour” and 50,000 model cars
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zooming along “such novelties as elevated freeways.”7 This vision of technological
progress “sped time past contemporary crises just as it increased the traveling speed of
the automobile.”8 As Paul Mason Fotsch points out, “built into the design of Futurama
was the assumption that expanded consumption would…bring the economy out of its
slump.”9 Therefore, only superhighways could “resolve the nation’s problems and bring
prosperity” by “creating a free flowing movement of people and goods.” 10 To construct
such a world required America’s best effort; greatness would follow.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was so impressed with the exhibit he hosted
a dinner for Geddes at the White House. 11 Within the West Hall, Roosevelt, Geddes, and
guests discussed how to lay the groundwork for a federal highway system. This attempt
ultimately fell flat as they butted heads over how to pay for such a system and who would
benefit. But the foundation had been laid. Ultimately, the United States’ entry into World
War II scuttled real action towards a national interstate system as domestic resources
poured into the war effort.
World War II may have forced planners at all levels to hit pause on policy
discussions regarding a federally backed system of interstate highways, but as historian
Roger W. Lotchin demonstrates, this urban planning interlude allowed for cities—and the
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country in general—to incur planning debts, with “its credits banked for the future.” 12
While he focuses on wartime Los Angeles, California, the trends he demonstrates
occurred in cities and states across the country. Rapid wartime urbanization and
industrialization wore down the country’s infrastructure: traffic congestion worsened,
roadways went without repair, and in some instances, they fell apart. Basically,
“everything that required substantial outlays of material…just got worse.”13 Additionally,
planners believed the US would return to depression-era unemployment following the
war. As a result, they believed postwar infrastructure planning and construction,
especially highways, would ease the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. 14
On April 14, 1941, realizing that a national system of highways provided the
nation and its cities the best opportunity for postwar economic development, President
Roosevelt created the National Interregional Highway Committee. This committee
consisted of bureaucrats, planners, engineers, and politicians. He tasked them with
studying “the need for a national system of interregional highways, the form such a
system should take, and the potential of such a large construction project to utilize
industrial capacity and manpower at the end” of World War II. Their report,
Interregional Highways, identified a set of needs and “codified many of the basic
planning doctrines for America’s postwar urban freeways.” It determined a master
freeway system, identifying 33,920 miles of roadways that would serve the country’s
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needs. Of this mileage, 4,400 would be in urban areas, with an additional 5,000 miles
recommended for circumferential routes in larger cities. The report suggested these urban
freeways would handle America’s increasing automobile traffic, thus moving vehicles
more quickly and more safely. Interregional Highways also claimed urban highways
could be a powerful tool for shaping a city’s growth since they aided revitalization by
inhibiting “trouble” spots from developing in urban centers. Circumferential outer
beltways would keep people and business from drifting to the urban periphery and lead to
“uniform development.”15 Policymakers seized upon the ideas Interregional Highways
provided and began working towards what would become the 1944 Federal Aid Highway
Act.
On March 13, 1944 at the congressional hearings on the postwar highway
program, C.W. Phillips, the Tennessee Commissioner of Highways and Public Works,
staked Tennessee’s economic future to federal highway funding. He claimed the state
needed funds to repair roads the war effort destroyed. Tennessee’s highways suffered due
to three years of troop mobilization, the hauling of military equipment, and “curtailed
maintenance.” “Roads,” he continued, “which under normal traffic, require only a
minimum of maintenance expenditure, now demand immediate restoration because of
almost complete failure.” Next, Phillips demonstrated what it would take to modernize
Tennessee’s highways. In the fifteen years before 1932, the state spent “five to six”
dollars for every dollar the federal government provided. This level of funding was
simply insufficient to meet contemporary demands. The crux of his argument pointed to
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the fact that pre-war roads were not built to “the standards of today” since automobile
and truck technology outpaced highway construction standards. Simply put, “the roads
built several years ago are in some state of obsolesce for the automobile of today or the
one to be put into service.” Lastly, he identified Tennessee’s financial needs to bring the
state’s highway system up to date: $205,040,000, exclusive of rights-of-way costs. Such a
cost was simply beyond the state’s means. Phillips concluded that Tennessee would
“make every effort to match every dollar made available by the Federal Government
through the passage of this act and we propose further to apply it to the needs of our
Highway System.”16 Restoring state highways to their pre-war functionality, but with an
eye towards future capacity, would help Tennessee’s postwar economy move forward.
In making his case for state highways, Phillips also staked the nation’s
transportation-based economy on Tennessee’s geographical location. He brought
congress’s attention to the state’s unique geographical location: Tennessee sat between
the North and the South; it bordered five states and a major transportation conduit—the
Mississippi River; was “strategically located” on most of the country’s North-South roads
between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico; and “owned” one of the nation’s
busiest all-weather river crossings—the Memphis-Arkansas Bridge—over the Mississippi
River in Memphis. To hammer this point home, Phillips declared, “Tennessee is within
one day’s drive of one-third of the Nation’s population.” “With its location in relation to
other states, its peculiar shape and area, its population and its agricultural and
manufacturing pursuits,” Phillips concluded, “Tennessee fits into three highway
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schemes…the development of the State and Federal System, the development of the
Strategic Network, and the development of the Inter-regional System.”17 Based on his
testimony, what was good for Tennessee was clearly good for the nation.
The 1944 Federal Aid Highway Act President Roosevelt signed into law on
December 20, 1944, teetered on the edge of revolutionary and the mundane. At the
national level this legislation created the country’s first master plan for a 40,000-mile
system of interconnected interstate highways. The master plan, which laid the foundation
for the Eisenhower interstate system to come later, gave planners around the country the
ability to view the US as a whole, as it created a National System of Interstate Highways
“not exceeding forty thousand miles in total extent so located as to connect by routes, as
practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers.” No longer
was the US simply a contiguous body of independent states operating beneath a larger
federal umbrella. Instead, it was an interdependent organism with commerce and security
pumping though its concrete veins. Perhaps for the first time, people across the country
saw their lives as interconnected: a cup of coffee purchased in New York helped build a
road in Montana and a truck carrying goods cross-country put money in the pockets of
people wherever it stopped. This legislation, as Arizona Senator Carl Hayden put it,
would ensure that American people could enjoy postwar prosperity. 18
Unfortunately for everyone, this legislation fell way short of providing Americans
an improved quality of life. Yes, states like Tennessee used federal highway funds to
drastically upgrade its road network. For example, in 1948, the Tennessee State Highway
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Department spent more than thirty-three million dollars on its highways—the largest
amount since 1930—a much needed upgrade. These improvements helped the state
absorb the 537,210 registered vehicles on Tennessee’s roads, an 88,937 increase from
1941 to 1946.19 But as Mark Rose points out, “the 1944 act promised fast-moving traffic,
jobs and prosperity—no more.”20 As the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 wound its
way through congress and across lobbyists’ desks, advocates saw its funding cut in half,
witnessed the government revert back to the fifty-fifty state/federal split, and gasped as
Senator Richard B. Russell helped remove the federal financing of rights-of-way—this
raised the cost of construction considerably, especially in densely populated urban
areas.21 This was not an innovative highway policy, one that united the movement of
people and goods with the revitalization of urban centers. Instead it was the status quo,
traffic-centered road building; a grand plan without the means. A truly revolutionary road
policy would have to wait until after World War II.
Despite the lackluster 1944 Federal Aid Highway Act, the State of Tennessee was
very much aware the nation desired an interconnected system of interstate highways.
How could Tennessee be part of this system? Governor Frank G. Clement and Highway
Commissioner William M. Leech led the push for highway planning at the state level. In
a message to the Tennessee general assembly, Governor Clement lamented that
Tennessee was trying to move “1954 traffic over a system designed to accommodate
1941,” which he claimed would have “a direct and adverse effect upon the social and
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economic progress of Tennessee.”22 If state officials would not act on these needs, then
Tennessee’s roads would be overwhelmed, if not decimated, by 1976. As a result, the
legislature turned inward to study its own highways and roads in anticipation of another
federal level push towards a comprehensive highway bill.
In 1953, the Tennessee State Senate took a major step towards ensuring and
maintaining the state’s postwar prosperity. It passed joint resolution no. 35, which led to
the creation of the Tennessee Highway Study Commission. The legislature tasked the
commission to “obtain all facts pertaining to a program of construction, improvement and
maintenance of the highways, roads, streets and bridges of the State, the maximum
utilization of existing roads facilities and the efficient administration and sound financing
of these facilities.”23 The Automotive Safety Foundation, a non-profit organization that
promoted highway safety and development, conducted the engineering study. 24 This
study would, in the Tennessee Highway Department’s mind, force people, politicians,
policymakers, and planners at all levels to recognize not just the state’s need for
highways, but the region’s, and the nation’s. If Tennessee sat at the nexus of the
country’s transportation network as C.W. Phillips believed, and its highway system was
woefully behind the rest of the nation, then the entire country stood to suffer
economically and in terms of national defense. The “systematic improvement” of the
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state’s highway system “was deemed of transcending importance.” 25 While Tennessee
highway officials realized this report would not magically make a grand highway bill
materialize, they did understand its value: as goes Tennessee, so goes the nation.
The Automotive Safety Foundation’s Highway Transportation in Tennessee: An
Engineering Appraisal of All Roads and Streets and Recommendations for the Future
identified the monies required for the state to modernize its highway system. The report
stated Tennessee would have to spend $3.6 billion dollars over the next thirty years to
modernize its roads and highway system. While the state’s current revenue streams
appeared sufficient to cover this cost, the state would have to incur debts to “catch up
with the present backlog of needs in a reasonable time.” 26 For example, to complete the
state highway system’s backlogged road projects within a ten-year period required
$2,119,450,000. The problem is that state revenues during this period only produced
$1,181,736,000. This presented the state with a big problem: it could either go into
bonded indebtedness or turn to federal monies to help boost Tennessee’s modernization
project. Without the money to construct, maintain, and finance a highway system to meet
the needs of postwar American society, then Tennessee’s social and economic
foundations stood to crumble. 27
While this report spoke to state-level highway issues, it made urban freeways the
lynchpin for Tennessee’s proposed modernization program. Roads in Tennessee’s cities
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carried the most traffic. As automobile use increased during the postwar period, traffic
clogged central business districts and placed cities’ economic vitality at risk. 28 For
example, Memphis during the postwar era had approximately 70,000 registered vehicles
at the end of World War II; by the summer of 1954 that number grew to 178,518. 29 A
1950 survey reported that Memphis’s most congested and heavily trafficked streets
carried approximately 93,000 cars daily. 30 Memphis’s traffic woes were no different than
that of Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. In fact, it mirrored cities around the
nation.31 As a result Highway Transportation in Tennessee claimed, “The most urgent
need in Tennessee today is the construction of freeways to move traffic into and through
the four largest cities.” They were safe, efficient, and “capable of handling large volumes
of traffic at reasonable speeds without stops and unnecessary delays.”32 Altogether, the
report called for the construction of 75.5 miles of urban freeways at a cost of
$222,158,000—a meager amount when compared to the $1.2 billion dollars needed to
upgrade and maintain the state’s county road program.33 But when one look at the per-
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mile outlay ($2,942,490) for only 75.5 miles of urban freeways versus the per-mile cost
($118,414) of 4,272 miles of rural road improvements, the cost is indeed staggering. 34
In response to this reality, Highway Transportation in Tennessee urged the state
to press for federal highway funds, which would offset road and highway modernization
expenses. Tennessee had 14,535 miles of roads eligible for federal monies. Over the next
twenty years, Tennessee would need approximately $1,573,564,000 to upgrade its
secondary roads, primary system, and interstate highways on the federal system with an
additional $2,420,000 needed per year for maintenance. 35 Even though federal funds
would only cover sixty percent of highway costs under current policies, it would allow
the state to shift its own money back to state roadways, thus alleviating the state’s burden
on modernizing its infrastructure. The state of Tennessee was aware of the role a
federally funded system of interstate highways could play in modernizing its roadways—
this report was its clarion call.
Policymakers also staked the nation’s security on highway policy. In 1941,
President Roosevelt’s Interregional Highway Committee produced a report titled
“Highways for National Defense.” It was a joint effort of the Public Roads
Administration, Federal Works Agency (FWA), the Advisory Commission to the Council
of National Defense, and the War and Navy Departments. As part of a wartime necessity,
the report called for upgrading bridges, widening strategic roads, ensuring access to large
cities, and serving populations around military bases. 36 In Tennessee alone, the Public
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Works Administration (PWA) considered and later approved numerous rights-of-way and
bridge improvements for wartime industries. 37 For example, the Tennessee State
Highway Department sought to construct a military access road at the Fisher Body Plant
in Memphis. Since this plant assembled bomber fuselages, district engineer Charles D.
Snead considered the road “essential to the operation of the plant and hence vital to
defense.”38 Reflecting on highways’ important role in the war effort, FWA head Philip
Fleming told Congress that in the moment he did not realize “how vital our highway
system was to our existence.” But after living through World War II, he came to
understand that “our highways really were part of our national [war] effort” since they
helped move airplane wings, turrets, engines, and fuselages from production to assembly
facilities, without which an Allied victory might not have been possible. 39 World War II
clearly demonstrated to policy makers the necessity of highways to national defense, a
fact not lost on the national interstate system’s champion, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
Eisenhower’s military experiences demonstrated to him exactly how important
highways were to the nation’s security. In 1911, fresh out of West Point, Eisenhower
joined the Army’s trans-continental motorcade from Washington D.C. to San Francisco,
California. This trip revealed to him the downside of not having an interconnected system
of high speed, usable roads. This cross-country journey took sixty-two days, averaging
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five miles per hour. The “roads” themselves caused the biggest causalities as vehicle
breakdowns and accidents were frequent. This experience led Eisenhower to describe the
trip as a nightmare “through darkest America with tank and truck” and described the
roads as “average to non-existent.” A report on that journey noted that roads were a
national problem: “The necessity for a comprehensive system of national highways,
including trans-continental or through routes east and west, north and south, is real and
urgent…as a … defensive military necessity.” 40 Additionally, his time in the European
theater cemented in his mind highways’ function as a military resource. Germany’s
autobahns were indeed “roads to war.” Even though allied forces targeted Germany’s rail
lines, with direct hits backing up supply lines for days, highways were more difficult;
convoys could still navigate through crater-filled roadways, delivering much needed
supplies to troops. Eisenhower learned firsthand the value of interstate highways. As
historian Tom Lewis points out “Eisenhower…carried the lessons from [his military
experience] with him to the White House.” 41
While Eisenhower’s military experience with highways influenced his desire to
press for legislation, it was the larger Cold War context that turned interstates into a
necessity. Two superpowers emerged following World War II—The United States and
the Soviet Union—each of which armed with the nuclear capacity to wipe the other off
the face of the earth. From the American perspective, with the Soviet Union exploding
“the Bomb” in 1949, the entire country felt the weight of an impending nuclear holocaust
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hovering above their heads and saw World War III lurking right around the corner. Many
Americans believed it was simply a matter of time before the Soviet Union dropped one
of their bombs on American soil—experts estimated that as many as twenty million
people could die in a single day. As expected, most, if not all, Americans prepped for
doomsday. Some stocked their basements with food and water in the event they had to
wait out a nuclear strike; others built fallout shelters in their backyard or mapped out the
quickest route to a community one. 42 Radios even came equipped with a “CD,” or Civil
Defense, marking that instructed people where to listen for information when bombs
began to fall. Rumors swirled amongst the populace as to which cities would be targeted
first. And just for clarification, the federal government compiled a list of 185 target areas.
People soon realized that the quickest route to safety was on the road out of town. 43
As the Cold War accelerated, and mutually assured destruction became a
perceived inevitability, scholars and bureaucrats increasingly believed constructing
highways would aid dispersal in the event of a nuclear attack on urban spaces. In a
special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, its editors and contributors tackled
the question: how can the U.S. survive an atomic attack? Its answer, “Defense Through
Decentralization.”44 According to the editor, dispersal was to be a preventative measure.
Since urban areas held a high concentration of people, governmental bodies, and
industrial production, decentralization would scatter these three geographically,
effectively assuring that a singular nuclear attack could not cripple a city, region, or the
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country’s modes of governance, production, and its labor force. These fundamental ideas
worked their way into policy decision-making. For example, Paul Yount, transportation
chief for the Army, estimated that as many as seventy million people would have to be
evacuated in the event of a war. Consequently, the military wanted highways on the
urban periphery to bypass cities in the event of a nuclear attack. He believed that with
enough warning people could load up their cars and evacuate cities across the United
States. New and improved roads, however, would be necessary for this mass exodus. 45
The nation’s defense and interstate highways would become inextricably linked during
the postwar period and “Congress would assume its importance whenever debating a
federal-aid highway.”46
In the summer of 1954 President Eisenhower created the President’s Advisory
Committee on a National Highway Program to bring his national system of interstate
highways to fruition. As Tom Lewis argues, “Eisenhower had an almost pathological fear
of a depression” and wanted to shake the Republican Party free from the responsibility of
the 1929 crash.47 Latching on to New Dealer’s arguments for public works projects,
Eisenhower, believed a national interstate system “would head off postwar
unemployment and recession” and “spark economic development throughout the
country.”48 Eisenhower placed friend, fellow soldier, and engineer, General Lucius D.
Clay (then head of the Continental Can Company), at its helm. Clay’s plan called for a
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Federal Highway Corporation to finance $2.5 billion worth of construction. The
corporation would issue $25 billion dollars-worth of bonds and retire them in thirty years.
Since traffic would continue to increase, the whole financial program would produce
enough money to finance 90% of the interstate system, refund toll debts, and integrate
toll roads into the national interstate system. The only problem was that no one, other
than Eisenhower, approved of Clay’s entire plan. His supporters lobbied hard, but Clay’s
refusal to make any changes killed the program. It failed in the Senate Public Works
Committee by an eight to four vote; pushed aside in favor of Tennessee Senator Albert
Gore’s own bill.49
Despite Gore’s legislative victory, his bill was not perfect. Gore kept Clay’s 90%
federal backing but cut construction time in half to five years. Since he kept funding so
tight, Gore required the Bureau of Public Roads to return to congress for yearly
appropriation but did not mention how congress would pay for construction. Maryland
Congressman George Hyde Fallon quickly realized Eisenhower would never sign this bill
since it raised the public debt. As a result, he and Frank Turner drafted a bill that kept
Gore’s bill fundamentally intact. However, this legislation extended construction over
thirteen years and created a trust fund filled with revenues from gas and oil tax hikes.
Taxes ultimately led to this iteration’s defeat by a non-partisan vote of 292-123 on July
27, 1955. Following Eisenhower’s annual address to Congress in which he lamented, “12
months have now passed in which we have fallen behind in road construction needed for
the personal safety, the general prosperity, [and] the national security of the American
people,” highway legislation was back on the table. Instead of writing funding into the
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1956 Federal Aid Highway Act, Fallon kicked it over to the House Ways and Means
Committee who drafted a separate Highway Revenue Act. This act created a trust fund
that enabled a “pay as you go” plan—as opposed to bonds—desired by so many people.
The Highway Act passed the House by a margin of 388-19 and by voice vote in the
senate.50 The construction of the nation’s largest public works program could finally
begin.

Memphis
Local debates in Memphis, Tennessee over highway policy, however, were about
something bigger than economic prosperity and national defense; in a city long ruled by
Boss Edward Hull Crump these debates revealed something fundamental to American
society was at stake—democracy itself. Crump was elected mayor in 1909 and later
ousted in 1916 for not enforcing prohibition laws but stayed active in local and state
politics. He shattered newspaper magnate Luke Lea’s state-level political apparatus
following the 1932 election and succeeded him as the boss of Tennessee. By 1944, Time
magazine labeled Crump “the most absolute political boss” in the United States of
America as he cast his shadow over almost every aspect of municipal and state affairs
until his death in 1954.51 During Crump’s final years, however, reform organizations like
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the Civic Research Committee (CRC) reached beyond Memphis’s political institutions
and latched on to the emergent interstate planning to combat boss rule in Memphis.
The CRC originated in the wake of Estes Kefauver’s Senate Democratic primary
victory in 1948, which provided space to reform Memphis’s governance. 52 This was an
earth shattering electoral victory for the anti-Crump camp since Crump maintained
control over Memphis by creating a “climate of fear…[which] thwarted any efforts”
towards democratic participation in municipal politics.53 While this electoral victory did
not fundamentally change politics in Memphis and Shelby County, it made Edward
Meeman, editor of the Press Scimitar and longtime anti-Crump stalwart; attorney Lucius
Burch Jr., a civil liberties advocate; and Edmund Orgill, the president of a local hardware
company realize that a “permanent local reform organization would be necessary” to
“insure the continued growth of political freedom.” 54 On May 27, 1949, fifty concerned
citizens incorporated the CRC. Its members came from a wide cross section of
Memphis’s civic and business community. It contained Republicans and Democrats,
labor and capital, and claimed to be non-partisan in its endeavors. 55 The CRC set out to
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effect reform in five areas thus weakening Crump’s hold over the city and inserting the
lay person into municipal politics: permanent voter registration, voting machine
implementation in elections, the replacement of the commission government with a
council-manager form, the creation of a civil service merit system for city and county
employees, and perhaps most important, city planning.56
The CRC’s Planning Committee believed transportation planning offered one of
the best chances to democratize city governance. 57 On the surface “Operation Traffic
Triangle” was an interdependent approach that focused on transportation infrastructure to
remedy the city’s traffic problems. 58 But built into the plan was a multi-party platform
that called for the city to come together with private organizations to fix urban problems.
This plan called for a public “Memphis Traffic Authority” to issue bonds for expressway
construction, encouraged the city and civic groups to work with private carriers to
develop express bus service, and urged the City to adopt measures to encourage private
investment to construct off-street parking.59 The Planning Committee studied the
program’s long-term feasibility, cooperated with other area organizations to study and
make recommendations to fix transportation problems, published reports on their
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findings, and most importantly given the context, gauged public opinion on transportation
improvements with the hopes of democratizing Memphis’s urban planning. 60
The CRC’s planning platform was an outright rebuke of Crump’s authoritarian
rule that caused Memphis’s planning deficiencies. During the 1920s, the City Planning
Commission called upon Harland Bartholomew, the famed urban planner who would also
produce Memphis’s 1955 comprehensive plan, to study the city’s transportation. 61 His
1924 Memphis plan focused on the city’s struggling street system and recommended
major improvements, especially street widening and the establishment of north and south
routes to increase traffic flow. 62 Bartholomew noted the plan’s effectiveness relied on
“politically astute leadership on the planning commission.” Without which, “neither the
general public nor elected officials would abide by the substance of the comprehensive
design.”63 But since Crump hand-selected the Planning Commission’s members, they
acted in accordance with his position on municipal affairs.64 This ominous statement
foreshadowed the City’s inaction on many, if not most, of its recommendations.
Much of this inertia began within the City Planning Commission itself. Since
Crump “saw little need for long-range planning,” the commission was woefully
underfunded and understaffed. According to the International City Managers’
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Association minimum requirements for “Local Planning Administration,” a city of
Memphis’s size needed a minimum staff of 20: a planning director with ten years of
experience, two senior planners, four general planners, six to ten draftsmen and clerks,
one statistician, and several stenographers. Memphis’s planning staff was woefully
deficient: its director had no technical planning education; the department employed no
trained planners, but instead only three draftsmen, and two secretaries. 65 Without the
necessary people to fulfill the city’s planning needs, then Memphis would stagnate and
eventually crumble.
As late as 1955, Charles Peete, chairman of the CRC’s Planning Commission,
lamented the city’s inaction on funding a more robust and efficient planning department.
He called on the City and County to consolidate their planning commissions to better
coordinate metropolitan planning and allocate a minimum budget of $100,000 annually.
Peete also demanded the Planning Commission have “complete authority in the selection
of a competent, qualified staff of planners.” 66 This last statement represented his disdain
for the Crump machine, which linked municipal employment to political work. For Peete
and the CRC, planning should be above politics.
But planning shortcomings were not just limited to the Planning Commission;
they included policy as well. In 1947, the city issued $25 million in bonds, of which it
allocated only $3 million for city streets. As G. Wayne Dowdy points out, this money did
“modernize much of the city’s infrastructure, but it was hardly an ambitious plan” and
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eventually “hobbled Memphis as it tried to compete with other southern urban centers”
such as Atlanta, Georgia. 67 Couple this with the city’s annexation of 72.6 square miles of
surrounding area between 1944 and 1956 and a postwar rock bottom assessed tax rate of
$1.80 per $1,000, Memphis proved fiscally incapable of undertaking the capital
improvements necessary to keep up with its booming postwar population and effectively
manage its growth. 68 Speaking to a joint meeting of the American Institute of Planners
and Associated General Contractors, Peete asked “how can Memphis grow up when the
$1.80 tax rate continues to be the dominating gauge of public needs[?]” 69 City planning
was visibly deficient, but before the CRC could affect any real change it had to take its
message to the streets and persuade the everyday Memphian to understand the urgency of
proper city planning.70
The CRC quickly realized that to get the citizenry involved in the city’s planning
efforts, it would have to embark on a grassroots campaign. During 1953 and early 1954,
the CRC directly challenged the Crump machine by showing The Living City, an
educational film on urban renewal and city planning that emphasized democratic
participation in urban planning. Planning advocates believed that citizens armed with
sufficient information would become civic activists, lobby city officials, and force the
Crump machine to remedy Memphis’s postwar ills and plan for the future. 71 The CRC
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held its initial screening on January 4, 1953, with key members of Memphis’s civic elite
and government in attendance. Following the film, Mayor Frank Tobey stated the CRC
should show The Living City around Memphis.72 The CRC acted on Tobey’s
recommendation and scheduled screenings with numerous civic groups in Memphis,
West Memphis, Arkansas, and North Mississippi. 73 While this type of outreach
eventually influenced city officials to hire Bartholomew to draft Memphis’s 1955 master
plan, these small viewings did not affect Memphis’s broader population. With this
shortcoming in mind the CRC turned to television to get their message into homes across
the region. If people would not come to the message, then the message would go to the
people.
The CRC worked with the Twentieth Century Fund to develop a planningcentered television program that furthered urban planning’s democratic promise. The
final product, “The City is You,” aired on local television station WMCT as nine fifteenminute episodes that covered topics such as the role of the city, traffic and transportation,
and comprehensive metropolitan planning. This programming did two things. First, it
demonstrated how urban planning affected peoples’ daily lives. Second, it would spark
Memphians into demanding a voice in their city’s development. For example, if after
watching the episode on zoning, an area resident would then understand how and why a
multi-family dwelling or industry appeared around the corner. If they opposed these types
of structures in their neighborhoods, they could voice their concerns to the Planning

72

Minutes of a meeting of persons interested in city planning, January 4, 1953, Box 8, Folder 7,

73

The Living City screening dates and locations, Undated, CRCP, Box 8, Folder 4.

CRCP.

83

Commission and affect the Commission’s decision as soon as they caught wind of such
developments. This kind of cause and effect was exactly what the CRC wanted to
happen.74 In the Planning Committee’s 1954 annual report, Peete believed The Living
City and “The City is You” generated a “great deal of interest” in planning, prepared
“Memphis citizens to understand and cooperate with a [comprehensive] plan for the
city,” and “blaze a trail in development of programs which may be exportable to other
communities.”75 He concluded that this “great show of concern” aided Memphis’s future
by creating citizens who “can contribute to the formation of a farsighted worthy plan for
the future development of our city.”76
If educational programs provided the impetus for grassroots planning, then
freeways were the backbone of the CRC’s planning reforms. Its freeway advocacy
occurred in an era in which cities around the country viewed freeways to maintain their
central business districts’ economic vitality. By the 1930’s decentralization was well
underway in American cities. 77 As residences sprawled in all directions, businesses
followed suit. If people no longer went downtown to shop, the central business district
would perish. Therefore planners and civic boosters saw freeways as one solution, among
many, to maintain the central business district’s centrality in economic affairs. 78 For
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example, Lawrence Hewes, the western operation chief for the Public Roads
Administration, claimed, “the modern expressway can help preserve the city” since it
allowed “convenient access now found in suburban centers.” 79 Freeways also
recentralized business by providing “uninterrupted movement from the periphery to the
center” and “enhanced downtown’s accessibility.” 80 The Traffic Advisory Commission
(TAC), a city-sponsored civic organization that studied Memphis’s traffic problems, also
understood that freeways maintained the central business district’s solvency. 81 So, by the
early 1950s when the Crump machine had not seriously considered freeways as a means
to maintain the central business district and solve the city’s traffic woes, the CRC took
the initiative to make freeways a public issue. 82
In May 1951, Bruckner Chase used the Crump machine’s planning incompetency
as a referendum on its ability to govern the city. Chase did not believe anyone within the
city government had “accurate knowledge on what a freeway is.” 83 Chase was
particularly angry at the City’s incompetence since he took trips around the country in
1949 to learn about freeways. 84 Upon return Chase brought up freeways at a TAC
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meeting that December and rallied civic groups throughout the city to his cause. Mayor
Overton appeared to respond to Chase’s advocacy. He sought out information on Federal
money and highway legislation, but by the end of 1952 these attempts did not match up
with his stated priorities regarding streets and traffic.85 So in the fall of 1952 when city
planner William Fredericks emphasized the City’s focus on expressways to remedy
Memphis’s traffic problems, his comments represented the Crump machine’s
acknowledgement that freeways were important to Memphis’s future.86
In the months following Fredericks’s speech, the CRC’s Planning Committee
explored possible avenues to enact freeway planning in Memphis. It briefly discussed
bringing the issue before the Shelby County Legislative Delegation as it headed to
Nashville for the upcoming legislative session, since state-level appropriations for
freeway studies and rights-of-way purchases would require legislative action. 87 But since
the delegation would need evidence as to what measures the City took regarding
freeways (and so far no measures had been taken), the Planning Committee scratched this
approach in favor of focusing on Memphis’s elected officials. Orgill suggested members
of the Planning Committee draft a statement and present it before the City Commission. 88
The statement questioned the Commission’s intentions regarding freeways. In an era
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where cities of comparable size had already moved forward studying, constructing, or
using freeways to ease traffic congestion, why had the Commission not done so?
Additionally, by citing the TAC’s 1950 freeway recommendations, area newspaper
reports on the benefits of freeways, and Fredericks’s speech, the CRC demonstrated that
freeway discussion was already prevalent in Memphis. 89
On December 9, 1952, Bruckner Chase forced the City Commission to go on the
record regarding its position on freeways. 90 His inquiries gave the Commission two
possible ways to respond: it either did not entertain freeways because it was incompetent,
or it did not care what Memphis’s citizens thought. Mayor Watkins Overton, a Crump
machine stalwart, was not happy with what he heard. 91 He chided the CRC for not giving
him the questions in advance. Overton was also obstinate in his response and talked in
circles. He stated there was no feasible plan for freeways in Memphis—an apt response
given that the City had not explicitly sought one. He also claimed the City hired a
competent planner in the past to conduct traffic studies, but he had not suggested
freeways specifically. And since there was no freeway plan, Overton could not approach
the Shelby County delegation to request legislation regarding freeways. 92 In short,
Overton answered with a resounding “no!” Despite Overton’s objections, Edmund Orgill
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believed the CRC acted in “good faith” for the community by getting “these matters out
in the open where they can be discussed by all” as opposed to in a private meeting behind
closed doors. Even though this was a small victory, the CRC knew they were still on the
outside looking in.
Given the CRC’s outsider status, it directed its advocacy towards the
Commissioners since it believed cooperating with other officials within the city
government to progress its freeway initiative would be the most effective method. The
CRC formed informal committees and met with members of the city government. 93 The
Planning Committee generally viewed these meetings a success as Fredericks appeared
cooperative and shared his views on freeways in more detail. Will Fowler, the city
engineer, even suggested Charles Peete write Mayor Overton and ask that he give Fowler
authorization to cooperate with the Planning Committee. 94 The Committee’s meeting
with Commissioner Frank Tobey proved the most beneficial as he clarified Overton’s
statements from earlier in the month and laid out the City’s position regarding freeways. 95
Yet this was not enough. As the CRC quickly realized, if it wanted freeway planning to
become a legitimate possibility, they would have to rely on the person whose power they
sought to overthrow: Ed Crump.
The Planning Committee’s consideration of working with Crump to enact freeway
planning tested their organization’s democratic ideals.96 All members of the Planning
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Committee understood that Crump’s power in Memphis was still near absolute. Howard
Ross claimed “no official in City Hall will commit himself without authority from Mr.
Crump.”97 Russell Latshaw concurred, “Mr. Crump must be sold on the idea before the
City will make an Expressway study.” 98 Others felt that enlisting Crump’s assistance
betrayed the “CRC’s non-political aims and the trust of CRC’s members and workers.” 99
The Planning Committee reached out to Lucius Burch to see if working with Crump
violated the CRC’s charter. 100 Burch did not believe this was the case since Crump was a
private citizen. He was also unable to “distinguish between attempting to solicit Mr.
Crump’s interest and similar activities that have already taken place.” He suggested
individual members of the Planning Committee approach him as an informal group “and
say to him that through their connection with the Civic Research Committee they have
become very much interest[ed] in the Expressways project and would like to enlist his
interest in the project.”101 Here Burch charted a pragmatic course that achieved both
objectives: pursue Crump’s influence and maintain the CRC’s non-political mandate.
Crump, however, passed away in 1954 before taking a public stance on the freeway. 102
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By the spring of 1953, the CRC realized it was impossible to build a freeway
outside of a broader planning framework. 103 Therefore it shifted its attention from
freeways specifically to comprehensive planning broadly, which focused on the
relationship between all forms of infrastructure. Since comprehensive planning entailed
streets, schools, and land use zoning, for example, the CRC could potentially broaden its
coalition. It was one thing to sell freeway planning to car owners or those that lived in the
suburbs, but if the CRC could recruit families with children and people concerned with
their physical surroundings into its fold, then the CRC’s grassroots movement to
democratize Memphis’s planning would pick up steam.
While at an American Planning and Civic Association (APCA) conference in
New Orleans in March 1953, CRC representatives enlisted Louis Bisso, Director, City
Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of New Orleans and coordinator for New
Orleans’s master plan for expressways, overpasses, and major street improvements, to
spread the gospel of comprehensive planning in Memphis. 104 During this visit he
addressed civic groups, elected officials, conducted a television interview, and served as
a panelist and keynote speaker for a forum on city planning. 105 Here Bisso laid bare the
solution to Memphis’s planning woes: comprehensive planning. 106 He also believed
politicians, planners, and people were the key entities in city planning. This “vital

Charles Caldwell, “Bartholemew Says: Revise Your Old Plan and then Publish Them,” Press
Scimitar, March 14, 1953, Frank Tobey Papers (FTP), Box 6, MPLIC; Charles Caldwell, “Key Ideas on
Planning Born at New Orleans,” March 17, 1953, Press Scimitar, Box 6, FTP.
103

104

Stimbert to Pool, April 18, 1953, Box 8, Folder 2, CRCP.

105

Plan of the Day, Box 8, Folder 2, CRCP.

106
Meeting of the Planning Committee, April 28, 1953, Box 4, Folder 7, CRCP; Charles Caldwell,
“Bisso to Memphis: You Must Have a Master Plan,” Press Scimitar, April 29, 1953.

90

triangle” equated proper city planning with good governance. 107 The people needed
planners and politicians to carry out city plans. If you removed the people, power would
become too centralized and there would not be anyone to agitate politicians to manage a
city’s growth. Without planners, a city would not have the technical expertise to carry out
a plan. Perhaps most importantly, he believed people could not lose their enthusiasm for
comprehensive planning. 108 Bisso warned the CRC that if they did not continue to agitate
for comprehensive planning and apply pressure to the City Commission, the whole
endeavor could fall apart.
The CRC’s enthusiasm towards comprehensive planning led to a series of lectures
and study groups that educated its attendees on comprehensive planning’s democratic
possibilities.109 Earnest Schumacher, APCA conference attendee, claimed a
comprehensive plan “is essential for any concerted effort to promote…economic growth”
since it would shape Memphis’s future commercial, residential, and industrial
possibilities.110 But a comprehensive plan would not implement itself. In his report to the
CRC’s annual meeting, Peete believed it was up to “citizens groups like C.R.C.” to
become “torch bearers for a successful completion of the program.” 111 He considered
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educational programs like this key to keeping the electorate informed on planning issues,
who would in turn agitate city leaders’ to address Memphis’s planning needs.
Between Bisso’s visit and the CRC’s educational programs, the City Commission
could no longer ignore its citizens’ cries for comprehensive planning. The CRC benefited
from Overton’s resignation in March, 1953. Commissioner Frank Tobey replaced
Overton as Mayor and provided the CRC direct access to city hall. He was also a big
supporter of an expressway system and responded positively to the Scimitar’s
endorsement of Harland Bartholomew.112 Tobey reached out to his firm and in May,
1953, Bartholomew responded by sending staff members to Memphis “to review what
Memphis has done and decide then what part of existing city planning can be included in
the new master plan.”113 After the City and Harland Bartholomew and Associates reached
an agreement, Harry Alexander with Bartholomew’s St. Louis Office issued Mayor
Tobey and the Board of Commissioners their proposal. The comprehensive plan was a
multi-faceted study on several areas of planning: population, land use, major streets,
parking, schools, parks and recreation, public buildings, the city’s appearance, and longrange public improvements. Alexander estimated Bartholomew’s planners would need
two years to complete the study and it would cost $144,500. He also suggested the City
appropriate an additional $10,000 to publish the plan after it was completed. 114
Memphis’s citizens finally had a voice in the city’s urban planning.
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While the comprehensive plan represented the capstone of the CRC’s planning
effort, Bartholomew’s “Major Street Plan” provided the impetus for freeway construction
going forward. The population study estimated that by 1980 most of Memphis’s
population would head east.115 To adapt to this eastward trend, the plan suggested several
alterations and improvements to Memphis’s current street grid: widen several east/west
routes and construct even more north/south rights of way. Most importantly, however,
Bartholomew suggested the City build an external freeway loop around Memphis and an
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internal freeway to connect the suburbs to the central business district. 116 The internal
route would flow from the east, through the central city to downtown splitting Overton
Park, Memphis’s oldest green space in two. The Tennessee State Highway Department
later incorporated this route into its own interstate planning following Congress’s passage
of the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act. 117 While this freeway system was still years away
from construction, it represented the hard fought, tangible results of civic education,
public advocacy, and democratic participation through planning. However, unbeknownst
to the CRC, the city, and planning advocates, the internal route would ignite an urban
revolt against the city, State of Tennessee, and the Federal Government that would shake
the region for the rest of the 20th century.118

Conclusion
So, what did Americans gain from the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act? First, it
expanded and fully funded the interstate system congress approved in 1944.
Fundamentally, it was the same 40,000-mile system but with 1,000 miles of freeways
tacked on for good measure. This legislation also stipulated the entire system be built to
high multilane highway standards regardless of whether traffic volume justified it,

116

“Proposed Major Street Plan,” Press Scimitar, MPS Morgue, Group 63068.

117

Harland Bartholomew and Associates, A Report Upon: Interstate Highway Routes in Memphis
and Shelby County, Tennessee, Box 83, Folder 1, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Papers (CPOP),
MPLIC.
Troy A. Hallsell, “’That which is removed is annihilated’: The Overton Park Freeway Revolt, a
National Movement, 1955-1971,” (paper presented at the 2014 Graduate History Conference, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, LA, March 21-22, 2014); Raymond Mohl, “Citizen Activism and Freeway
Revolts in Memphis and Nashville: The Road to Litigation,” Journal of Urban History 40 (2014), 870-893;
Peter L. Strauss, “Administrative Law Stories: The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park V. Volpe,” Columbia
Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 05-85 Law & Economics,
Working Paper Series, Paper Number 267.
118

94

deviating from a long-standing engineering principle that stated demand should
determine the routes. Second, instead of divvying up money among the states, this
legislation funded the entire interstate system as a single project, which finalized the
transition towards a consolidated bureaucratic road-building regime.119 This was key.
Instead of building, improving, and maintaining state and local highways through the old
federalist system of local control, it all but guaranteed the highways would be built in a
set period as opposed to in a piecemeal fashion.
What did such a program cost? The bill authorized approximately $25 billion
dollars to be spent over twelve years to accelerate interstate construction. The federal
government would pay 90% of expenses, leaving the states to come up with the
remaining 10%. While this legislation had something for everyone, cities came out on
top—since traffic congestion was worse in urban areas, they would receive a higher share
of the funds. To pay for interstate construction and maintenance, money would come
from a highway trust fund. Revenues from taxes on fuel, tires, and new vehicles would go
into the trust fund and were for construction alone. 120
But what did such a program cost? Much like how the price of poor roads was
built into the cost of consumable goods prior to the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act, the
invisible nature of fuel taxes and duties obscured the legislation’s social and
environmental costs. As Christopher Wells points out, “the legal linkage of gasoline taxes
to road building…shielded car- and highway-centered transportation policy from the
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regular discussion and debate that typifies the allocation of general funds.” 121 This
legislation, in the words of Mark Rose, “foreclosed most of the options in American road
politics.”122 Aside from those whose homes were seized or threatened by freeway
construction, the citizenry-writ-large did not challenge the fiscal politics of highway
construction once it began. Freeway construction would continue even after anti-freeway
activism erupted in the 1960s and 1970s. With the system paid for, freeway opponents
became outliers, obstructions to progress.
Perhaps more importantly than what Americans gained from the legislation, is
what this legislation did to American society. The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act wrote
into law an auto-dependent society. 123 This was not lost on critic Lewis Mumford:
When the American people, through congress, voted a little while ago…for a twenty-six
billion highway program, the most charitable thing to assume about this action is that they
hadn’t the faintest notion of what they were doing. Within the next fifteen years they will
doubtless find out; by that time it will be too late to correct all the damage to our cities and
our countryside, not least the efficient organization of industry and transportation, that this
ill conceived and preposterously unbalanced program will have wrought. 124

Mumford’s premonition indeed played out as the interstate system helped complete a
geographic, demographic, and political realignment of American cities. This realignment
consumed natural resources, increased residential segregation, and disproportionately
altered metropolitan tax bases in favor of suburban municipalities via tax flight, which
helped fuel the postwar conservative movement, pitting white suburban spaces against
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black urban ones as they fought over political power. 125 Postwar housing needs may have
pushed white Americans to the suburbs, but the interstate system all but guaranteed they
would stay there. And for people to get from their suburban homes to the urban core for
work, shopping, or leisure, they would take the freeway, directly through the city.
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Chapter 4: The Overton Park Freeway Revolt, a National Movement, 1955-1971

In April 1964, amidst the uproar caused by the proposed freeway construction
through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee, a local newspaper published a political
cartoon. It depicted an engineer wearing a white shirt with tie, black pants, and a hard hat,
perched upon a steamroller. The dust of “land marks” and “historical sites” caught in his
destructive path shrouded the engineer’s eyes, blinding him of his effect on the built
environment in which he passed. With his gaze forever focused on “progress,” the
weight, force, and “authority” of urban renewal left the citizens of Memphis shaking
from the rumble of his machinery as it rolled forward in the quest for modernity.
In response to this destruction, Anona Stoner, secretary for the Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park (CPOP)—a grassroots organization aimed at stopping freeway
construction through Overton Park—wrote to her former boss and mentor Arthur E.
Morgan, past president of Antioch College and the first director of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. She claimed that “Memphis is being ripped to pieces” and “in many spots its
[sic] like a bombed-out city.” The following July, Marie Handy, president of CPOP,
wrote a letter to Rex Whitton, the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads (BPR).
She was concerned with the lack of parkland in Memphis and believed the proposed route
would not just ruin the park; it would annihilate it. “That which is removed is
annihilated,” fumed Handy, and “it is impossible to ‘restore’ it.” She understood that
highways were “needed for progress” but parks, “created by God, for the people, should
not be ignored and destroyed by men.” CPOP and opponents of the interstate understood
what Memphis stood to lose if construction moved forward and no amount of money
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could “buy, restore, or replace what will be removed in this proposed construction.”
Staring annihilation directly in the face, CPOP turned outward for help. 1
During the mid-twentieth century, freeway revolts broke out all over the United
States.2 The scholarship on freeway revolts has not, so far, considered these protests as a
national movement.3 In the past, historians have largely depicted freeway revolts as
episodes of civic activism within a location’s demarcated boundaries; placed a revolt’s
eventual success within an institutional context, as was the case with state highway laws
in California; or demonstrated freeway opposition within the halls of power, Baltimore
and Washington D. C. for example. A freeway revolt’s success, however, is not rooted in
place—its efficacy relies on the movement of people and ideas. I argue that the Overton
Park freeway revolt was successful because of this mobility and transmission of ideas
across city and state boundaries. Yes, the Overton Park freeway revolt took place in
Memphis—fought in Memphis by Memphians for the local community—but it was part
of a larger protest. By stepping back and viewing the activists as national, rather than
purely local, we see that the Overton Park freeway revolt was not just part of a national
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movement—it was a national movement. Along with local citizens, anti-freeway groups,
and conservation organizations across the United States, CPOP stood up against profreeway advocates. It employed tactics derived from a national web of activists.
Transplants to the city brought their conservational and grass roots experience with them.
Freeway opponents in the federal government lent them a helping hand. National
movement literature influenced CPOP’s rhetoric, direction, and drive. It also reached out
to other freeway revolt organizers for advice, tactics, and support. Without this
interaction between activists and freeway opponents throughout the country, Overton
Park, as we know it today, would not exist.

Early Activism
Between 1955 and 1964, there was some local, uncoordinated opposition to the
plan from segments of the Memphis community that laid the groundwork for an emergent
grassroots anti-freeway movement. This largely took the form of vocal protests at City
Council meetings. On September 6, 1957, CPOP (then the Committee to Preserve
Overton Park) circulated a form letter to Midtown residents calling on them to sign a
petition opposing the proposed route and attend an upcoming City Commission meeting
to show the Commissioners there was “concerted and organized opposition to the EastWest leg of the proposed expressway.” 4 At the September 18 Commission meeting, 300
residents from the Overton Park area listened to William Pollard of Harland
Bartholomew and Associates explain the details of the proposed interstate route. Despite
claiming the freeway would cause minimal damage, he was met with frequent outbursts
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from angry residents. In response to statements in support of the freeway, opponents
would shout down speakers with a loud “No, no!” When Mayor Edmund Orgill asked the
crowd if they wanted a hearing. The crowd responded, “We want to talk. That’s what we
came here for.”5 Unfortunately for the antis, these early protests fell on deaf ears. Antifreeway activists’ fortunes changed, however, with the arrival of Anona Stoner.
Before spending her first spring in Memphis in 1963, she was a woman of many
hats in the Dayton, Ohio, area. Stoner was a charter member of the Nature Conservancy
of Ohio (Dayton chapter) and the Glen Helen Association, an organization focused on the
conservation of the Glen Helen Nature Preserve in Yellow Springs, Ohio. She was the
president of the Little Gardens Club; and the chairman of its Conservation Committee,
Civic Betterment and Beautification Committee, and Maintenance Committee. She also
served on the Mayor’s Special Committee for Community Needs, investigating and
implementing a treated water supply for the town of Brookville, Ohio. She was a
graduate of Antioch College and worked as a teacher, tutor, and family social welfare
worker. Interested in the development of the self, Stoner believed that parks were places
of beauty and a “live educational laboratory for children.” To her, “outdoor education,
recreation, and natural beauty should be available to everyone.” 6
Stoner was well versed in freeway opposition after battling the state of Ohio in
1958 and 1959. In 1958, the state proposed a cross-town traffic artery to connect two
state highways near Dayton. The artery was hidden in a bridge restoration and
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maintenance proposal. When the citizenry realized a new bridge would push a road
through established neighborhoods, Stoner worked with local citizens to mobilize
opposition. The proposal met with resounding defeat when the bond issue went to
referendum, with seventy percent voting against it. In 1959, the Ohio State Highway
Department proposed a multi-lane 300-foot-wide highway through the 1,000-acre Glen
Helen Nature Preserve between Antioch College and John Bryan State Park. Dr. Kenneth
Hunt, professor of biology at Antioch College and the director of the Glen Helen Nature
Preserve, contacted Stoner for assistance, likely due to her familiarity with Glen Helen
and her role in the Dayton revolt. Working through her garden clubs and women’s
groups, Stoner “sold” the importance of conservation to her friends, who in turn
contacted local conservation organizations in the area. Newspapers latched on to the
cause and opposition to the proposed route soon formed. Within a year, the Governor of
Ohio ordered the highway department to find an alternate route. 7

The Intellectual Origins of Anti-Freeway Activism
When Stoner arrived in Memphis, she was once again in her element. Memphis
citizens’ reaction to the proposed route created a tense situation that was ripe for revolt.
Midtown women rallied to fight freeway construction since they considered Overton Park
to be under their purview. The threat of losing Overton Park particularly encouraged
women to organize politically. The Memphis anti-freeway movement was rooted in a
“politics of motherhood.”8 While CPOP consisted of both men and women, women did
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the work; they pounded the pavement to circulate petitions, organized rallies, and
corresponded with local, state, and federal officials. As Michelle Nickerson points out in
her study on conservative women’s grassroots politics, “the domestic ideology guiding
their family, social, and civic lives” propelled them “into political careers by translating
widespread cultural assumptions about female intuition into a basis for asserting authority
in local affairs.” CPOP’s women’s politics developed in response to bureaucratic,
economic, and intellectual elites, whom they believed sought to usurp their local and
familial control. Much like Nickerson’s activists, CPOP staked a claim in the antifreeway battle as “representatives of the family—mothers and housewives protecting
children, home life, and neighborhoods.”9 Memphis anti-freeway activists did not simply
organize as homeowners, but as mothers who sought to maintain control over their
families by protecting what they saw as the nucleus of their community, Overton Park.
Key to CPOP’s activism was protecting the Old Forest. As the city’s only piece of
wilderness, which occupied approximately 170 acres of Overton Park’s north-eastern
perimeter, it became a focus of the rhetoric that anti-freeway activists wielded to fight
freeway construction through the park.10 Anti-freeway activists’ ideas about the Old
Forest were part of a centuries-long process of intellectual development regarding
wilderness.11 Wilderness began as “something alien to man—an insecure and
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uncomfortable environment against which civilization had waged an unceasing struggle,”
but slowly gave way to the idea that wilderness was necessary to combat civilization.12
Famed conservationist John Muir believed “thousands of tired, nerve-shaken, overcivilized people are beginning to find out that…wilderness is a necessity; and that
mountain parks and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating
rivers, but as fountains of life.”13 Aldo Leopold contributed an ecological worldview—
the idea that man and the environment are interconnected—and redefined civilization as
one that preserved its remaining wilderness. This new definition changed “the role of
Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-opportunity to plain member and citizen of it.
It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.” 14
In Leopold’s definition, wilderness became man’s salvation from progress. As the
intellectual children of John Muir and Aldo Leopold, Memphis’ anti-freeway activists
built upon their legacy as they developed a “philosophy of wilderness,” or, an idea that
defended wilderness “in the way that the philosophy of human freedom underlies the
many specific defenses of civil liberty.” 15
Anti-Freeway activists initially used a “rhetoric of loss” to rally people to defend
the Old Forest on moral grounds.16 In a letter to Mayor Henry Loeb, Anona Stoner,
quoting Henry David Thoreau, called on the necessity of having a primitive forest nearby
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as “a common possession…for instruction and recreation.”17 Anti-freeway activists
repeatedly spoke of the forest as an environment unspoiled by mankind. 18 CPOP
president, biologist, and professor at Southwestern College, Arlo I. Smith described the
Old Forest as a “relatively undisturbed native woodland” and emphasized its biodiversity.
Within its acreage stood ten different species of oaks, four species of hickories, and
approximately fifteen other species of understory trees such as Eastern Hornbeams and
Red Maples. Smith notes the “rapid decomposition of fallen leaves creates a humus-rich
forest floor which supports numerous woodland flowers” such as May Apples and Indian
Strawberry. Emphasizing the natural life cycle, he describes in detail how fallen logs,
along with decaying plant matter, create various molds, which in turn are consumed by
earthworms who “convert waste matter of many sorts into rich and mineral-laden soil,
which is then absorbed by nearby vegetation, creating new life; “nature, unimpeded,
efficiently reuses all her ‘waste’ products.”
The Old Forest contained many species of animals, too. Migratory birds such as
Warblers, Cardinals, Chickadees, and Flickers found the wooded areas in Overton Park to
be a natural sanctuary. Smith emphasized the park’s spring and summer guests as many
different species of Thrushes, Woodpeckers, Carolina Wrens, and Cedar Waxwings built
“their nests and rear[ed] their young in the parkland.” He lamented the disappearance of
the Great Horned Owl, Albino Coon, and the Opossum, believing them to have
disappeared “threatened by so-called ‘progress’.” Smith believed that if the State of
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Tennessee did not build the interstate though Overton Park, the old forest would
“maintain itself indefinitely without a change in species content.” But if construction
continued this “almost bucolic serenity” would be disrupted and destroyed. 19 Freeway
construction did not just destroy a park; it destroyed the circle of life.
Activists’ affinity towards the Old Forest also stemmed from Progressive Era
beliefs that interaction with “wilderness” was key to an adolescent’s wholesome
development.20 The Old Forest contained meandering paths that provided children access
to the area’s only “natural” area. 21 Here youngsters could enjoy a free-range education
through interaction with the park’s natural environment. In letters to city, state, and
federal officials, anti-freeway activists repeatedly spoke to this issue. Anona Stoner
harangued Mayor Henry Loeb about this impending devastation. She asked if “any
thought [had] been given to the point that Overton Park is…a live educational laboratory
for children?” If freeway construction destroyed this space, how could they learn about
the park’s birds and wildlife?22 Marie Handy directed Federal Highway Administrator
Rex Whitton to the idea that Memphians were blessed with a “teaching laboratory for the
biological sciences.” She claimed Memphis was unique in this instance since most other
cities did not have “such areas that Overton Park affords.” 23 Building upon Stoner and
Handy’s claims Arlo Smith stated, “it is easy to understand why Overton Park is the year
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round focus of field trips” for high schoolers, college biology students, and Boy and Girl
Scouts since “man’s impingement upon the woodland—lure Scout Troops from as far
away as Little Rock, Arkansas.” With an eye to the future, Smith hoped the Memphis
Park Commission “would soon incorporate nature study programs in its spring and
summer activities.”24
Freeway construction also threatened the zoo’s educational value. Here, activists
shifted to a “rhetoric of rationality,” where they collected information to support their
claims and formulated policy positions, or in the anti-freeway activists’ instance, build a
legal case.25 The Tennessee Highway Department routed Interstate 40 along a preexisting bus path that ran east/west through Overton Park. Thus, six lanes of concrete
would abut the Zoo’s southern border, with fast moving traffic whizzing by and harming
its four-legged residents. 26 In her account of the expressway controversy, Irma O.
Sternberg pointed to one of the biggest problems regarding freeway construction. She
believed noise and air pollution, especially particulate-laden smog, would waft its way
into the zoo, infecting the animals and its visitors. The public must be warned of “the
correlation between air levels of such pollutants as carbon monoxide, unburned
hydrocarbons, sulfur oxides, and particulates, and the incidence of certain diseases,
including especially emphysema and bronchial asthma.” While this may simply suggest
adverse health conditions, Sternberg invoked the Schuylkill Expressway in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, perceived by contemporaries to be a colossal boondoggle that threatened
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Philadelphia’s zoo; she believed freeway construction would lead to animals’ deaths from
highway-generated pollution, a concern seconded by zoo personnel.27 Anti-freeway
activists used these environmental concerns to test new federal legislation. “There seems
to several observers a strong [National Environmental Policy Act] case to be made here
in Memphis,” Sternberg declared optimistically, “a case which could well serve as [a]
testing ground for a number of important aspects of the environmental statutes.” 28 Armed
with environmental legislation, anti-freeway activists would slowly build up their arsenal
of administrative hurdles around which the State of Tennessee and the Department of
Transportation would have to maneuver.
Contemporary literature also reinforced the notion that Overton Park was a
feminine space. Peter Taylor’s short story, “The Old Forest,” originally published by the
New Yorker in 1979, explores the intertwined roles of race, gender, and class among the
residents surrounding Overton Park in the late 1930s. The park and the forest, while only
occupying a few scant pages of the essay, foregrounds the story’s larger mystery. On an
icy Saturday in December, Nat (the protagonist), a young employee of his father’s cotton
firm and student at nearby Southwestern College, picked up his “female companion” Lee
Ann Deehart and headed off to the library to study for an upcoming Latin exam. While
traveling through Overton Park the protagonist swerved his car off the road to miss an
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oncoming truck but turned too late and struck the approaching vehicle head on. After
coming to, Nat realized Lee Ann was not at the scene of the crash; according to the truck
driver and nearby ice skaters, she leapt form the vehicle seconds after the impact and
sprinted up the hill into the Old Forest. All the protagonist could remember were her
empty footprints in the snow.29
Taylor roots the Old Forest in both the old-world conception that wilderness was
something to be feared, an un-civilizing, dangerous place, and the mid-twentieth century
perception that wilderness was a respite from the stressors of daily life. Over the next
several days Nat, with the help of the police, local newspaper men, his parents, and bride
to be, scoured the city looking for Lee Ann. Remembering that she took off to the Old
Forest, Nat asked himself if she had “come to some harm in those woods?”30 Here, the
author emphasized old world biases towards wilderness: that it was a threat to one’s
survival and a moral vacuum, home to the world’s most uncivilized creatures. While Nat
pointed to contemporary concerns like the “unsavory characters” that occupied the forest
near the zoo, he linked the present to the past and pointed to an oft repeated rumor that
the Chickasaw Indians once ambushed white settlers in this very forest, at this very
location. But here is the twist. Taylor portrays Nat’s concern over the Old Forest as an
attack on his masculinity. Taking up the mantle of male protector, Nat lamented men’s
inability to protect women from the dangers of wilderness. Memphis men, he continued,
“who had any sense of their past” believed “the forest was woman’s greatest danger.”
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They “remembered mad pioneer women, driven mad by their loneliness and isolation,
who ran off into the forest, never to be seen again, or incautious women who allowed
themselves to be captured by Indians and returned at last so mutilated that they were
unrecognizable to their husbands or who at their own wish lived out their lives among
savage captors.”31 For Nat, the Old Forest was an uncivilized space that emasculated men
by wresting women out from under their control.
For Lee Ann however, the Old Forest was a feminine space, a sanctuary. After
Nat and his fiancé Caroline tracked Lee Ann down, Taylor reveals the forest was not the
culprit; it was Lee Ann herself. She claimed she was drawn to the forest following the
accident; “something” made her stay for a while. “She didn’t know what it was. She had
leaned against one of the trees, feeling quite content. It had seemed to her that she was
not alone in the woods. And whatever the other presences were, instead of interfering
with her reflections they seemed to wish to help her clear her thoughts.” 32
By fleeing the accident and running into the Old Forest, she hoped to keep her
grandmother’s identity a secret. Nat, and his fiancé, were of old money, cotton money,
and sat at the top of Memphis’ racial and class order. Lee Ann, however, was a
demimonde, a “girl who was not in the Memphis debutante set,” but often spent time
with society boys like Nat. 33 If the newspapers linked Lee Ann to the car crash, then the
city would learn of her grandmother’s identity. And if her grandmother’s identity became
known, then so would Lee Ann’s past—her mother abandoned her as an infant, and left
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Lee Ann with her grandmother, a working-class woman with a goiter on her neck and the
proprietor of The Cellar, a bar downtown on Adams Street. In a place where class
mattered, this revelation would be the end of her. While in the Old Forest Lee Ann made
up her mind, she was going home to grandma. The Old Forest was the very space that
provided refuge to make such a monumental decision. It was a space free of patriarchy’s
reach. It was a space that allowed her to be a person, not simply a woman. It was a space
where futures were made. Even Nat acknowledged how wilderness empowered women:
“the great forests seemed woman’s last refuge from the brute she lived alone with in the
wilderness.”34
The sanctity of the Old Forest becomes even more intense if we view freeway
construction as a man’s violation of a female body. In a 1970 poem, “The Rape of
Overton Park,” anti-freeway activist Agnes Bowe drew a direct line between freeway
construction through Overton Park and sexual assault. In her mind, Overton Park was a
female space that creates life and provides comfort from the stressors of contemporary
society. Conversely, Bowe gendered the freeway male. It was a hard, phallic object,
designed and built by men, barreling towards Overton Park. Upon construction, it would
ruin the park of its female capacity. Her words recreate the assault’s violent nature: “Now
giant saws, bulldozers, earth-movers / Ruthlessly prepare to change the scene.” As if to
say, “our elected officials were supposed to protect us, but instead betrayed us,” Bowe
projected the trauma of sexual assault upon Memphis’ own citizens:
Have blasted hopes, and broken hearts,
Brought Shock, despair, even early death
To trusting citizens
Who built upon this doubtful platte
34
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Of Peace and Promise

Faced with such an obscene reality, she looked up to God she asked, “What is
Progress?”35
Lastly, freeway construction heaped additional hardships upon women. Irma O.
Sternberg critiqued highway planners’ claim that no harm or damage would befall the
park or its patrons. Speaking in terms most Memphians could understand, Sternberg’s
scale model, as she imagined it, depicted Overton Park with a “football-field width”
barrier between the zoo to the north and the playgrounds, greensward, and golf course to
the south. Next, upon the pedestrian bridge that connected the zoo to the rest of the park
she included small, children-sized figures “high above the whizzing traffic.” Sternberg
intended this image to invoke fear over Midtown children’s safety. While this bridge
would likely be enclosed, children were mere steps away from falling over the side of the
bridge into the oncoming traffic below. Additionally, her model depicted “mothers
carrying infants up the steep stairs on one side and down the other.” While this imagery
did not invoke certain death like the one above, it did place an additional burden upon
women. Instead of pushing their children in a stroller along the greensward or gently
rolling sidewalks to the zoo, mothers would have to haul their children and strollers up a
flight of stairs, across the interstate, and down the other side, effectively neutralizing the
redemptive quality of parks and adding to a woman’s already heavy workload. Who was
to blame? The men who destroyed parks in the name of progress. 36 Female anti-freeway
activists’ gendered view of Overton Park encapsulates many of their fears: freeway
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construction forced women to make additional sacrifices in a male-dominated “Age of
Speed.”37
Anti-freeway activists demanded people realize Overton Park’s value, not simply
its monetary worth. “Highways and roads that encroach on publically [sic] owned park
lands,” Marie Handy claimed, would “usurp the most valuable rather than least expensive
land.”38 In her mind, Memphis was already in short supply of park space. “Disturbing and
removing any part of Overton Park…and substituting an Interstate Highway,” she
claimed, “would result in even more inadequate…recreation facilities.”39 CPOP argued
that Overton Park gave “service to a large cross-section of people for the advancement
of…recreational needs.”40 “Some children,” Handy lamented, “have no other opportunity
to see squirrels leap about in trees.” 41 Since Midtown neighborhoods emerged around
Overton Park, it was literally at the area’s center. For her, there was “Nothing like the
appeal of immediacy—something citizens can…take part in today.” Overton Park’s value
did not lie in the money it produced, but its place, both physically and emotionally, in
Midtowner’s lives.
Most important to these women, however, was their stewardship over Overton
Park as they charged themselves with fighting to preserve it for future generations. In a
flier for a protest rally in July 1964, CPOP placed this goal front and center. They called
on all Memphians to save Overton Park for “the children of tomorrow.” Again, CPOP
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emphasized the Old Forest. Activists noted it was “one of the few urban forests left in the
world today” and they cried out to not “let man destroy in a few days what Nature took
hundreds of years to produce.”42 To them this “primeval land” was a priceless piece of
art. Its destruction would cause a “spiritual loss that cannot be concealed.” 43 Activists
also argued the park held local historical knowledge. The park represented a right to
participate in Memphis’ history.44 In a letter to State Highway Commissioner David M.
Pack, CPOP activists emphasized Overton Park’s place in the city’s past.45 Named after
one of the city’s founders, Judge John Overton, these activists sought to preserve its
“precious heritage…used and passed on unspoiled, undisturbed, to coming
generations.”46 One observer noted Edward Hull Crump’s shame as she claimed to see
the statue turning its head from side to side “saying no, no, no to I-40 in the Park.”47
Activists understood preserving Overton Park as necessary to local identity. Take away
the park and you lose one’s ability to be Memphian. When Midtown women rallied to
save Overton Park from destruction, they did so as stewards charged with the sacred duty
of “maintaining the park and the forest for future generations.” 48
CPOP’s politics, in the words of environmental historian Samuel Hays, did “not
fit into traditional political ideologies, but…cut across them.” True to the emergent New
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Right, anti-freeway activists understood freeway construction through Overton Park as
the destructive results of a powerful, centralized federal government. But activists rarely
framed their criticism as such. Instead of directly pointing to Washington, DC, they
instead used rhetorical questions. For example, when residents asked why the city no
longer cared for the simple things, or why the government would spend double the
amount of money for a freeway that was half as good, they revealed their severe distrust
for a distant government that that supposedly passed legislation and implemented policies
for their benefit, but at their expense. Many threw their hands up and turned to God for an
answer. But had they bothered to look, they would have realized God was not the
problem, it was the government. 49 As a result, CPOP turned to the very government that
threatened Overton Park to solve their problems. In the examples that follow, we will see
CPOP wielded newly passed environmental protection legislation to block freeway
construction. To an outsider, this may appear to be contradictory. However, by using
Michael Stewart Foley’s contention that instead of emphasizing peoples’ politics as
ideological liberal or conservative, scholars should look at an individuals’ “front porch
politics,” or politics based on their own experiences. Here CPOP responded to events that
affected their daily lives and responded accordingly. 50
When anti-freeway activists organized to protect Overton Park, they also asserted
their rights as citizens. CPOP’s anti-freeway activism shifted the freeway planning
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process from one that excluded citizens, to one that required their participation. Kyle
Shelton calls this infrastructural citizenship, or the “quotidian acts residents used to
construct themselves as political actors.” 51 In her history of the Overton Park Freeway
Revolt, Irma O. Sternberg blames a willful exclusion of Memphians from the planning
process. It was such that the public was not permitted to see and comment on a proposed
route. “Only after a route has been surveyed and its location determined,” she wrote “is
the public taken into the planners’ confidence. Then any protests are met with the
assurance that now ‘it is too late’!”52 This procedural, if not willful, exclusion of citizens
from the planning process forced residents to become politically active. When CPOP’s
attorney made the protestors’ case at the freeway’s first public meeting, he put
democratic participation front and center. He reminded the Commission that “Today is
the 170th anniversary of the signing of the declaration of the Constitution and this
meeting is democracy in action.” TG Emmons, a resident of Court Ave., noted the
freeway was paid for by the government. “Who is the government? It is us.” 53 While this
early foray into anti-freeway politics was unsuccessful from a policy standpoint, it got
politically disengaged residents involved in the political process. In the sections that
follow, we see how one public meeting begat a national movement to save Overton Park.
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Early Grassroots Politics
Given the relative newness of freeway revolts by the mid-1960s, CPOP needed
assistance. To come up with an operational framework to combat state highway officials,
Anona Stoner, now in Memphis, corresponded with her Ohio allies. She asked Dr.
Kenneth Hunt about what tactics kept the highway out of Glen Helen. Hunt
recommended CPOP take up a letter writing campaign. According to Hunt, letters from
individuals were more effective than resolutions from organizations. But this campaign
would have to be “large-scale to work.” Next, he suggested CPOP reach out to local,
state, and national conservation organizations, inform them about the issue, and ask if
they would contact their members for support. Third, he stated CPOP needed to get the
public on their side. Unfortunately for CPOP, Memphis newspapers, typically the vehicle
for getting public support on any number of issues, were ardent supporters of the Overton
Park route. Finally, he emphasized that freeway opponents had to meet with decision
makers. If Glen Helen was any indication, Hunt believed these meetings resulted from a
fervent letter writing campaign. Stoner and CPOP had their work cut out for them. 54
Taking Hunt’s recommendations almost to the letter, CPOP began contacting
civic, environmental, and conservation organizations. In the summer of 1964 Stoner and
company compiled a list of regional and national organizations that could be of
assistance. At the local level CPOP reached out to organizations that stood to be affected
by the Overton Park route: Brooks Art Gallery, Memphis Art Academy, and the MidMemphis Improvement Association. Local conservation organizations included the
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Shelby Forest Council and the Tennessee Ornithological Society. At the national level
they contacted Wilderness Society and the Nature Conservancy. This type of outreach
eventually enlisted the Sierra Club and National Audubon Society (NAS), both powerful
and influential conservation organizations, to join the lawsuit against the Secretary of
Transportation in 1969.55
On July 25, 1964, to raise awareness about the proposed freeway route and get the
citizenry involved, CPOP held a rally at Rainbow Lake in Overton Park. It handed out
bumper stickers, which stated “KEEP X-WAY OUT OF OVERTON PARK.”
Automobiles sporting these stickers could then serve as moving billboards for freeway
opposition. CPOP members also distributed flyers. The flyers laid out the nuts and bolts
of the controversy for the public. They explained the path of the freeway and used
photographs of road construction and subsequent destruction of Riverside Park in
downtown Memphis as a warning of the damage I-40 would cause to the park. They
stated newspapers, local and state officials, and business interests have kept the public
uninformed on the matter. The flyers also discussed the “cost” of the freeway, which
included both the monetary price tag as well as the environmental damage the park and
surrounding neighborhoods would incur. But most importantly it told the reader what
“you” could do about it. “Write letters,” instructed Marie Handy, president of CPOP in
1964. “Write lots of protest letters.” 56
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These methods, recommended by Hunt and implemented through Stoner, earned
CPOP a meeting with Governor Frank Clement, Tennessee Highway Commissioner
David Pack, and Chief Engineer of Tennessee Highways Warren Dunlap in the fall of
1964. The delegation included Marie Handy, Arlo Smith, Helen Parker Overton, wife of
former mayor Watkins Overton, and Stoner. They aired their grievances and concerns.
Overton spoke in opposition to the proposed route “not just because it’s named Overton,
but because the expressway would cause destruction which could not be measured in
dollars and cents.”57 The expressway would not just destroy homes; it would destroy
entire communities. Memphis’s history and heritage, however, were not the only things at
risk. Smith spoke to the park’s educational value. The wooded areas housed “rare plants
and wild life…particularly so for a mid-city” and claimed the park to be an educational
center, used by “nature students” throughout Memphis. CPOP claimed the expressway
would cause severe ecological damage to the park, killing all the wildlife and inhibiting
the growth of the forest thus rendering the educational value of the park inert.58
Clement was receptive to CPOP’s protests. He claimed to be “in sympathy” with
their cause and preferred “to keep the expressway out of the park.” He ordered another
“exhaustive study” of the proposed route, one that would take three to six months to
complete. A letter from Rex M. Whitten, director of BPR, to Handy expressed the
diligence and scope of the new study: “These studies for Interstate Highway 40, which
include the impact on the community and Overton Park, have not been finalized. All
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responsible agencies continue to study this matter to assure the soundness of a plan to be
followed. No effort is being spared to see that all considerations are properly balanced,
and there are numerous considerations involved.” 59

Freeway Proponents
The Overton Park I-40 expressway route had a considerable number of
proponents for a variety of reasons. Scripps-Howard, which owned the Memphis PressScimitar and the Commercial Appeal, was a staunch supporter of the Overton Park
route.60 This monopoly over Memphis’s two largest circulating newspapers provided the
citizens of Memphis with a favorable view of the route while rendering CPOP nearly
voiceless. In editorial after editorial, the Press-Scimitar decried the expressway
opposition’s protests, downplaying the environmental concerns. It stressed the route
would only use twenty-six to twenty-eight acres of parkland, nowhere near enough to
adversely affect the park. The paper also stated Memphis was a popular travel
destination, which brought increased automobile traffic. The Press-Scimitar knew of one
way to alleviate traffic congestion; build freeways. New freeways would only help tourist
dollars flow into the city. It also derided CPOP for trying to influence the route. “Just
because a group of citizens fights a government proposal does not always mean the group
is right.” In reaction to CPOP’s “stepped up letter-writing campaign,” the Press-Scimitar
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called for citizens to back the state of Tennessee, Shelby County, and city officials to get
the expressway built.61
Anti-freeway activists believed Scripps-Howard’s monopoly over the city’s
newspapers tipped the scales in favor of the freeway route. Irma Sternberg and Sunshine
Snyder levied accusations at the press claiming they intentionally obfuscated or refused
to report upon the route’s details. For example, Snyder stated the Commercial Appeal
was CPOP’s “true nemesis” since it did not present an accurate picture of the proposed
route. She claimed the paper misled the public by stating the “route through the park was
not going to be a 20’ wide strip, but rather two 20’ wide strips with a median inbetween.” Sternberg claimed the media was “largely to blame” for the route since “they
have chosen to echo” freeway proponent’s “tired and disproven clichés” that highways
mean progress. By refusing to educate or inform the public, Sternberg lamented, “most of
our citizenry likewise have been misled, deceived, bamboozled into signing away the
deed to 26 acres or more of priceless urban parkland.” Writing in American Forests,
Mike Frome derided Scripps-Howard for placing all its bets on commercial interests. He
claimed, “It suppressed news, slanted and distorted news, and treated developments on
Overton Park with the bias of a Russian blackout…[it] ridiculed park defenders, belittled
any politician wo dared support them, and sought time and again to create an impression
that the issue had been settled.”62
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More importantly, Irma Sternberg believed this monopoly was a threat to
democracy in Memphis. In 1956, Dutch psychoanalyst and Jewish refugee Joost A.M.
Meerloo published The Rape of the Mind: The Psychology of Thought Control,
Menticide, and Brainwashing, which explored totalitarian governments’ application of
brainwashing through case studies on Nazi Germany, Communist Soviet Union, and the
United States’ own House Un-American Activities Committee. In a section titled “Mass
Conditioning Through Speech,” Meerloo demonstrates how governments condition their
people through indoctrination and propaganda. He names the media as the best vehicle in
which this act is most possible: “he who is master of the press and radio is master of the
mind.” Governments could easily distribute these “ready-made opinions” daily until they
became embedded in the brain. For Meerloo, there was on formula for political
conditioning, if someone repeats over and over “your assumptions and suggestions” it
will minimize people’s ability to communicate “dissent and opposition.” This
conditioning produced a form of groupthink where “people are incited to think what other
people think” and forced everyone to “identify with the powerful noisemaker. Big
Brother’s voice resounds in all.” 63
Sternberg’s handwritten notes on this section clearly indicates that Meerlo’s ideas
resonated with her. She underlined the above quotations, which supported her belief that
not only was the media stacked against the “obstructionist environmentalists” in favor of
the Overton Park freeway route, but that a media abdicated its responsibility to the people
by echoing the perspective of “an entrenched plutocracy, aided by a power-swayed
bureaucracy.” Instead of educating or informing the reading public, the media “misled,
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deceived, bamboozled” Memphis’s citizens “into signing away the deed to 26 acres or
more of priceless urban parkland.”64 Sternberg was so incensed that she added her own
touches to a Press-Scimitar political cartoon that appeared in an October 1971 issue. The
original cartoon depicted Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol lecturing a bullet-ridden
body, named democracy, tied to a post. However, Sternberg made this distant conflict
ring true for Memphians. On Lon Nol’s shirt, she crossed out his name and wrote
“Memphis Media.” And beneath the word “Democracy” on the lifeless body Sternberg
added “In Memphis.” This may have been hyperbolic, but anti-freeway activists made
their beliefs clear: Scripps-Howard’s coverage of the Overton Park freeway route was
“characteristic of all authoritarian societies.” 65
The Memphis Chamber of Commerce aligned itself with the media by calling on
city officials to listen to the “majority interests of the community.” Speaking as part of
this majority in 1964, the City Beautiful Commission claimed, “It is the consensus…that
this route is justifiable and will be made into a beautiful route into our city.” The
Commission sympathized with CPOP in wanting to preserve parks and “even increase
them in numbers.” However, due to increased traffic and “desires to travel safely and
quickly,” the Commission believed that modern problems needed modern solutions. Roy
Marr, president of the Downtown Association, believed the proposed route was the most
economical and practical option available and “this entire proposition has been studied
for a sufficient amount of time” and “shouldn’t be delayed any longer.” But well-to-do
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businessmen and those concerned with the beautification of Memphis were not the only
ones with an axe to grind. In a postcard to Handy dated October 11, 1964, an anonymous
author berated CPOP for their activism. In a profanity-laced tirade, the freeway
proponent demanded Handy keep her “shitty nose out of Progress.” The author believed
the freeway would get working people and shoppers to and from downtown, which was
“going to the dogs.” Out of what appeared to be a combination of malice, contempt, and
frustration, the author fumed: “I wish they would build it [the freeway] through your
house.”66
But these proponents paled in comparison to the people who brought the most
clout, Tennessee state highway officials. Their view of the Overton Park route illustrated
what James Scott calls “high modernist ideology” and was evident in officials’ ideas on
progress, which ideologically handcuffed them to the proposed route; as if no alternative
existed, less the entire project and the future of Memphis, Tennessee, and the United
States fall apart. To justify their actions, state highway officials offered reasons why the
Overton Park route was the only possible one. The current route already cost around $20
million. An alternate route, such as skirting the freeway around the north side of the park
down North Parkway, would increase construction costs by an additional $9 to $10
million. Over time the extra gas, wear and tear on cars, and time spent behind the wheel
would add up, essentially raising the individual cost for each driver.67 Tennessee
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Highway Commissioner Pack’s view was even grimmer. He believed they had already
reached a point of no return. The proposed Mississippi River bridge location was
contingent on the Overton Park route. Pack worried that any discussion on a new route
would move the bridge further upstream. Luckily for Pack, BPR approved the park route
in January of 1966. Upon the decision, Pack reiterated his position. “In weighing all
decisions,” the Tennessee Highway Department (THD) and BPR believed that there was
no “feasible alternative to this location…without jeopardizing the entire east-west
route…and this…would [have] place[d] the future location of the Mississippi River
bridge in uncertain status.” Progress would move forward unabated. 68

Anti-Freeway Activists Turn Outward
To counter freeway proponents, CPOP turned to an unlikely ally—the federal
government. As Zachary Schrag argues, freeway revolts did not just occur at the
grassroots level. During the 1960s and 1970s, “another freeway revolt emerged” and it
came “within the established power structure, most notably, the federal executive
branch.” Freeway opponents in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, such
as Darwin Stolzenbach, National Capital Transportation Agency administrator, Alan
Boyd, the first Secretary of Transportation, and Egil Krogh, White House liaison to the
D.C. government, “planted the seeds of a more flexible policy towards federal
transportation.” But this opposition was not limited to transportation-related
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governmental agencies. It also worked its way out to branches of the federal government
not typically associated with freeways, namely the Department of the Interior (DOI). 69
In 1966 Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act. This legislation served as
Congress’ pro-environmental response to heavy-handed state highway engineer urban
freeway construction methods. The most important aspect of this law, which would
ultimately serve CPOP in future legal battles, was section 4(f); the “Preservation of
parklands.” This statute maintained the Secretary of Transportation will “use maximum
effort to preserve Federal, State, and local government parklands and historic sites and
the beauty and historic value of such lands and sites.” Stoner believed this legislation was
a step in the right direction. She worried the language was not “specific enough for the
Concrete-minded Highway men,” but it did “furnish some leverage to use with the
politicians.” In CPOP’s eyes, Overton Park obviously fit the parklands criteria. However,
if the government conferred historic status upon it, CPOP would have additional
ammunition to combat highway officials and the proposed route. 70
In the spring of 1967, CPOP stepped up the level of national involvement in their
movement by reaching out to federal officials. Dan Kuykendall, a Republican
congressman from Memphis, contacted Steward Udall, the Secretary of the Interior, to
discuss having Overton Park registered as a “Natural Landmark.” Kuykendall wrote to
Stoner that this fresh approach would provide an additional method for combating the
proposed route. CPOP knew the Department of the Interior did not have any say in
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freeway matters. But since Udall was sympathetic to its ordeal, it should try to get
Overton Park on the National Register of Historic Places. “If Beale Street could get a
special designation,” asked Stoner, “why not Overton Park?” 71
CPOP secured a meeting with DOI officials in April and sent Margaret Ayers,
chair of the Expressway Committee for the Mid-Town Civic Club, to Washington D.C. to
discuss Overton Park’s preservation. 72 Ayers met with C. Kenny Dale, acting chief of the
Division of National Park System Studies. Dale’s recommendations aided CPOP’s
application for landmark status, while also demonstrating how embedded freeway
opposition had become within the federal government, especially when green spaces
were at risk. In a letter to Smith, Ayers reported that Dale recommended the petition be
kept a secret: “don’t let anyone know [about the petition] that can possibly be kept from
knowing.” He informed her that a registered landmark “isn’t immune from
encroachment” but does provide a powerful weapon. Dale also recommended that
Memphis’s congressional representatives put in a formal petition to the President’s
Committee, with the hopes that this action would highlight the citizens’ concerns. 73
On August 16, Dale made a personal trip—“incognito” in the words of Stoner—to
Overton Park to inspect the particulars of CPOP’s application for national landmark
status. “Half of the park is developed and used extensively,” he remarked. The number of
children and teenagers using the golf course and the walking trails in the wooded area
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impressed Dale. He believed the wooded walking trails within the park offered outdoor
educational opportunities, and he lauded “the potential this area possesses for nature
education and recreation.” If naturalist programs were implemented, Memphians would
have access to “learning experiences which impart a depth of biology and ecology that is
not attainable in the classroom.” “Should the interstate be built,” Dale continued, “the
people of Memphis could be denied its potential values.” Overton Park, did not,
unfortunately “meet the criterion for national significance.” But, “in my opinion it is a
mistake to use this park land for highway purposes.” For anyone willing to look, Dale
bemoaned, “the transcendent value [of the] park…should be obvious.” 74
During the mid-1960s, a similar freeway revolt raged in New Orleans, Louisiana.
The proposed freeway way route ran along the riverfront of the Vieux Carré (the French
Quarter). While the Vieux Carré was a historic area and not a park, New Orleans freeway
opponents had similar concerns as their allies in the Bluff City. In a letter to CPOP, Mark
Lowrey, president of the Crescent Council of Civic Associations and a key actor in the
New Orleans revolt, believed the proposed route was a threat to the “architectural and
historic heritage” of New Orleans and risked destroying the site of an 18 th century
European settlement. Tourism generated $200,000,000 annually for the city of New
Orleans and the highway would destroy the aesthetic value of the French Quarter. If the
freeway were built, who would want to visit one of the oldest cities in America? Lowrey
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claimed highway officials wanted to destroy the city’s economy in the “dubious pursuit
of progress.”75
Despite these concerns, he remained optimistic. New Orleans activists used both
recent and past highway legislation to their advantage. In 1968 Congress amended
section 4(f) of the 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act. It added that all route planning must
“minimize harm” to parks, recreational areas, wildlife refuges, or historic sites. This
language forced highway officials to plan freeway routes so as to reduce damage to green
and historic areas before the federal government approved funding. The 1956 FederalAid Highway Act also created a trust fund that paid ninety percent of highway
construction costs, leaving the state to cover the remaining ten percent. In their battle
with the state of Louisiana, New Orleans activists consistently pushed for a depressed or
tunneled highway under the Vieux Carré, a tactic that Lowrey conveyed to Stoner. With a
possible compromise design in the works, Lowrey intended to restart the legal process
and would “accept nothing short of a totally depressed and partially covered solution.”
He believed the city and state would not be able to cover their ten percent of the
construction costs, effectively killing the route. While a depressed route may have only
caused “minimum damage” to Overton Park, Lowrey believed CPOP should insist on a
“fully depressed tunnel” as the only option. “Keep…pushing,” wrote Lowrey, and
“threaten legal action.”76
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The dialogue between conservation groups provided CPOP with practical advice
and support. Talking to local, state, and federal officials, CPOP used New Orleans’s
recommendations to stymie the route’s progress. Its diligent lobbying forced officials at
all levels to consider a depressed highway. Even though an April 2, 1968, Memphis City
Council resolution reluctantly approved the route through Overton Park; the Council
intended to minimize the freeway’s negative effects. The resolution called for a
“depression deep to keep vehicles below ground level.” Former Federal Highway
Administrator Lowell Birdwell had favored a depressed route, but it met with staunch
resistance from local and state officials. 77 City Engineer Tom Maxon had two chief
concerns: the additional expense and technological difficulties. A depressed route would
cost an additional $4.5 million dollars. Maxon believed the combined cost of the
depressed highway and constructing and maintaining a pumping station needed to
remove excess water from Lick Creek would be excessive. State Highway Commissioner
Charles Speight made his opposition clear: “Any engineer that would build that
monstrosity ought to have his head examined.” He continued, “That’s a big creek…and
everything would drain into that big hole in the ground. I don’t want to put my name on
something that just won’t work.”78
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To appease the freeway opponents and engineers, the BPR presented a
compromise design. This design still followed the bus route through the park. However,
the depressed road would raise enough by the time it reached Lick Creek “to allow
natural drainage of the creek underneath the roadway.” Maxon had some reservations but
approved of the redesign. Charles Blackburn, Director of Public Works, believed “we
may be able to have our cake and eat it, too.” 79
Considering the growing approval of this “compromise” design, which failed to
preserve the park in its entirety, CPOP turned to more drastic measures. At a City
Council meeting in June of 1969, CPOP shifted its demands from a depressed route to a
tunnel under the park. “Overton Park again?” asked Councilman Billy Hyman, “I thought
we were through with that?” “No,” replied Stoner, “we are not.” She continued, “If the
expressway must run through the park we are asking…that it be tunneled.” Smith also
claimed a tunnel had the support of conservation groups around the country. “A tunnel
has been recommended by the Department of the Interior, the Audubon Society, the
Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,” and could
therefore maintain the environmental integrity of the park and facilitate traffic through
the city.80
These protests seemed to work. On September 30, 1969, Secretary of
Transportation John Volpe ordered a halt to the Overton Park route to consider a
redesign. The route would not change but officials did consider a tunnel. Highway
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engineers grumbled about the additional cost of tunneling under Overton Park. The 1965
construction estimate stood at $17,141,000. Engineers would not attempt an official
estimate but believed “the cost would be tremendous.” An engineer’s best “guess” on a
tunnel was $43,000,000, well more than double the original estimate. Volpe finally
approved a redesign of the redesign with “significant qualifications.” Essentially, the
redesign pushed the expressway a foot or two deeper, provided two additional pedestrian
overpasses, added one combination pedestrian and vehicular overpass, and implemented
“extensive landscaping…to minimize the impact of traffic on the park.” Federal highway
officials believed this design was the most reasonable option available. 81
CPOP believed otherwise. Legal action increasingly became the only, if not last,
means to halt the Overton Park route. “Without a lawsuit,” asked Stoner, “where are
we?” CPOP began educating itself on legal action as early as April 1966. Sara Hines,
who sat on CPOP’s Board of Trustees, had a subscription to the Vieux Carré Courier,
which served as a textbook for the Overton Park opposition. It is difficult to determine
exactly the level of influence these publications had on CPOP activists. But if the notes
scribbled in the margins of these articles and the sections the reader(s) underlined are any
indication, they scoured and absorbed every bit of information pertaining to the New
Orleans lawsuit. Within these pages they formulated their early strategy for legal
opposition. CPOP learned about the proper channels and resources needed to challenge
state highway officials. It also realized the Overton Park revolt ran parallel to New
Orleans. Crescent City activists had already navigated this treacherous path, so CPOP
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turned directly to the New Orleans activists with a list of questions. It needed to know
how to file a lawsuit, complaint, or an injunctive request. CPOP asked how much legal
fees could run; for business and political reasons, it had problems finding legal
representation in Memphis, and would have to hire a lawyer from out of the area, adding
such costs as long-distance phone calls, postage and shipping, and travel expenses. CPOP
also asked for advice on contacting foundations to assist in the litigation. 82
In response to these inquiries, Lowrey recommended CPOP contact Louis
Oberdorfer, an attorney with the Washington D.C. firm Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering.
He suggested CPOP write Oberdorfer with the case details since “he is very interested in
the Highway Law and its application.” Lowrey went on to comment “he threatened to file
a suit on behalf of New Orleans citizens” and “has great influence in Washington.” He
also suggested CPOP contact Sierra Club, since he believed them to be a very powerful
organization and could provide moral, financial, and legal support. 83
As environmental historian Adam Rome points out, by the early 1960s park
preservation served as a bridge between old and new missions for conservation
organizations such as the National Audubon Society (NAS), Sierra Club, and Wilderness
Society. During the postwar era, ecological notions on the interaction between man and
the environment forced these organizations to reconsider their missions and shift their
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focus from narrowly defined wildlife and wilderness conservation to more concentrated
activism on the relationship between man and nature. In 1954, John Baker, NAS
president, declared the society had moved “from the idea of simple protection of birds to
an emphasis on habitats and interrelationships.” This new focus required “an all seeing
eye instead of the narrowly aimed binoculars of a bird watcher.” Howard Zahniser,
Wilderness Society administrator and editor of Living Wilderness claimed his society’s
mission was still to preserve wilderness areas, “yet we find that to accomplish this we
need to cooperate in every sound conservation enterprise and to support as actively as we
can the whole conservation movement.” This included preserving parks from increased
recreational demand and subsequent pollution. At the Sierra Club's biennial wilderness
conference in 1961, housing reformer and urban planner Catherine Bauer Wurster warned
conservationists about "the urban octopus." It was "spreading its tentacles farther and
farther out into natural areas for all kinds of purposes." It choked off agricultural land,
spread air and water pollution, led to increased energy use, and most importantly filled up
open space, which was vital to urban populations for recreation, maintaining their water
supply, and served as a check against erosion and flooding. Since these organizations
were concerned with man’s interaction with the environment and sought the preservation
of land, the shift to parks was easy. But instead of naturalists standing amongst 500-yearold pines, they would stand next to forty-year-old buildings amongst a torrent of
automobiles.84
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The 1960s also saw a rise of environmental lawsuits. Conservation organizations
increasingly turned to the courts when they felt Congress acted too slowly in enacting
pro-environment legislation. Citizens groups like CPOP viewed legal challenges as a
rejection of the “old doctrine of sovereign immunity.” As historian Stephen Fox points
out, by suing industry, or in CPOP’s case, the state, “private citizens gained a mechanism
that let them operate on a parity with government agencies.” In 1966, when Sierra Club,
NAS, and Wilderness Society’s interests dovetailed with CPOP’s around park
preservation, George Alderson of Sierra Club suggested CPOP use the park protection
language in the 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act as the foundation for a legal challenge
against state and federal highway officials. Two years later, Michael McCloskey,
Conservation Director for the Sierra Club, backed up Alderson’s contention and believed
Overton Park “to be a test case as far as the meaning of the protections afforded to parks”
in transportation legislation “are concerned.” In June 1969, Earnest Dickerman stated the
Wilderness Society was exploring a possible lawsuit and believed several national
conservation organizations should pool their resources and come together to preserve
Overton Park. Additionally, his concerns over the transcript from the May 19 th, 1969
public hearing on the Overton Park freeway route violated federal policy and provided
another building block in CPOP’s pending legal action. 85
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As legal action around the proposed freeway became a reality, national
conservation organizations provided CPOP different levels of support. Wilderness
Society, NAS, and Sierra Club made monetary donations to CPOP’s cause. While all
organizations continued to provide “moral support” to CPOP’s judicial battle, NAS and
Sierra Club were the only ones to enter into the lawsuit as a plaintiff. As historian
Michael Cohen argues, court cases offered a good chance for publicity. During the late
1960s and early 1970s, NAS and Sierra Club were at their height of popularity. Adding
their names to CPOP’s lawsuit served to attract more publicity for Memphis activists.
People around the country may never have heard of Wilderness Society, writes Fox, but
“whether reviled or recognized,” Sierra Club and NAS were “recognized.” NAS and
Sierra Club’s participation in the lawsuit brought the Overton Park revolt mainstream
national attention.86
Following Secretary Volpe’s approval of the route on November 4, 1969, CPOP
held a special meeting on December 1, 1969, at 5:45 PM to vote on legal action regarding
the construction of I-40 through Overton Park. This moment was thirteen years in the
making. Thirteen years of insistence by state and federal highwaymen that the Overton
Park route was the only option. Thirteen years of hearings and debates. Thirteen years of
redesigns. Thirteen years of uncertainty, dread, and fear. Smith, the newly elected
president called for a motion to authorize John W. Vardaman, an attorney with Wilmer,
Cutler, and Pickering in Washington D.C., to file for a declaratory judgment and
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preliminary injunction to block freeway construction against Secretary of Transportation
John A. Volpe in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. Its lawsuit contended that
Volpe’s formal approval in November 1969 was invalid because he violated section 4(f),
of the 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act and section 138 of the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway
Act; did not adhere to BPR’s Policy and Procedure Memoranda 20-8 by omitting
approximately one hour of testimony, due to faulty equipment from the May 19 th
redesign hearing; provided inadequate notice for the public hearing; and did not make
adequate effort to minimize harm to Overton Park. No debate or discussion was held. The
motion passed unanimously, 10-0.87

The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., et al vs. Volpe, et al
CPOP’s case followed the typical course of such lawsuits en route to the Supreme
Court. Vardaman filed suit against Secretary Volpe on December 3, 1969. On January 23,
1970, Federal District Judge William B. Jones transferred the case to the West Tennessee
District Court in Memphis so “the state of Tennessee and other interested parties could be
heard more readily.” Using recommendations from anti-freeway advocates around the
country, CPOP’s legal strategy centered on two primary violations. First, Volpe violated
the Bureau of Public Road’s Policy and Procedure Memoranda 20-8, which required
highway officials to hold two hearings: one on freeway location and another on freeway
design. The State of Tennessee was to hold a “corridor public hearing,” which dealt with
the general location of a proposed freeway and occurred before the state highway
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department committed itself to a specific route, along with a “highway design public
hearing” that focused on freeway construction. These hearings provided “a public forum
that affords a full opportunity for presenting views on each of the proposed highway
alternative locations, and the social, economic, and environmental effects of those
alternate locations.”88
Tennessee highway officials held such a hearing at 10:30 AM on May 19, 1969,
to discuss changes in the “compromise” design, but CPOP maintained there never was a
true “corridor meeting, nor has any consideration ever been given…to the environmental
impact of the highway on Memphis and Overton Park.” Arlo Smith accused highway
officials of failing “to solicit advice from ecologists, demographers and sociologists on
the social and environmental effects of the project.” Additionally, the State highway
department was to provide a verbatim written transcript of the public hearings to
Secretary Volpe, but the plaintiffs claimed the Tennessee highway department certified a
partial transcript of the meeting that omitted the testimony of eight witnesses. CPOP
argued that since Secretary Volpe did not “comply with 23 USC 128 including the rules
promulgated thereafter by the department of transportation including PPM 20-8,
Paragraph 10.d. Defendant Volpe’s approval of the Project in the absence of the hearings
that comply with Section 128 is illegal.” 89 Speaking to the City Council, Stoner claimed
the state had an obligation to present the design to the public but never did: “the engineer
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who was to do this for the State Highway Department left the meeting before he was to
speak and never returned.” She went on to claim, “there was no consideration of the
parkland—it just looked like free public property—for almost a mile.”90
CPOP also claimed Secretary Volpe violated the “Preservation of parklands”
statute in the 1966 and 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Acts. Once implemented, Sections
4(f) and 138 prevented the Secretary of Transportation from approving any program or
project that used public lands unless “there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the
use of such land and such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site.” While such
language did not constitute “a mandatory prohibition against the use of the enumerated
lands, but rather a discretionary authority which much be used with both wisdom and
reason,” CPOP believed Overton Park was an excellent test case for this statute “in spirit
and in letter” since the State’s “compromise” design did not “minimize damage” in the
park. Bisecting the park and having visible traffic, noise, smog, elevated roads, elevated
paths, an elevated zoo entrance, ramp access in the park, and a large construction
easement did not fit CPOP’s definition of minimal damage.91
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On February 26, 1970, Judge Baily Brown issued his decision. He ruled in favor
of the defendant by denying CPOP’s motion for a temporary injunction, granted the
defendant a summary judgment, and denied the plaintiff’s action. Brown recognized the
alleged deficiencies regarding the May 19, 1969, meeting’s transcripts and acknowledged
the procedures did not adhere to literally with the Bureau of Public Road’s Policy and
Procedure Memoranda 20-8, but he concluded the errors were harmless and that the
evidence provided demonstrated there was substantial compliance. Brown also ruled the
“Parklands statutes” did not require a formal finding. According to legal scholar William
A. Thomas, “the court put special emphasis on the wording ‘of national, state, or local
significances determined by the federal, state, or local officials having jurisdiction
thereof’ and on the congressional intent that ‘clearly enunciated local preferences’ should
not be overruled by the Secretary’s discretionary authority.” Since Memphis’ Mayor,
City Council, and the Park Commission supported this route, “the court observed that in
view of the circumstances it may well be that the Statutes simply did not apply because of
this evidence of local preference for the highway.” Sunshine Snyder, one of the
complainants, believed Brown’s decision was a “bitter environmental blow to Memphis,”
but was optimistic about the appeal process.92
On April 13, 1970, CPOP filed an appeal with the United States 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cincinnati, Ohio. Again, CPOP questioned whether there was adequate
evidence to show that Secretary Volpe decided the freeway’s route as mandated by the
“Preservation of parkland” statutes. The plaintiffs contended there were at least three
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alternatives that would minimize harm to Overton Park: a tunnel under the park, a
highway cut through the park and then covered, and a depressed highway below ground
level. The court, however, believed otherwise. In a 2-1 decision, the Appellate Court
confirmed Brown’s ruling. It claimed Secretary Volpe did not act in an arbitrary or
capricious nature—the term “possible” must be interpreted “within the bounds of wisdom
and reasonableness.” After studying the affidavits and exhibits, the court determined that
Volpe did indeed make his determination. However, the “Preservation of parklands”
statutes did not require him to make his determination public. Additionally, the court
concurred with Judge Brown that the court should give preference to local authorities
since they supported the route through Overton Park. Lastly, the court acknowledged the
unfavorable social consequences of freeway construction by altering the existing route.
Since the state had purchased, condemned, and razed homes along Interstate 40’s east
and west approaches any changes to the route would cause additional harm to the local
community. Essentially, the 6th Circuit Court believed that since the State of Tennessee
had already spent the money, it might as well continue with the existing route.
Fortunately for CPOP the ruling was not unanimous.93
Judge Anthony J. Celebrezze’s dissenting opinion revealed chinks in the legal
armor worn by highway officials. He had two main objections to the court’s majority.
First, he believed the case was not appropriate for a summary judgement.
The two most critical issues of fact in this case are in vigorous dispute: (a) whether the
Secretary made the determinations required of him by statute (i.e., 'no feasible and prudent
alternative,' and 'all possible planning to minimize harm'); (b) whether, assuming the
Secretary made those determinations, they were supported by sufficient evidence (either
'substantial evidence' or, as the majority prefers, 'arbitrary and capricious') on the record as
a whole. Indeed, the only facts over which there is no dispute are that the Secretary
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approved an appropriation for a highway through Overton Park, which is a 'park' within
the meaning of section 138. 94

Additionally, Secretary Volpe could not fulfill his statutory simply by holding public
hearings. Especially since a full statement of record is not available. “How a reviewing
court can determine whether the Secretary's findings were supported by sufficient
evidence, when the Secretary has published no findings,” pondered Celebrezze, “is a
source of great puzzlement for me.”95 According to legal scholar Peter L. Strauss, Judge
Celebrezze claimed “the Secretary’s failure to explain his decision had precluded
effective review or enforcement of his statutory obligation to respect park values.” 96
Since issues existed that called Secretary Volpe’s determinations into question, and
whether there was enough evidence to support his conclusions, the dissenting court
preferred a full trial in which the it could determine if he adhered to his statutory
responsibilities.97
On November 7, 1970, Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart referred CPOP’s
stay to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) and issued a temporary
restraining order to halt construction on the Overton Park route. On December 7, 1970,
the Supreme Court heard preliminary oral arguments on the case. It ordered CPOP to file
its briefs by December 21, 1970, and for Volpe and Speight to do the same by January 4,
1971. The Supreme Court heard official arguments on January 11, 1971. Once again
CPOP argued Secretary Volpe did not issue findings to support his conclusion that there
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were no “feasible or prudent” alternatives for the Overton Park Route and that his actions
were subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal statute that
governs the way in which administrative agencies may propose and establish regulations
and grants judiciary oversight over all agency actions.98
On March 2, 1971, SCOTUS issued its opinion and ruled in favor of CPOP 8-0.99
It agreed with the lower courts that formal findings were not required, but believed there
was a reason Congress enacted the Parkland Statutes: “The few green havens that are
public parks were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present in a
particular case or the cost of community disruption resulting from alternative routes
reached extraordinary magnitudes.” The court believed It noted federal funds were only
to be used for freeway construction through parklands in the most unusual of
circumstances. But given the lack of formal findings, the court believed section 706 of
the APA required the court to make a formal inquiry into Secretary Volpe’s decision.
Additionally, Department of Transportation Order 5610.1, issued after the Secretary’s
decision, required formal findings when using parklands. Normally the court did not
grandfather in decisions made before a new rule appeared but given that there were
changes in the circumstances that led Secretary Volpe’s final decision regarding the
Overton Park route, the court remanded the case to Judge Brown in the West Tennessee
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District Court and called for a full trial, which included a review the entire administrative
record.100
While the SCOTUS decision was important locally—it saved one of Memphis’s
oldest urban green spaces—it should be remembered for its national significance. The
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe set a legal precedent that expanded far
beyond its immediate result. First, it established the legal framework for judicial review
of administrative agencies’ actions in all branches of government. It also established a
“device” for “achieving a high degree of substantive judicial control over administrative
decisions.” Finally, the decision represents the burgeoning influence of environmental
values on highway routes, something environmentalists applied to other arenas of
activism. This decision drastically tipped the scales in favor of environmentalists across
the board. Currently, decision makers are directed to begin the planning process with the
preservation of parklands already in mind. The burden of proof is on decision makers
who must argue the benefits of pollution and destruction over conservation. In essence,
Citizens gave environmental causes a head start. 101 Yet despite CPOP’s legal victory,
their war to protect Overton Park was far from over as freeway proponents dug in their
heels to protect their place as experts in American society.
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Chapter 5: Freeway Planners, Anti-Freeway Activists, and the Decline of Expertise,
1972-1981

In 1973, the Commercial Appeal published a political cartoon that revealed
freeway advocates’ frustration over the lack of progress in getting the interstate built
through Overton Park. The image depicts Mayor Wyeth Chandler, Governor Winfield
Dunn, and Congressman Dan Kuykendall huddled over a conference table reviewing the
three options available for the “Overton Tunnel Compromise”: a depressed freeway, a
deeply depressed freeway, and an abjectly depressed freeway. While they work diligently
a bespectacled man rushes into the room holding a telegram from “citizens to stop the
road.” As they raised their heads, a dejected look washes across their faces. The man
relayed the last message they wanted to hear: “now they want us to elevate the park.” 1
By the time the Commercial Appeal published this cartoon, freeway advocates
had faced defeat after defeat. Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe may have denied
the state of Tennessee funds to build the Overton Park freeway in 1973, but so did
Secretaries Claude S. Brinegar and William T. Coleman, with Brock Adams making their
defeat all but final in 1977. The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1969 compounded their frustration as the 1972 and 1976 Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) repeatedly demonstrated that freeway construction would cause
irreparable harm to Overton Park. Never willing to surrender to the “little old ladies in
tennis shoes,” the Tennessee Highway Department threw justification after justification at
the problem, hoping one would stick. It failed. In 1978, pro-freeway forces even sought
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to rewrite a freeway appropriation bill that exempted the Overton Park route from
existing environmental legislation, but it did not get out of committee. From 1969 to
1981, freeway advocates failed to build a freeway through Overton Park; their data ran
afoul of on the ground concerns for a treasured natural and cultural resource and the
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP) who wielded new environmental protections.
CPOP was part of a national wave of anti-expert fervor that sought to return
authority to the people. 2 The public’s confidence in government had been on the decline
since the 1960s.3 Throughout the 1970s roadbuilders’ previously unchallenged place as
technocratic experts in American society gave way to grassroots anti-freeway activists
who wielded federal legislation and their own technical expertise. CPOP reoriented
freeway planning away from the federal and state levels to the local. Freeway planners’
repeated attempts to get the interstate routed through Overton Park in Memphis was their
last gasp at protecting and exerting their previously unchallenged place in American
society. These men were abjectly depressed indeed.
The Highway Engineer’s Worldview
The elevation of highway engineers to the level of technocratic experts in
American society was part of a long process of American governance and state
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formation. In his book Paving the Way: New York Road Building and the American State,
1880-1956, historian Michael R. Fein argues that the anti-freeway unrest of the 1960s
and 1970s is rooted in the development of the American state. Using roadbuilding in New
York state as a lens, he argues that the United States’ public works infrastructure “rested
on a rise of more complex American federalism that drew broadly on the governing
powers of state and local governments even as the federal government expanded.” 4 As
road building shifted from a piecemeal local policy regime at the end of the nineteenthcentury to a consolidated bureaucratic regime on the eve on the interstate era, local
decision makers surrendered their roadbuilding authority to people up the chain. Initially,
highway engineers were the remedy to boss-driven, partisan, turn-of-the-century road
building politics. But during the postwar roadbuilding frenzy, they became the very
problem they sought to cure. Individuals appointed to state and federal positions such as
the Tennessee State Highway Commissioner or Federal Highway Administrator were
immune from the ballot box. In Tennessee’s case, the Tennessee Highway Department
(THD) routed, designed, and built interstates for the good of its citizens, and the benefits
were legion. But this process revealed a widening gulf between Nashville and citizens in
Midtown, Memphis: roadbuilders and residents around Overton Park did not want the
same thing. As a result, CPOP challenged roadbuilders in the courts and eventually won.
But in the face of anti-freeway activism, “engineers stubbornly defended their vision,
crowding out alternative transportation schemes and exercising authority with increased
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disregard for the nontraffic interests of ordinary” people.5 On the surface this might
appear to be a typical case of NIMBYism, but the ensuing battle between CPOP and the
roadbuilders was the result of freeway engineers’ insulated positions within state and
federal government and the rise of High Modernism.
The Eisenhower Interstate System—of which the Overton Park freeway route was
a part—was the epitome of a high modernist social engineering project. In his book
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed, Jim Scott argues that high modernist projects like freeway construction often fail
in spectacular fashion due to four interconnected criteria. First, highway engineers
adhered to high modernist ideology. It was a “strong, one might even say muscle-bound,
version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress…It was uncritical,
unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the
comprehensive planning of human settlement.” 6 In the Overton Park case, the state of
Tennessee repeatedly pushed the route forward in the face of environmental legislation, a
loss in the Supreme Court, and the refusal of four Secretaries of Transportation. The state
was ideologically handcuffed to this route. Instead of relenting and listening to antifreeway activists or adhering to federal legislation it considered the Overton Park route
an engineering problem to be solved, not an affront to CPOP’s worldview.
Second, a high modernist project requires the power of an authoritarian state. The
Cold War gave the federal government the authority to coerce such a project into fruition.
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The Eisenhower interstate system responded to two key problems: it was a defensive
safeguard against a Soviet nuclear attack and it increased urban economic productivity.
Additionally, professional associations such as the American Association of State
Highway Officials (AASHO) backed interstate construction, along with downtown
business interests, unions, and local politicians. With federal highway spending soaring to
$1.124 billion by 1960, they had a clear mandate to build. This combination of factors
gave the state of Tennessee the motivation and leverage to repeatedly force the Overton
Park Route.
High modernism’s third criteria is that a state makes its citizens legible. Freeway
engineers adhered to a subjective, political mission despite that they had the “full
confidence that their work was objective, impartial, and above the fray of social and
political conflict.”7 Freeway engineers claimed the scientific use of traffic and census
data provided them the authority and rationale to objectively identify and design freeway
routes.8 For example, origin-destination surveys located areas that produced the most
traffic. Engineers in turn used these desire lines to chart ideal freeway routes. Freeway
planners then translated this data into maps capable of simplifying a complex reality. The
Bureau of Public Roads’ 1955 “Memphis” map effectively rendered invisible the
densely-populated Midtown area that surrounded Overton park in the name of traffic-
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centered origin-destination data.9 This simplification of data helped identify traffic
conduits from the eastern suburbs to downtown, which in turn aided commercial and
residential development, boosted economies, and facilitated civil defense. But
roadbuilders failed to acknowledge that their traffic data favored the suburbs and blinded
them to the negative consequences of freeway construction. As a result, Midtown
residents pushed back against their expertise.
The Overton Park Freeway Revolt deviates from Scott’s final criteria for a failed
social engineering experiment. There was not “a prostrate civil society that lacks the
capacity to resist these plans.” 10 The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP) actively
resisted, and defeated, TDOT’s attempts to plan, design, and build an interstate through
Overton Park. Activists campaigned at the local, state, and federal levels. They wielded
emergent environmental legislation such as section 4(f) of the 1966 Federal Aid Highway
Act, NEPA, and they leveraged the federal court system to check Tennessee’s
roadbuilding power. In repeatedly challenging roadbuilders’ expertise, they helped to
facilitate the decline of this high modernist project, at least locally, and forced
roadbuilders to listen to citizen demands.

Remand to the West Tennessee District Court
The Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) interpretation of section 4(f)
of the 1966 Federal Aid Highway Act in Citizens v Volpe dictated CPOP attorneys John
Vardaman and Charles F. Newman’s legal strategy in the West Tennessee District Court
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remand trial. In its decision, SCOTUS defined the terms “prudent” and “feasible” from
section 4(f)—the preservation of parklands statute—in such a way “that made it much
harder than anybody had thought for the proponents of the highway to justify going
through the park.” The state of Tennessee and Department of Transportation could no
longer reject alternative routes on the grounds they were not feasible unless they were
“literally impossible” in an engineering sense. Nor could they discard prudent alternatives
just because they would be disruptive, which in Overton Park’s case would always be so.
Their justification, Newman claimed, would have to be “truly extraordinary.” Reflecting
on his time litigating this case, Newman argues the SCOTUS decision “was the very
beginning, not the end of the fight. It was another ten or twelve years of hard work and
some good luck before we won it.”11 SCOTUS’s decision provided CPOP the legal tools
to challenge Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe’s 1968 decision to route the
freeway through Overton Park.
The remand trial in Judge Bailey Brown’s court lasted from September 27, 1971,
to November 5, 1971. It tested the plaintiffs’ legal acumen. CPOP’s legal team, armed
with SCOTUS’s interpretation of section 4(f), built a legal strategy that focused on three
key issues. First, as a matter of law, were there any feasible and prudent alternatives
available? Second, did the state of Tennessee and Department of Transportation conduct
all possible planning to minimize harm to the park? Third, did the Secretary of
Transportation act within the scope of his authority when approving the Overton Park
route? Did he understand section 4(f)’s requirements? Did the evidence provided him
during the decision-making process demonstrate there were no feasible or prudent
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alternatives? Did the same evidence lead him to believe all possible planning had been
done to minimize harm to the park? Did Secretary Volpe’s decision reveal a “clear error
in judgement?”12 Judge Brown placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to show that
the Secretary of Transportation erred in selecting the Overton Park route—a heavy legal
weight upon John Vardaman and Charles Newman’s shoulders. 13

The Hernando DeSoto Bridge and I-40 Rights of Way Acquisition
Before the Overton Park route went to court, roadbuilders had already undertaken
a massive engineering project that, in their mind, demanded the east/west route through
Memphis’s inner city: construction of the Hernando DeSoto bridge across the Mississippi
River.14 This project required coordination between the Tennessee and Arkansas highway
departments and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).15 In an October
30, 1964, conference on the Mississippi River Bridge, Colonel Edmund Kirby-Smith with
the USACE, Memphis District sat down with federal and state road building
representatives. In this meeting, he revealed the mammoth undertaking such construction
required; USACE had to realign the Mississippi River. Engineers would dredge the
isolated, western portion of Mud Island and use this fresh dirt to raise its existing
elevation by approximately twenty feet. The force of this new channel would then
remove the Loosahatche Sand Bar across from the mouth of the Wolf River. Colonel
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Kirby-Smith stated matter-of-factly, “We have built bridges before, but we haven’t done
this.” When prodded by W.E. Dunlap, an engineer with the Tennessee Highway
Department, as to whether or not he could get to work “at the extreme ends” of the new
bridge before the channel was moved and secured, Colonel Kirby-Smith stated that
everyone would have to “play it by ear…There’s no way to manhandle the river.” 16
By 1966 freeway proponents believed the I-40 route had already reached a point
of no return. Tennessee Highway Commissioner David M. Pack believed the proposed
Mississippi River bridge location was contingent on the Overton Park route and worried
that any discussion on a new route would move the bridge further upstream. Luckily for
Pack, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) approved the park route in January of 1966.
Upon the decision, Pack reiterated his position. “In weighing all decisions,” the
Tennessee Highway Department (THD) and Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) believed that
there was no “feasible alternative to this location…without jeopardizing the entire eastwest route…and this…would [have] place[d] the future location of the Mississippi River
bridge in uncertain status.”17 This idea was particularly unnerving for Tennessee
Governor Winfield Dunn since he believed the Hernando DeSoto Bridge was “a dramatic
example of the importance Memphis enjoys as a vital national gateway linking the two
halves of this continent.”18 With the design work to begin on April 30, 1965, and the
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entire project slated to be under construction by May 8, 1969, freeway advocates’
worldview became clear: they had gone too far to consider any alternative possibilities. 19
Freeway advocates further justified the Overton Park route because they had spent
countless hours and exorbitant amounts of money in acquiring the rights-of-way for
freeway construction leading into and out of Overton Park. As one of the largest land
acquisitions in Memphis’s history, state rights-of-way agents were charged with
purchasing $50.5 million dollars of real estate for freeway construction. In a 1968 letter
from then-Mayor Henry Loeb to Secretary John Volpe, Loeb called on him to move
quickly on the I-40 issue. When the State of Tennessee purchased the rights of way
through Overton Park in the late 1960s, the city planned to use these funds to acquire
additional park space. By the time Loeb wrote Volpe, the route’s uncertainty placed the
Memphis Park Commission’s purchase of the Fox Meadows golf course at risk. In Loeb’s
mind, if the Overton Park route did not materialize, he was afraid of what would happen
with this money and the expansion of park services. Federal Highway Administrator
Francis C. Turner’s deposition supported Mayor Loeb’s concerns. He claimed that “we
have provided more park area for more people of the city of Memphis by the actions we
have taken than we are taking from Overton Park.” 20 Viewed this way, Memphians stood
to lose more park space if the Overton Park freeway route was not built.
Others pulled on the public’s heartstrings by invoking the pain and loss of
property owners in the freeway’s path. For example, on October 16, 1966, rights-of-way

“Tennessee CPM Work Schedule for Mississippi River Bridge on I-40,” Box 28, Folder 2,
Record Group 84, DHPW.
19

20
Kay Pittman Black and Tom Jones, “Wildlife Threatened, X-Way Hearing Told,” Press
Scimitar, October 6, 1971.

154

agents contacted Eugenie Kiblinger Butler, the owner of Resthaven Nursing Home,
located at 1143 Poplar Avenue, where the Claybrook interchange would be built to the
west of Overton Park. The State of Tennessee offered her $140,000 for her property, but
Butler refused—for her this was not fair market value. The state then initiated
condemnation proceedings. 21 State’s attorney J. Alan Hanover sympathized with her
plight. He understood what the action meant to her personally, and to her business, but he
could not “allow public projects …which are designed to benefit the entire community, to
be thwarted and delayed by one individual” and pointed out that “all other property
owners who are affected by the expressway program…are in the same position.” 22 As late
as 1978, local officials employed this argument to make the Overton Park route a reality.
During a Senate hearing before on the Subcommittee on Transportation of the Committee
on Environment and Public Works, Mayor Walter Chandler continued to push this
narrative. He claimed that about 2,000 families were uprooted from the area during right
rights-of-way clearance. “We took their land saying we were going to build an
expressway,” he remarked. Such an act could not be for naught. 23 As a result, J.D.
Braman, US Assistant Secretary of Urban Systems and Environment, claimed “the
planning process had gone too far to consider reversing the prior decision to go through
the park.”24 From top to bottom of the freeway routing process, elected officials and
roadbuilding bureaucrats demonstrated that the construction of the Hernando DeSoto
21
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Bridge and rights-of-way acquisition forestalled legitimate consideration of alternative
freeway routes.
Opponents recognized that the State of Tennessee was forcing the Overton Park
route by invoking bridge construction and rights of way acquisition. Before the remand
trial began, Sunshine K. Snyder’s lawyers submitted a motion for preliminary injunction
to the Appeals Court of the Sixth Circuit that prevented the defendants “from performing
work on the East-West Expressway project.” They contended that since the state had
acquired the rights-of-way in, through, and out of Overton Park, that it had let
construction contacts on the east-west I-40 leg to the edges of the park, and their claim
that there were not alternate routes added “urgency to the need for defendants to be
restrained from further work” pending the remand trial. Without this injunction,
construction “limits the number of ‘feasible and prudent’ alternatives or in making
destruction of further parklands inevitable.” 25 Even though the Appeals Court denied her
motion, this injunction revealed to the public what CPOP already knew: if the state
forestalled any feasible and prudent alternatives, then the Overton Park Route would be
the only option.26

The Louisville and Nashville Route
CPOP’s defense team’s opening salvo attacked freeway planners’ route selection:
they argued that by not considering alternative routes, state highway officials made the
Overton Park route the only option. By the time of the remand trial, the Tennessee

25

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, September 3, 1971, Box 8,
Folder 21, JBBP.
26
Kay Pittman Black and Tom Jones, “Appeals Court Denies Pleas by X-Way Route Protesters,”
Press Scimitar, September 9, 1971.

156

highway department provided three possible routes for Interstate 40’s urban leg. First was
the route that brought the plaintiffs and defendants to the court room: a freeway corridor
located along the existing bus route that entered and exited Overton Park’s eastern and
western borders, splitting the park in two. 27 But it also explored two alternates: one that
skirted the park to the south, and another to the north. However, attorney John Vardaman
accused the government of selecting two alternate routes that would “hit every major
institute in the city” to silence its critics. The northern alternate would take part of
Southwestern College and Snowden School, and the southern alternate would destroy
First Baptist Church and B’Nai B’rith, a Jewish retirement community, along with the
neighborhoods that surrounded the routes. He claimed, “the state acknowledged that in
1964 it had been pestered by people who wanted to save the park and so they
arbitrarily…drew up on paper two alternate routes…and then told their engineers ‘All
right, now, figure out the damage we have done with these alternatives’.” Vardaman
continued, “If they tried they couldn’t have picked two routes that would tear up more
major institutions.”28
Vardaman then shifted the court’s attention to an alternate route that the state
highway department never considered. In 1958, Harland Bartholomew and Associates,
the planning firm that initially suggested building a freeway through Memphis’s urban
core, conducted a study that revealed a viable alternative to the other options. It suggested
using the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) Railroad tracks that traveled through the
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Vollintine-Evergreen neighborhood. This route would allow the east/west interstate to be
built but could skirt Southwestern College and Overton Park to the north before it
rejoined “the present [right-of-way] after missing the park.” 29 While the state of
Tennessee would still have to raze some homes in the neighborhood, the social cost
would be much less since no homes existed within the immediate railroad right-of-way
and it would leave Overton Park intact.
Roadbuilders pushed back immediately on this option, emphasizing traffic data
and monetary costs to justify the Overton Park route as the most prudent path forward.
William B. Pollard, chief engineer for Harland Bartholomew and Associates who
recommended the Overton Park route, claimed the appropriate question to ask was not
“Can you put [the freeway] somewhere else” but “should you?” He asserted the L&N
route was not where the need was; he selected the Overton Park route based on a cost
benefit analysis. His data said this was the best route. While he could find an engineering
solution to integrating the L&N railroad into the freeway design, it would require a
substantial rights-of-way acquisition into the adjacent industrial park, costing money and
decreasing the city’s industrial capacity. 30 Federal highway administrator Francis C.
Turner’s deposition backed up this claim. Based on his forty-two years of road building
experience, constructing bridges over each of the L&N railroad’s spur tracks would make
the entire project too expensive. Besides, the park route was straighter. Turner argued the
law governing the building of highways “requires us to build the most direct route
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involving the least amount of mileage.” When Vardaman asked if he gave the
preservation of parklands “paramount importance” he replied no. He gave “paramount
importance” to the overall public. Turner believed 4(f) meant he was to weigh parks,
wildlife, cost, safety, and displacement equally, that none were to be “considered
exclusively.”31 This conflict between what the data revealed and what the law dictated
would be a point of tension throughout the litigation.
CPOP’s attorneys used their own expert to support Vardaman’s position that the
L&N route was a prudent and feasible alternative. Robert Hart, a New York City-based
architect and urban planner, stated that from a cost and traffic perspective, the L&N
alternative was essentially the same as the Overton Park route. Yes, the park route would
service a “fraction” more traffic, but that one “cannot base a final decision when fractions
are involved.” A person would get from the suburbs to downtown in the same amount of
time regardless of which route they took. State attorney J. Alan Hanover objected to his
claim since the rights of way may not even be available for purchase, but Hart contended
that this was irrelevant, since engineers could design the freeway around the railroad.
Using the city of Memphis’s own expertise against them, he pointed to the 1969
Memphis Area Urban Transportation Study for the Southern Freeway as an example:
planners could use the railroad as the expressway median and run the highway along both
sides. Pointing to the newly built Midtown interchange at Claybrook and the Mississippi
River bridge under construction, U.S. attorney Thomas F. Turley scoffed and asked if
engineers should stop construction on the bridge or tear down the interchange: “How
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would you go about choosing another route? How would you unring that bell?” Hart
chuckled and said neither. Instead, he urged the defendants to study, not ignore, the L&N
alternative and come up with connection possibilities that fulfilled their requirements and
bypassed Overton Park. 32
The Overton Park Route’s Environmental Impact
CPOP’s legal team also demonstrated that Tennessee and federal highway
officials did not do everything possible to minimize all possible harm to Overton Park.
Early in the trial CPOP brought a flurry of witnesses to the stand to demonstrate the
environmental damage the Overton Park freeway route would cause. The plaintiffs
pointed to two major pollutants that would destroy Overton Park: noise and air pollution.
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Overton Park served many functions, one of
which was respite for Midtowners from the pressures of daily life. The noise that cars
would make whizzing through the park at fifty-five miles per hour would upset this
peace. Additionally, this noise would travel from the freeway to the zoo and hinder its
educational value. For example, while on the witness stand for the plaintiffs, Robert H.
Mattlin, director of the Overton Park Zoo, argued freeway noise would be “very
detrimental” to the zoo’s inhabitants. Drawing a direct line between noise pollution and
death, he claimed the bears’ breeding habits stood to suffer. Mattlin pointed to the noises
caused by the present bus route as an example: “One of the buses backfired and about an
hour later one of our mother bears killed her babies.”33 The zoo had a very successful
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captive breeding program. The noise pollution caused by freeway traffic would affect the
scientific community well outside the park’s borders.34
During his testimony, Arlo Smith, Professor of Biology and Ecology at Rhodes
College and chairman of CPOP, added to Mattlin’s concerns by linking freeway
construction to ecological catastrophe. He noted that the Old Forest was home to many
animals, including fifty-six species of birds and a diverse mix of plants. If built, the
Overton Park route would create a biological barrier, severing the northern end of the
forest from the south. This barricade would create a confined area that absorbed the
sound of interstate traffic and repulsed the birds that made the park their home. Smith
measured noise levels at East Parkway and Summer and the northeastern corner of
Overton Park. He found that decibels measured 90-95 when trucks went by, as opposed
to 62-80 on McLean to the west of the park, where trucks were forbidden. Given this
noise level, Smith concluded that “some birds, such as the mocking bird, sparrow and
starling, are able to adapt to man but most aren’t…Eventually you would wind up with
nothing.”35 He believed that freeway construction would reduce the forest and park’s
effectiveness as an educational resource and general amenity—a position he had held
since the highway department conceived the route. 36
Plaintiffs also argued air pollution from cars would poison Overton Park’s
inhabitants. During the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalists focused on problems that
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directly threatened human survival. In his study on postwar air pollution, historian Scott
Hamilton Dewey argues that for urbanites, air pollution was front and center in their
minds, since it was most severe within cities. “Air pollution was more likely to conjure
images of potential mass death,” he noted, since “once released, [it] could never be
captured.”37 Viewed this way, the plaintiffs realized car exhaust would billow into the
park poisoning flora and fauna alike. Supporting this contention, Mattlin claimed
automobile exhaust would have a detrimental effect on his animals. He believed the
Overton Park route would pump car exhaust into the zoo and cause lung cancer and metal
poisoning in all his animals. He pointed to an example in New York where many animals
died because of lead poisoning from car fumes. 38 Mattlin’s testimony tapped into CPOP’s
long-standing belief that the park was an educational space—if the zoo’s animals died as
a result of noise and air pollution, then area children could no longer learn from the park
itself.
The defendants countered with their own expert witnesses. However, their
testimony revealed a widening chasm between anti-freeway activists and roadbuilders:
the state viewed freeway opponents’ concerns as problems to be solved, not issues to be
incorporated into freeway planning. For example, the defendants called Dr. William
Baker, Jr., Professor of Engineering and Chairman of Biomedical Engineering at
Vanderbilt University, to allay Mattlin’s noise pollution concerns. Dr. Baker conducted
his own measurements in the zoo and found that ambient noises such as the waterfall near
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the bear pit (which masked traffic noise) and male lions roaring, were about twice as loud
as sounds that registered outside the zoo. Therefore, he did not believe the noise from the
interstate would have an adverse effect on the zoo’s occupants. 39 Regarding air pollution,
Dr. Donald Dean Adrian, engineering professor at the University of Massachusetts and
pollution consultant, argued that “traffic that moves at a fast and steady flow contributes
less air pollution than stop and go traffic.” Since the Overton Park route was a high
speed, limited access expressway, the fast-moving traffic would not affect the level of air
pollution in park—automobiles’ speed would disperse their exhaust into the atmosphere
as opposed to concentrating in the park. In response to the destruction of the Old Forest,
the defense demonstrated how the road builders planned to mitigate destruction. Robert
Odle, engineer for the Tennessee Highway Department, revealed how the THD
inventoried every tree in the route’s path and planned to erect a wooden sheath around
trees that might be harmed during construction. In conclusion, he stated that in his thirtyeight years with the THD, he did not believe “there has been another project
developed…that gives as much attention to such detailed preservation considerations.” 40
No matter what steps state highway officials took to protect Overton Park’s old forest
during freeway construction, to CPOP activists, a freeway was still a freeway. No amount
of sheathing and replanting trees could make up for the damage and displacement of the
Old Forest’s flora and fauna. And while the plaintiffs explicitly pointed to emergent
concerns such as air and noise pollution, roadbuilders’ decision-making processes on
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freeway design reveals the possibilities and constraints they faced when trying to build
the freeway within (or without) section 4(f)’s mandate.

Re-designing the Overton Park Route
According to historian Edward K. Mueller, “the escalating pressures to conserve
open space and American’s beautiful landscapes, along with the outrage at burdensome
social disruptions and environmental degradation of urban freeways” during this period
“provoked federal and state highway officials to amend their traditional policies and
procedures.”41 As a result landscape architects sought to shift highwaymen’s ideas away
from their heavy-handed approach to urban roadbuilding and towards one that
“encouraged land use planning in coordination with freeway design.” Not only would
freeways “follow the grain of the city,” but they would enhance the landscape and “soften
the freeway’s impact.” While the THD was already aware of the social problems
associated with urban freeway construction, they did not seriously consider these design
alternatives until the Overton Park route went to court. 42 By that time, Volpe and
company would have to consider redesigning the Overton Park route to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which was signed into law in 1970. While
this shift came in fits and starts, the THD’s defeat in the remand trial forced it to slowly
consider highway design alternatives that made urban freeways “acceptable pleasing.”
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As part of their legal strategy, the plaintiffs introduced a new freeway design that
demonstrated the THD did not do all they could to minimize harm to Overton Park. Roy
Harrover, president of the Memphis chapter of American Institutes of Architects,
proposed a “cut and cover tunnel” design that would minimize harm to Overton Park. His
recommendation shrunk the freeway’s footprint substantially. First, he substituted the
forty-foot median that divided the east and west lanes with a median wall that reduced the
rights-of-way from 204 feet to 142 feet. Next, Harrover suggested depressing the entire
4,200-foot freeway by placing a tunnel cover over the 2,400 feet within Overton Park—
the proposed interchange near East Parkway and Summer Avenue prevented him from
covering the entire route. Finally, he would cover the tunnel with a landscaped three-foot
mound. While on the stand Harrover emphasized this cut and cover design was just that,
a design, and that he had not engineered this drawing. But he believed this alternative
design was feasible, should be investigated, and “would probably take a team of 10
engineers six months to determine how to put the proposals into effect.” Altogether,
Harrover estimated this design would cost approximately twelve million dollars more
than the current one.43
Harrover’s cut and cover tunnel remedied most of CPOP’s complaints about the
Overton Park route. First, he claimed that enclosing the depressed freeway would lessen
its visual impact. The juxtaposition of his design with the THD’s on the October 17, 1971
edition of the Commercial Appeal supports this contention. The THD’s design was full of
empty space that anti-freeway activists detested. On the left, readers saw a busy six lane
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interstate depressed below ground level with numerous vehicles traveling east and west
and a fence erected along the freeway’s north and south borders to keep people and
animals from entering the interstate. Additionally, an enclosed pedestrian bridge provided
access to the zoo on the north side and links the two halves of the park together. Aside
from the noise and air pollution, this design rendered much of Overton Park useless for
recreation. However, by enclosing the freeway using a cut-and-cover design, roadbuilders
could maintain Overton Park as a usable park space. Harrover pointed to the design’s
many uses. The newly planted grass, shrubs, and small trees on top of the mound could
easily make Overton Park a place of peace, relaxation, and serenity. Looking at his
design, a reader could see people taking a stroll across the freeway mound, maybe even
having a picnic. Lastly, the design made park advocates’ environmental concerns moot.
For example, Harrover’s cut and cover tunnel “would reduce the effects of…noise and
vibration…since it would be dampened by the earth.” This, journalist Michal Lollar
noted, would make Zoo director Mattlin happy since “sustained vibration” from vehicle
traffic would disrupt zoo animals’ breeding habits. 44
While Harrover’s design seemed to many an appropriate solution to the Overton
Park freeway conundrum, it was designing the cut and cover tunnel around Lick Creek
that fueled THD’s opposition. In the face of a feasible freeway design, the THD shifted
towards engineering concerns. Incorporating a siphon and drainage system into
Harrover’s cut and cover tunnel design raised many concerns for freeway advocates. First
were the design problems itself. Lick Creek was an integral part of Overton Park’s
ecosystem; it is a small body of water body of water that runs north/south across the park,
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dividing it into an east and west section. The THD’s depressed route called for the
freeway to be depressed on the park’s east and west ends, but “crest near the middle in
order to cross Lick Creek.” Harrover stated his design would essentially do the same
thing. But according to J. Alan Hanover, special Counsel for the State Highway
Department, doing the same thing, and “essentially” the same thing, were indeed not the
same thing. Hanover pointed out that Harrover’s proposal pushed the interstate below the
creek’s bed, “thereby requiring the use of a siphon to divert the creek under the
roadway.”45 According to Fred Larson, an irrigation engineer who helped design the
Overton Park route, installing an inverted siphon and pumping station to move Lick
Creek under the freeway and expunge excess water required engineers to dig deeper into
the ground and construct a reservoir in Overton Park to hold expelled water, which would
consume precious park acreage. 46
These design requirements led to the second problem: cost. Larson drew up plans
for the siphon, pumping system, and tunnel but never submitted them to state officials
since “such devices would double the estimated cost of the expressway.” 47 Tom Maxon,
Memphis’s City Engineer, also rejected the inverted siphon. He argued that an inverted
siphon would require constant maintenance, with one official placing the cost $400,000
per year. He also claimed, “the water collected underneath the roadway would
provide…a breeding place of mosquitos” and put residents at risk of a malarial
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outbreak.48 George D. Burns, manager of the Mid-South division of Buchart-Horn
engineers provided perhaps the most damning testimony regarding the cost of Harrover’s
cut and cover tunnel. He claimed that to build a cut and cover tunnel, engineers would
need wider rights-of-way clearance. The more depressed a highway, the wider swath of
land required to keep the tunnel from collapsing. If the THD did construct Harrover’s
design, the state would have to purchase more land from the City of Memphis, thus
increasing the overall cost of construction. Taken together, the siphon and pumping
systems to move Lick Creek under the interstate, expanded rights-of-way for
construction, and high cost of maintenance would cost taxpayers $59 million, almost $42
million over the 1965 estimate. 49
As the trial hit its final stretch, Judge Bailey Brown dealt a fatal blow to the
defendants’ strategy; he let it be known the freeway’s cost could not be a factor in
denying there were alternative routes or designs for minimizing harm. On October 23,
1971, Judge Brown told US Attorney Thomas F. Turley could not “go into the cost of
abandoning the present route through the park.” Brown claimed SCOTUS made no
mention of it and “indicates to me that [they] do not consider it to be of any importance.”
Turley responded in befuddlement. “It’s the most dramatic fact about the lawsuit,” he
declared. “Yes, it was to everybody but Mr. Vardaman and his clients,” Brown replied. 50
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In this brief exchange, Judge Brown made it clear that the defense could not rely on the
costs accrued by the State of Tennessee and Department of Transportation during rightsof-way acquisition, design, or freeway construction—be it money spent or the social and
emotional costs on property owners—as a reason for approving the Overton Park route.
However, despite CPOP’s evidence, Judge Brown was not entirely convinced of feasible
and prudent alternatives to the Overton Park route. 51 As a result, the trial turned to
Secretary of Transportation John Volpe’s decision-making process and judgement in
approving the interstate.
Secretary Volpe’s Testimony and Judge Brown’s Decision
The plaintiffs’ third and final strategy was to demonstrate Secretary Volpe’s
decision-making process was “arbitrary and capricious.”52 On the surface, Volpe’s
affidavit revealed to the court a Secretary of Transportation who followed the spirit and
letter of the law when he approved the Overton Park freeway route. Volpe conferred with
his immediate staff, the Federal Highway Administration, his general counsel, and
especially the Assistant Secretary for Environmental and Urban Systems, when making
his decision. He also claimed to be involved with the project when the review began in
the summer of 1969 until his conditional approval that November, since his role as
Secretary of Transportation required him to personally approve any projects that were
subject to section 4(f). 53 Secretary Volpe’s testimony from August 31, 1970, however,

Kay Pittman Black and Tom Jones, “’Objectors Didn’t Prove Prudent Alternative Route,” Press
Scimitar, November 5, 1971.
51

52

“Plaintiffs’ Pre-Trial Memorandum,” Box 8, Folder 21, JBBP.

53

“Affidavit of John A. Volpe,” July 15, 1971, Box 19, Folder 19, JBBP.

169

suggested that he did not consider section 4(f) when he made his final decision. When
President Richard M. Nixon appointed Secretary Volpe to his position in January of
1969, the President tasked him with establishing an Office for Environment and Urban
Systems. This office was responsible with overseeing the environmental impact of urban
transportation projects like the freeway. But before any procedures were enacted, Volpe
stated the office “operated on the basis of verbal contracts with Mr. [J.D.] Braman,” its
director. Secretary Volpe stated formal procedures materialized over time, but he did not
remember if these procedures “for approving controversial routes [were] being used
when the Overton Park outing was cleared.” 54 This policy grey area gave CPOP’s
attorneys an opening.
During questioning, the plaintiffs demonstrated that Volpe did not have policies in
place to make an informed decision regarding the Overton Park route’s section 4(f)
compliance. For example, CPOP attorney John Vardaman revealed that the Federal
Highway Administration gave the THD approval on the Overton Park route seven months
before Volpe rendered his decision. When Vardaman asked Volpe if he knew the FHWA
“approved the design submitted by the state” in April of 1969, Volpe responded, “they
may well have.” Did the FHWA request your approval “before issuing an approval in
April 1969?” Vardaman demanded. “To the best of my recollection, no,” Volpe
responded. Was he aware if the FHWA consulted with Braman’s office? Volpe waffled,
but Vardaman pressed him harder. He asked if Volpe remembered “making any inquiries
as to whether or not the procedures which you had required to be followed were being
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followed in this case?” “Apparently not,” he replied. This line of questioning pressed
Secretary Volpe into a corner. If Volpe was unaware the FHWA, the federal authority in
charge of highway construction and maintenance, did not consult the Office for
Environment and Urban Systems, the department who oversaw section 4(f) compliance,
with policies that may or may not have been in place, how could he have made a formal
decision on the Overton park freeway within the parameters of section 4(f) without
knowing if his decision complied with the parklands statute? For CPOP’s attorneys the
answer was clear: he did not.55
The plaintiffs also used former Department of Transportation officials’
testimonies to support their claims that Volpe ignored section 4(f)’s requirements to
“minimize harm” to Overton Park. First, Lowell K. Birdwell, the Federal Highway
Administrator from March 1967, until Volpe took office in 1969, testified that he did not
appreciate the level of environmental damage interstate construction would bring to
Overton Park until he took a trip there in April, 1968. After Birdwell realized “Overton
park was more highly developed and highly utilized as a civic and cultural facility” than
previously understood, he ordered additional study on the route. Birdwell also used this
trip to meet with the City Council to discuss all options. He insisted that he did not try to
influence the Council by stating his preference. Instead Birdwell gave “them an
opportunity to express themselves on all alternatives,” since all options were on the table
at that point. In fact, he claimed the rights-of-way acquisitions that already occurred were
a non-issue in route selection. Second, Alan S. Boyd’s testimony revealed the
Department of Transportation had indeed considered a cut and cover tunnel like the one
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Roy Harrover suggested. Since Boyd believed that cost was not a factor, the cut and
cover tunnel could minimize harm to Overton Park. He stated, “from my own experience
I knew that a cut and cover tunnel was feasible…The only problem there was the water
table and [Lowell] Birdwell’s comments to me were that a siphon for the creek was
feasible.” As mentioned above, Lick Creek was an engineering headache, but Boyd did
not consider this a problem since he knew siphons “had been done in other places so I
thought all of these were totally feasible.” 56 These revelations by former federal
transportation officials pointed to the fact that by ignoring section 4(f), Volpe did not
have consider alternative routes or designs.
CPOP Attorneys convinced Judge Bailey Brown that Secretary Volpe’s decisionmaking process was “arbitrary and capricious” since he did not consider section 4(f).
“I’m inclined to believe that Mr. Vardaman is correct,” Bailey declared, “And, I think it’s
a difficult question here for the defendants as to whether (Mr. Volpe) was applying the
right standards.”57 U.S. Attorney Turley leapt to his feet and claimed Volpe applied the
same tests that Boyd did, but just used different language.
Brown snapped back, claiming that was not the same thing. As a result, Brown
planned to remand the decision back to Secretary Volpe, where he could use the
information revealed during this trial—250 exhibits, 25,000 pages of documents, and
7,000-8,000 pages of transcribed testimony generated daily—to make a proper decision.
This terrified attorneys Turley and Hanover since the Department of Transportation
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would have to start the entire review and approval process for Overton Park all over
again. This meant holding two more public hearings—one for the route and another for
the design—and considering the recently passed National Environmental Policy Act that
required an environmental impact statement on all federally supported projects. In his
final decision, Judge Bailey Brown remanded the case to Secretary Volpe, so he could reassess the route considering the full administrative record.58

1972 Environmental Impact Statement
When Judge Bailey Brown remanded the Overton Park freeway route to Secretary
John A. Volpe, he had to consider the newly-passed National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). Signed into law by President Nixon in January of 1970, NEPA was the federal
government’s response to the environmental crisis that emerged throughout the 1960s. 59
Part of the act required federal agencies to conduct an environmental impact statement
(EIS) that considered the “environmental ramifications resulting from federal agency
actions.” The EIS was a mandate that forced federal agencies to incorporate NEPA’s
environmental values into any federally backed project. 60 It required:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the
proposed action (iv) the relationship between local and short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity, and (v) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resource which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented. 61
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It also provided citizen oversight of federal government actions. Federal agencies were
required to engage with the public during the EIS process by disclosing the information
gathered and analyzed, as well as to hold public hearings and provide opportunities for
citizens to comment on the project at hand. However, as scholars Matthew J. Lindstrom
and Zachary A. Smith demonstrate, since most people are not trained in law, ecology, or
public administration, these hearings can be a one-way affair that does not respect the
spirit of NEPA. Any violation of the EIS process “opened the door to a flood of
environment litigation brought by environmental organizations.” As historian Raymond
A. Mohl points out, this “baffled the highway engineers throughout the 1970s and
became the most effective legal weapon for the freeway fighters.” 62 CPOP latched on to
this new legislation and leveraged it against the state of Tennessee and Department of
Transportation, eventually forcing Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe to cancel
the Overton Park route.
Almost immediately following Judge Bailey Brown’s remand to Secretary Volpe,
federal officials got to work producing the route’s EIS, which came to the same
conclusions Volpe did a few years prior: the Overton Park freeway route was ready to go.
Between January 17 and June 30, 1972, the FHWA’s team of engineers analyzed the
entire administrative record and produced a draft EIS for agency and public comment. 63
The FHWA-produced EIS reflected roadbuilding advocates’ pro-freeway position found
in the courtroom and, not surprisingly, used the same rationale to come to the same
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conclusion as Volpe in approving the Overton Park route in 1969. CPOP pounced on
what they believed to be a blatant disregard of NEPA’s intent by treating the EIS as a
bureaucratic hurdle to be overcome instead of seriously considering the route’s impact on
Overton Park and the Midtown, Memphis area. When the Federal Highway
Administration sent the route’s draft EIS out for comments CPOP jumped on this
opportunity to tear apart, not just its conclusion—that the Overton Park freeway route
should be built—but the very foundation upon which the entire EIS stood.
CPOP’s attorneys took issue with how the FHWA reached its conclusion in the
EIS. First, Vardaman and Newman chastised the authors for not studying alternate
freeway routes. For CPOP’s lawyers, this was a glaring issue. Since the EIS cited
previous studies that did not consider or explore alternatives, then it was no surprise the
EIS supported building Interstate 40 though Overton Park. They claimed, “every other
study has taken as a given fact that if there were to be an east-west expressway, it would
go through Overton Park.” By using the same data that Volpe used to draw this initial
conclusion, the result would be the same. Reflecting on this battle, Newman chalked the
FHWA’s refusal to consider alternatives up to bureaucratic recalcitrance: “They had
drawn that line and…they were stuck.” Had they conducted this study in good faith, the
outcome may very well have swung in their favor. 64 For Vardaman and Newman, by not
studying alternative locations for the east/west route, “their only choice was to go through
the park or not have an east-west route at all.”65
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Second, the EIS failed to reconcile Memphis’s population trends with who it
claimed would benefit from the proposed route. Vardaman and Newman argued even
though the Overton Park route was an interstate route, it “would have practically no
interstate use”; the EIS projected ninety percent of the trips on the east/west route would
serve people within Memphis’s city limits. Additionally, in figure A-13 the EIS identified
specifically who the east/west route intended to serve because of Memphis’s growing
population: Midtown and East Memphis. For CPOP’s attorneys, this argument was
disingenuous. While they did not “quarrel with the emphasis on population as an
important factor in predicting traffic movements,” they disputed the EIS’s claim there
had been substantial population growth in the area I-40 would serve. As they point out,
Figure A-16 identifies substantial population growth in the north, south, and southwest
areas of the Memphis metropolitan area but not to the east. “In addition,” they contended,
“the Statement cites widely exaggerated population forecasts for the Memphis Urban
Area.” The EIS claimed Memphis saw a twenty-five percent increase in population.
However, none of this growth was in the area depicted in figure A-13. In fact, Dr. Monte
Blair, a demographer at Memphis State University, testified during the remand trial that
the Midtown area saw a five percent decrease in population from 1960-1970, and the
Memphis-Shelby County Planning Commission reported that the city’s population
“within the expressways” decreased by four percent over this same period.
This data pushed Vardaman and Newman to argue that Memphis’s east/west
surface streets could meet Memphians’ existing traffic needs without building a
freeway—a proposal Harland Bartholomew initially made in his 1955 master plan.
Besides, if the FHWA built the east/west route through Overton Park, Vardaman and
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Newman concluded this action would “hasten the flight to the suburbs and will place
Memphis firmly in the mold of so many other cities in the United States who have seen
their inner cities die as residential areas and the people move out to the suburbs.” If no
one lived within I-40’s service area, then why build the interstate? 66
Vardaman and Newman also refuted how the EIS minimized the level of
“community disruption” caused by the Overton Park freeway route by relying on
quantitative, not qualitative metrics. First, they argued the FHWA could not base its
decision on properties already purchased during rights-of-way acquisition in the 1960s.
The EIS led with the properties route already consumed by the Overton Park freeway
route: 412 residential units, thirty business and industrial properties, and four churches
affecting 8,207 people in total. By emphasizing this data, the FHWA reverted to its
argument during the remand trial that community disruption had already occurred. Why
do it again? Vardaman and Newman used the EIS’s own data against itself; in exploring
the northern alternative’s effect on neighborhoods to the north of Overton Park, the
FHWA revealed this route was less disruptive. It would only affect 6,386 people. If the
EIS adhered to its own logic, then the northern route was a feasible and prudent
alternative. Besides, since the state of Tennessee purchased these properties after section
4(f) became effective and before the Secretary of Transportation made an official
determination, Vardaman and Newman argued that these actions were illegal. 67
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Second, the FHWA’s use of quantitative data to measure community disruption
was “a wholly inadequate basis on which to judge the effects of this highway on the
community.” CPOP and its lawyers were well acquainted with how freeway construction
affected urban areas around the country. The freeway was a physical barrier that cut
neighborhoods in two; the current rights-of-way already split Binghampton and
Evergreen in half. This construction would inevitably be a catalyst for residential decline,
sending neighborhoods into a spiral of blight. Additionally, they believed the land around
the proposed interchanges would eventually turn into commercial property since “there is
great pressure to use the area for commercial development such as filling stations or
shopping centers.” As a result, “the location of these interchanges will invariably lead to
the replacement of the residential areas by commercial development.” Furious at these
omissions, Vardaman and Newman argued the EIS’s claim that “land uses in vicinity of
this highway section are not expected to change to any significant degree in the
foreseeable future” was an attempt to hide community disruption from the public and the
Secretary of Transportation, thus guaranteeing the Overton Park freeway route would be
built.68
For attorneys John W. Vardaman and Charles F. Newman, the EIS was a
complete fraud. It was a blatant violation of the NEPA’s environmental values and still
inconsistent with section 4(f) of the 1966 Federal Aid Highway Act. Put simply:
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement is a disappointing document. It fails to meet
the most minimal requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and it fails to
give the secretary a complete up-to-date, impartial review of the proposed route and the
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available alternatives. It is a rehash of the positions taken by the defendants in the trial
court and reflects the approach of an advocate.69

Most damning was their statement that the EIS claimed “Overton Park would suffer if
this highway were not built.”70 Despite CPOP’s point-by-point rebuttal of its EIS, the
FHWA affirmed the route. 71
On September 14 and 15, 1972, the Department of Transportation (DOT) held a
public meeting in the City Council’s chambers to discuss the results of the FHWA’s EIS
on the Overton Park route. Over the course of two days, 155 people provided fifteen
hours of testimony on the EIS, most of which rehashed arguments for and against the
route from previous public debates. 72 For example, Lieutenant Governor John Wilder
pointed to the Hernando DeSoto bridge. He noted it was nearly complete but “we can’t
get on it…we can’t get through Memphis.” 73 Approving and building the Overton Park
route would fix this problem. Bernice Smith, a nurse and freeway advocate, argued the
interstate would make it easier for her—and emergency patients—to get to and from the
Medical District. Besides, she could not understand why anyone wanted to preserve
Overton Park since “no one uses it but the hippies.” 74 CPOP members and other antifreeway protesters packed the chambers and engaged in verbal battles with freeway
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advocates. These arguments became so heated that Lt. Governor Wilder had to step back
from the podium while a state highway official called for order. In the end, ninety-two
people spoke in favor of the route while sixty-three were against it. Following this twoday marathon session, state highway department officials set to work transcribing the
proceedings, which they later sent to Secretary Volpe for his consideration.
Secretary Volpe’s Final Decision
Following the public hearing on the 1972 EIS, Secretary Volpe’s Assistant
Director for Environment and Urban Systems, John E. Hirten, recommended that he
reject the Overton Park freeway route. His rationale mirrored that of CPOP attorneys
Vardaman and Newman and used SCOTUS’s interpretation of section 4(f), which
declared “protection of parkland was to be given paramount importance.” According to
the EIS, the east/west leg of Interstate 40 through Memphis would primarily serve local
traffic; only nine percent of the traffic was to/from Memphis or through the city. In his
opinion, “the environmental impact statement does not demonstrate that there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to serving this traffic without using land from Overton
Park.” Hirtnen argued the city and state could increase east/west mass transit in
conjunction with exclusive bus lanes on surface streets to move more people; use the
L&N corridor as a dedicated busway (something the EIS did not consider); or use the
northern leg of I-240, one of CPOP’s favorite alternatives, in “combination with public
transportation and arterial improvements.” To him, this alternative was “inadequately
considered and the arguments against it in the environmental impact statement assume no
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change in the existing streets and no use of an exclusive bus lane on I-240.” To Hirten,
these were all “feasible and prudent” alternatives to the Overton Park route. 75
On January 18, 1973, Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe rejected the
Overton Park freeway route “on the basis of the record before me and in light of guidance
provided by the Supreme Court.” In his decision, he noted SCOTUS’s interpretation of
section 4(f) of the 1966 Federal Aid Highway Act, which held that “the protection of
parkland was to be given paramount importance.” Following his General Counsel’s
guidance Volpe was not convinced there were “no feasible and prudent alternatives to the
use of parkland nor that the broader environmental protection objectives of the NEPA
and the Federal-Aid Highway Act have been met.” He did, however, suggest some
alternatives to the State of Tennessee. Volpe believed the I-240 loop in conjunction with
improved arterial streets, the L & N Railroad corridor, and a broadened use of public
transportation or combination of these three would meet Memphis’s, transportation
needs. Additionally, he argued a tunnel “would be less harmful to the park than the
present design.” Volpe emphasized that his suggestions should not be misconstrued as an
endorsement of any of them, nor does his statement preclude other alternatives.
“Likewise,” he concluded, “it should not be construed as a finding that the ‘no-build’
alternative has been rejected.”76
How did Secretary Volpe go from yea to nay on the Overton Park freeway route
in a relatively short amount of time? Before becoming President Richard M. Nixon’s
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Secretary of Transportation, John A. Volpe had a storied career as a road-building
advocate: he was a building contractor, public works director, governor of Massachusetts,
and the first director of the Federal Highway Administration. One journalist claimed, “the
highwaymen have good reason to assume that Happy Days are Here Again,” since Volpe
had a reputation as a hardline roadbuilder. Critics, however, argued he would “pave the
country” or drop a “concrete curtain” on American cities. For CPOP and its allies, his
November, 1969, Overton Park decision supported this notion. But as his final decision
on the matter demonstrates, this period marked a turning point in his relationship with
roadbuilding in urban areas and a shift towards a balanced approach to transportation that
emphasized mass transit in conjunction with automobiles. As Raymond Mohl points out,
“Volpe’s conversion from highway builder to mass-transit advocate and environmental
protector at first mystified and then angered his old friends in the highway lobby.” By the
time he resigned as Secretary of Transportation in 1973 to become the Ambassador to
Italy, John A. Volpe set a precedent that no Secretary of Transportation who followed
would overturn.77
Over the next four years, the Overton Park freeway route loomed over Memphis,
the State of Tennessee, and the Department of Transportation like a bad dream.
Following Volpe’s decision, Tennessee Highway Commissioner Charles W. Speight
petitioned the district court to make the Secretary comply with the remand order by
making a specific route determination. In Speight’s eyes, by listing possible alternate
routes and not picking a specific one, Volpe had not done his job. On May 1, 1973, Judge
Bailey Brown granted the State of Tennessee relief and ordered the new Secretary of
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Transportation, Claude S. Brinegar, to make several determinations within forty-five
days. First, he had to find unequivocally there was no feasible and prudent alternative or
clearly identify one. Second, Brinegar had to state on the record whether the route
violated NEPA, the 1970 Federal-Aid Highway Act’s air quality statutes, or the FHWA’s
noise standards. Third, he did not have to reconsider the route, but could consider
changes to freeway design. Lastly, Judge Brown placed the burden of proof for all
decisions on the Secretary. Both CPOP and the Department of Transportation attacked
Judge Brown’s decision, claiming these requirements were not necessary—Secretary
Volpe’s decision should stand. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and held “the
Secretary has at this point complied with his duties,” shifting the burden of proof to the
State of Tennessee to demonstrate its route and design met the feasible and prudent test
within the context of NEPA. 78
Following the Appellate Court decision, state highway officials bandied around
several design and route possibilities with the hopes of one gaining approval: a tunnel
under North Parkway on the park’s norther border; an elevated highway over North
Parkway; and a $160 million cut and cover tunnel recommended by President Gerald
Ford’s Secretary of Transportation, William Coleman, Jr. 79 Secretary Coleman’s proposal
went through another round of environmental impact studies, with the EIS claiming the
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Overton Park freeway was bad for the environment. 80 On September 30, 1977, Secretary
of Transportation Brock Adams made his—and the final cabinet-level—decision on the
Overton Park freeway route. In a letter to Governor Ray Blanton, he rejected the State of
Tennessee’s proposal to build I-40 through Overton Park on the grounds it did “not meet
the standards required by the Supreme Court in the case of Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Secretary John Volpe.” According to Federal Highway Administrator William
Cox, Adams’s decision “rejects all future proposals to take I-40 over, through or under
Overton Park.”81 While an immediate victory for the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
and freeway opponents around the country, this decision led the United States Senate to
ask a big environmental question: was section 4(f) still good for the country?

1978 Senate Hearing on Section 4(f)
In an opinion piece published by the Commercial Appeal on February 22, 1976, J.
Alan Hanover called for a re-writing of the law to remove any obstacles to building the
Overton Park route. As special counsel to the State of Tennessee during litigation, he
experienced defeat after defeat in the courtroom. For him, the issue was not the Highway
Department’s refusal to adhere to legislation that guided freeway construction and
mitigated its environmental impact, or the federal courts’ decisions. Instead, the problem
as he saw it was the “Preservation of Parklands” statute itself. To Hanover, section 4(f)
was a “legal monstrosity” implemented after both rights-of-way acquisition and design
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plans were complete and enforced retroactively by the federal courts, which “effectively
stymied” completion of the Overton park route. Arguing that no “feasible and prudent”
alternatives existed and pointing to the fact that most major public and civic
organizations wanted this project completed, he believed “the only possible way to have
an expeditious completion of this segment of this expressway is by a special act of
congress.” He pointed to road construction through Brackenridge Park in San Antonio,
Texas, as a precedent—Congress inserted a provision into the 1973 Federal Aid Highway
Act that allowed the city to exempt itself from federal funding, thus constructing a
connector and freeing itself from federal red tape. 82 Another possibility was to write
freeway legislation specifically exempting the Overton Park route from section 4(f) and
NEPA. “Special legislation,” Hanover concluded, “appears to be the only hope on the
horizon.”83
When Tennessee Senator Howard H. Baker, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on
Transportation, convened a hearing on the Overton Park freeway route in April 1978, he
was responding to an idea raised by freeway advocates two years prior. The central issue,
as he saw it, was balancing park protection with community disruption. On the surface,
this appeared to be a straightforward test, but it was not an easy one to make given that
any final judgment had to adhere to the standard set forth by SCOTUS. “The delays and
lack of progress in the Overton Park case do not encourage one to believe that section
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4(f) provides a workable framework for reaching such a judgement,” Baker concluded,
“and that is what these hearings seek to find.” 84
During the hearing local, state, and federal officials named section 4(f), the
“Preservation of Parklands” statute in the 1966 Federal Aid Highway Act, as the reason
why the Overton Park Freeway route stalled. For Secretary of Transportation Brock
Adams, the problem with section 4(f) was not the statute itself, but its timing. By the time
Congress inserted the “Preservation of Parkland” statute into the 1966 Federal Aid
Highway Act, the State of Tennessee and the FHWA had already planned and
constructed much of Intestate 40 through Memphis. Adhering to section 4(f) was a much
easier problem to solve for freeways that originated after 1966. Had the DOT possessed
this guidance from the outset, then Secretary Adams believed the controversy would not
have gotten to this point. 85
Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton believed this controversy was less an issue of
legislative timing than of Congressional intent. In order for the Secretary of
Transportation to make an informed decision regarding the Overton Park route, he had to
understand what Congress intended meant by the terms “prudent and feasible.” Governor
Blanton identified two causes for this confusion. First, was section 4(f)’s negative
wording that “prohibits approval of a proposed route unless [the Secretary of
Transportation] finds no feasible and prudent alternative exists.” Second, was SCOTUS’s
interpretation of the law, which “set inflexible standards not intended by Congress when
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the law was originally enacted.” Governor Blanton hoped this hearing would lead to an
administrative fix to the problem within the DOT, but if this did not occur, “there needs
to be legislative action to clarify such terms in the act as ‘prudent’ and ‘feasible’ and the
term ‘all possible planning’.”86 Memphis Mayor Wyeth Chandler echoed Governor
Blanton’s call for a legislative solution. He believed Congress should re-write the law so
that no freeway route could go through parklands “unless the legislative body that had
control of those parklands should resolve that the design and the route would have no
adverse impact on the parkland.” This suggestion put the approval in the hands of local
governments with the Secretary of Transportation rubberstamping their decision.
However, if Congress opted to keep the law as it was, then the federal government would
have to clearly identify an alternate route or design and fund that route. Regardless of
which direction Congress went, he wanted a definitive yes or no answer from the
Secretary of Transportation so the City of Memphis, State of Tennessee, and the federal
government could put this issue to rest. 87
In response to the above testimonies, CPOP attorney Charles F. Newman, flanked
by members of several environmental organizations, pushed back against elected
officials’ contention that section 4(f) was the problem. Instead, he argued the Tennessee
Highway Department’s refusal to study alternate routes after Congress passed the
“Preservation of Parklands” statute is what kept the Overton Park route mired in federal
courts, leading to its ultimate defeat. For Newman, section 4(f) was a reasonable
provision that balanced park preservation and transportation needs, and any modification
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of this law would constitute a “breach of faith with those who have relied on its
provisions” in Memphis and throughout the nation. 88 The problem, as he saw it, was of
the state’s own doing. Not only did the highway department show in its own EIS that a
freeway through Overton Park would increase air and noise pollution well beyond federal
guidelines, it also refused to carry the “burden of demonstrating that the alternatives are
not feasible and prudent.” This was the reason Secretaries Volpe and Adams rejected the
state’s proposal. The Overton Park Freeway Revolt persisted for as long as it did, not
because section 4(f) was a problem like Governor Blanton and Mayor Chandler claimed,
but because the State of Tennessee refused to consider anything else. “The first step in
resolving this controversy,” Newman concluded, was not to rewrite section 4(f) but “to
recognize the futility, and indeed folly, of continued consideration of that route.”89
On May 11, 1978, the Environment and Public Works Committee voted against
Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker’s proposed amendment that would have exempted
the Overton Park freeway route from section 4(f) of the 1966 Federal Aid Highway Act.
Had the committee adopted his amendment, then the State of Tennessee could have
moved forward with its plan to build an interstate along the existing bus route through
Overton Park. “This was the last resort, and last resorts are seldom favorable,” he
lamented.90 A couple days later, CPOP Secretary Anona Stoner shot off a celebratory
letter John Vardaman: “It Happened! One-vote margin defeat.” Despite this victory,
Stoner conveyed to Vardaman they must remain vigilant in case Senator Baker took his
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proposal directly to the Senate floor for a full vote. “Let us hope for good luck and not
have that happen,” she concluded. 91 Luckily for her, Baker let it die in committee. The
State of Tennessee finally gave up on the Overton Park route at the end of the Carter
administration and asked the segment to be dropped from the national interstate system
just days before President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. This move released $300
million dollars in federal funding to the city of Memphis for use on other transportation
projects. And in 1987, the State of Tennessee returned the rights-of-way through Overton
Park back to the city. 92 The citizens finally beat the experts.

Conclusion
Using the legal history of the Overton Park freeway route during the 1970s
demonstrates how CPOP defeated the roadbuilders and knocked them off their high
perch. By 1945 roadbuilders had elevated to an unassailable place in American society.
Wielding the rhetoric of objective data collection and analysis they planned, designed,
and built the Eisenhower Interstate system across the country and through Memphis,
Tennessee. Convinced their mission was just and based on practical realities such as
rights-of-way acquisition and building the Hernando DeSoto Bridge across the
Mississippi River, roadbuilders committed themselves to the Overton Park freeway route
and could not envision any alternative. CPOP’s legal team wielded their own experts and
proved there were indeed “feasible and prudent” alternatives to the north of Overton Park
along the Louisville and Nashville railroad tracks, and that the Tennessee Highway
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Department did not do everything it could to “minimize harm” to Overton Park— Roy
Harrover’s cut and cover design, an approach roadbuilders dismissed due to its cost and
engineering difficulties, would limit the freeway’s intrusion into the park by pushing the
freeway below people’s line of sight and returning most of the rights of way to park use.
These two facts, combined with Secretary Volpe’s “arbitrary and capricious” decisionmaking, led Judge Baily Brown to rule in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case to
Volpe once again, this time having to consider the entire administrative record and newly
passed federal environmental preservation legislation.
When roadbuilders continued to force the Overton Park route, CPOP wielded the
NEPA to their advantage. Since federally funded projects now required an EIS before
roadbuilders could move forward, CPOP used this bureaucratic hurdle as another
opportunity to bog down the freeway giving decision makers in the Department of
Transportation time to re-assess the entire project and ultimately decide to cancel the
Overton Park freeway route. After a decade of litigation, CPOP effectively wrested urban
planning authority away from bureaucrats and engineers in Washington, DC and
Nashville, Tennessee and returned it to the grassroots. As we will see in the next chapter,
Midtowners used this hard-won victory in conjunction with federal historic preservation
legislation to stitch their neighborhoods back together and stabilize their communities
during the age of White Flight.
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Chapter 6: Historic Preservation and Neighborhood Revitalization in Evergreen and
Vollintine-Evergreen, 1977-2000

On October 25, 1979, The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP) placed
Overton Park on the National Register of Historic Places. During litigation and the
protracted regulatory battle that consumed anti-freeway activists, policy makers, and
local, state, and federal officials during the 1970s, CPOP wielded the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966 to help ward off Interstate 40. While the historic
preservation movement began in the early twentieth century to preserve places like
Colonial Williamsburg, the postwar historic preservation movement catalyzed around the
wholesale destruction of city spaces by urban renewal programs and freeway
construction. Its mission was to save, preserve, and restore whole districts or
neighborhoods in older urban areas. NHPA also gave preservationists two main tools.
First, it authorized the Secretary of the Interior to maintain a National Register of Historic
Places. The criteria to get on the register was relatively low—a prospective district had to
represent a unifying feature, for example. In Vollintine-Evergreen it was early twentiethcentury architectural styles, such as Bungalows and Tudors. It also had to have some sort
of local, state, or national historical significance. Second, it required any federally backed
project to consider its effect on buildings or districts on the National Register of Historic
Places before moving forward. 1
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CPOP first caught wind of this option during the 1976 iteration of Interstate 40’s
Environmental Impact Statement. Myra F. Harrison of the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation contacted Ben L. Smith, an administrator with the Environmental Planning
Division of the Tennessee Department of Transportation and requested that his office
inquire whether Overton Park was eligible for the National Register of Historic Places.
While the Tennessee State Historic Preservation Officer stated there were no historic
buildings in the interstate’s path, Harrison believed that if assessing the freeway’s
environmental impact included the possible destruction of a historic park, then this
additional step was part of the state’s due diligence. 2 CPOP reached out to the National
Park Service to determine Overton Park’s chances, and upon a favorable reply hired local
architect James F. Williamson, Jr. in October of 1978 to conduct the survey.3 Given the
gravity of Overton Park’s nomination, Williamson encouraged Stoner to lay the
groundwork for success—simultaneously preparing the city for an announcement and
maintaining “complete silence until the final consideration and disposition”—since he
expected freeway advocates would resist any measure that could deter freeway
construction.4
The National Parks Service received Overton Park’s nomination packet on August
22, 1979. On November 6, Herbert L. Harper of the Tennessee State Historic
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Preservation Office notified Mayor Wyeth Chandler about Overton Park’s new
designation. “By this action,” he wrote “the Overton Park Historic District is recognized
as possessing unusual significance to the history of our state” and that “beyond the
recognition itself, inclusion in the National Register assures that this office will review all
federal projects to determine any effect they have on your property.”5 The Memphis City
Council was furious. 6 While this designation alone would not stop freeway construction
through Overton Park, it added another bureaucratic hurdle for roadbuilders to jump over;
the neighborhoods surrounding Overton Park watched closely.
This chapter analyzes the historic preservation campaigns of the Evergreen and
Vollintine-Evergreen neighborhoods around Overton Park in Midtown, Memphis. These
campaigns emerged as a direct response to freeway construction and the racial
demographic changes that came with suburbanization. Evergreen residents wielded
historic preservation as a means to stich their neighborhood back together after the land
clearance for the I-40 route cut directly through the neighborhood, dividing it in two.
Residents used Evergreen’s historic preservation designation to immerse themselves in
the politics of urban planning: the neighborhood got its members on the Mayor’s
Midtown Redevelopment Committee, the civic body charged with devising a
redevelopment plan for the abandoned I-40 corridor, and pressed the city to create and
enforce a historic conservation district under the auspices of the Landmarks Commission,
a governmental body staffed with civic volunteers who oversaw the city’s historic
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properties and districts. This approach ensured Evergreen would become whole again by
repopulating the neighborhood with new turn-of-the-century homes, restoring the area’s
pre-freeway visual fabric for people who could afford it.
Vollintine-Evergreen residents, by contrast used historic preservation to bring a
community together to protect their homes against white flight. During the 1970s, the
Vollintine-Evergreen Community Action Association (VECA) emerged to stabilize the
neighborhood and protect white home values as more black residents moved in to replace
whites that fled to the suburbs. During the 1980s, after its demographics stabilized,
VECA undertook a historic preservation campaign to get its residents re-energized about
the neighborhood. This campaign led to VECA establishing a Community Development
Corporation (CDC) that raised and dispersed close to a million dollars of grant money to
renovate blighted homes, upgrade dilapidated properties, and teach the neighborhood’s
low-income residents to be proper homeowners. This neighborhood-level urban planning
was the bottom-up response to top-down schemes like freeway construction that ignored
local communities’ wants and needs in the name of a “greater good.”
Taken together, Evergreen and Vollintine-Evergreen’s historic preservation
campaigns and subsequent neighborhood-level urban redevelopment projects did their
best to return the Midtown area to a semblance of its pre-freeway self. Evergreen, at least
visually, returned to its former glory: it became a bastion of white, elite homeowners
occupying the neighborhood’s new turn-of-the-century mansions next to the city’s
“crown jewel,” Overton Park. Vollintine-Evergreen, meanwhile, created and maintained
one of the city’s only integrated neighborhoods. In each instance, white homeowners
used historic preservation to preserve and maintain their white space.
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The Evergreen Historic District Association’s Historic Preservation Campaign
The neighborhood activism of the Evergreen Historic District Association
(EHDA) during the 1970s built upon its earlier iteration, the Evergreen Club, from the
early twentieth century. 7 As demonstrated in chapter 1, Evergreen residents had banded
together and brought Snowden School and Evergreen Presbyterian Church to the
neighborhood in 1910 and 1916, respectively. Longtime residents like Sue Williams, who
first came to Evergreen as a child during the club’s early years, served as a bridge
between the old guard and this new generation of neighborhood activists. Residents
initially formed the Stonewall Citizens’ Committee to fight the construction of a
McDonald’s restaurant at the southeast corner of Poplar Avenue and Stonewall Street on
Evergreen’s southern border. They believed this development would set a precedent that
allowed commercial development to encroach upon their neighborhood and impressed
upon Evergreen residents to oppose additional rezoning initiatives on Poplar between
Stonewall and Willet Streets. Eventually EHDA’s board conceded and supported
rezoning property facing Poplar for office, but not for commercial use, since they
believed such a move could provide a buffer between commercial development and their
homes. Williams remembered “everybody was running up and down the street with
petitions and...went down and fought city hall and won which gave us a sense of ‘Hurray,
look what we did’.”8 Evergreen residents found some success in this early fight, and it
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provided momentum for EHDA to move forward with other projects to protect the
neighborhood from outside forces. In this case, interstate construction making its way
through the federal courts.9
EHDA explicitly used historic preservation as a tool to bog down freeway
planning. Initially it focused on preserving the Galloway Mansion, the turn-of-thecentury home of the neighborhood’s founder Robert Galloway, but soon turned its
attention to establishing “a preservation district so they can’t get the interstate through.” 10
Early attempts at the historic district survey sputtered due to the neighborhood being too
big an area, with too few people, and too little money. 11
EHDA’s fortunes changed when Janis Richardson, a Texas transplant, moved to
Evergreen in 1979. As an urban anthropologist, Janis Richardson sought to understand
her home, street, and neighborhood. What initially began as an interest in her new house,
a four square on Stonewall Street, soon became full-on participation in Stonewall’s
historic preservation survey. She remembered that even though the issue was nearly dead
by the time she moved to the neighborhood, “there was so much mistrust…of the state
highway department, there was a sense that it could come back at any time.” Placing
Evergreen on the National Register of Historic Places ensured there would be “another
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level of review at least, that would slow the process down.” 12 Richardson was later
recruited to join EHDA’s board of directors where she took over the association’s
floundering historic preservation campaign.
She implemented a number of small but significant changes to the program that
helped it progress efficiently. First, she reached out to the Central Gardens neighborhood
association for information on how to conduct a neighborhood-wide historic preservation
survey. Then she expanded the survey to include the area directly affected by the
freeway. The new boundaries extended to North Parkway (north), Overton Park (east),
Poplar Avenue (south), and Watkins (west). Finally, she divided the large area into
smaller sections, allowing surveyors to tackle smaller, less imposing swaths of land at a
time. Lastly, she enlisted Christian Brothers College history students to conduct library
research. By March 1984 Richardson and her volunteers had collected all the survey data
and forwarded it to the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) in Nashville for review
and it was entered into the National Register of Historic Places on January 11, 1985. 13
Richardson and the EHDA used the success of the National Register Nomination as a
springboard into redeveloping the I-40 Corridor.
EHDA’s attempts to get the abandoned I-40 Corridor redeveloped required three
things to happen. First, the State of Tennessee had to declare the corridor land surplus
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and sell it to the City of Memphis. Second, the Office of Planning and Development
devised a planning guide to steer the corridor’s development. Third, EHDA had to get
Evergreen and the corridor declared a conservation district to ensure that new
development was in keeping with the neighborhood’s early twentieth-century aesthetic.

I-40 Corridor Redevelopment
When the I-40 Corridor gouged the Evergreen neighborhood, it created a 1.1mile-long scar that extended from Overton Park in the east along Galloway Avenue,
turned south, plowing over Overton Park Avenue and running along the street until it
terminated at Claybrook Street to the west where a freeway interchange had been under
construction since the 1960s. Between 1968 and 1970 the State of Tennessee razed 408
single family homes, eighty-four duplexes, 266 apartments, forty-four businesses, five
churches, and one fire station along with fifty six acres of land. 14 But when the route got
tied up in federal court, the state left the lots empty.
The scene was something out of a science fiction movie where mankind had been
stricken from the planet and left nature to reclaim her turf. Over time, the corridor
became overgrown with grass, littered with debris, and home to felled trees and limbs. 15
Historian Willie Bearden claimed that “one of the saddest sites was in the spring when
the dogwoods were blooming and the tulips were pushing out of the ground in empty
lots.” Images from that period reveal a haunting absence of humanity. The paved streets
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along the corridor were still intact, along with the sidewalks that had weeds growing
thought the cracks. However, these sidewalks directed pedestrians to concrete steps and
walkways that led to nothing. Bearden called these “sidewalks to nowhere” since they
“outlined the haunted spaces of block after block of demolished houses.”16 Janis
Richardson claimed she felt a palpable sense of loss among her neighbors: “The
neighborhood was grieving…and there were stories of people who lost their houses and
moved and died.”17 Faced with this long-standing trauma, Richardson and Evergreen
residents worked towards re-developing the corridor to knit the neighborhood back
together.
On January 28, 1985, EHDA’s Corridor Planning Committee charted a path
forward for the abandoned interstate land. First, they asked themselves why they moved
to Evergreen. Many were drawn to the fact it was a multi-generational neighborhood.
Some loved the neighborhood’s proximity to downtown. Others loved the trees and the
way it was laid out. However, there was one thing the committee members agreed upon:
they loved the houses. Based on her work with the Historic District survey Richardson
knew the neighborhood was built over thirty to forty years, and its mix of Queen Annes,
Tudors, Spanish Missions, Bungalows, and Four Squares created an eclectic aesthetic not
found in other parts of Memphis. This knowledge, Richardson remembers, “fed into our
idea of how [the neighborhood] should be developed.” And since Evergreen already had
the lots, sidewalks, and utility lines, “we just [needed] the houses back.” EHDA’s goal
was to redevelop the corridor with homes that looked like they were built in the early
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twentieth-century. And “once the trees grow up and the lawns are in, it would be hard to
tell where the corridor started and stopped.”18
Returning Evergreen to its former glory required residents to get involved in the
politics of urban planning. The association threw its lot in with Memphis’ hard-charging
mayor, Dick Hackett. First elected to office in 1978 at twenty-eight years old, Hackett
became the nation’s youngest mayor in 1983 at thirty-three years old. While campaigning
for a second term in 1986, he made a campaign promise to develop the abandoned I-40
corridor in Evergreen. 19 Richardson met with Hackett’s Public Works Director Maynard
Stiles and confirmed that Mayor Hackett and the EHDA were on the same page: they
wanted the I-40 corridor to be redeveloped “primarily with single family homes that are
consistent with the neighborhood.” 20 Richardson was anxious to work with the mayor and
city planners to “devise a plan for redevelopment of this land that would insure that both
the needs of our neighborhood and the City would be met when the time comes to
redevelop the land” since “developers [were] hovering around like vultures.”21
None of this was possible, however, until the State of Tennessee released the
abandoned corridor back to the City of Memphis. The I-40 corridor was tied up between
state and federal statutes. This meant land could not be sold for development until the
State of Tennessee declared it surplus land that would not be used for transportation

18

Minutes, Corridor Planning Committee, January 28, 1985, Box 1, Folder 18, EHDAC; Janis
Richardson interview with author, April 6, 2018.
19

Otis Sanford, From Boss Crump to King Willie: How Race Changed Memphis Politics,
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2017), 185-191.
20

Foster to EHDA Executive Board, March 5, 1985, Box 18, Folder 16, EHDAC; Suggested
Questions for Group Discussions,” Box 2, Folder 2, EHDAC; Janis Foster, “I-40 Corridor: The Long Drive
Back,” The Mid-Memphian, July-August 1987.
21

Foster to Hackett, April 24, 1986, Box 3, Folder 19, EHDAC.

200

purposes. As of 1987, the engineering firm of Allen & Hoshall was working on a study
on the “stubs” of the former I-40 route located between Tillman and East Parkway to the
east of Overton Park and at Bellevue to the west of Evergreen. Only after the federal
government had reviewed these studies, held hearings, and made a final decision, could
the State declare the corridor surplus.
In the spring of 1989, EHDA board members accompanied Mayor Hackett to
Nashville to lobby state legislators to revise state representative Pam Gaia’s amendment
that gave former landowners right of first refusal in the event the land became surplus
property.22 With approximately 300 parcels of land left over, the Tennessee Department
of Transportation (TDOT) would have to spend substantial amounts of time and money
conducting due diligence in compliance with the law. In an address to legislators the
mayor claimed that “requiring a search for and negotiations with 100 owners and their
probably numerous heirs would substantially delay the rejoining of these
neighborhoods.” He continued, “this project would cost the taxpayers a substantial
amount of money for attorneys’ fees and title searches and could be delayed for years or
possibly indefinitely.”23 State Senator Richard Cohen introduced Senate Bill No. 1089 on
February 1, 1989, to amend Tennessee Code Annotated 12-2-112 by deleting the right-offirst refusal stipulation to former landowners and replacing it with a ninety-day window
to purchase their old property before the State of Tennessee sold it to the City of
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Memphis.24 Stakeholders throughout Memphis voiced their support for this legislation. 25
Angered by Gala’s intransigence, area residents called on her to put “this issue behind
us” since “we can’t afford to continue to sacrifice the restoration of a valuable portion of
Memphis because of their feelings.” 26 It soon became law, and with the state unburdened
by the right-of-first-refusal the corridor was on a path towards redevelopment. 27
The Mayor’s Midtown Corridor Redevelopment Project
The city and EHDA also united to formulate a long-range development plan for
the I-40 Corridor. During the summer of 1986, Janis Richardson reached out to Cynthia
Buchanan with the Office of Planning and Development (OPD) to encourage the city to
conduct a neighborhood-level study. She believed that an OPD study would guide
developers to use the land in a way that would be most acceptable to the city and
neighborhood.” Richardson hoped that getting out in front of urban planning
developments would give EHDA the power to “guide development rather than merely
reacting to proposed changes.”28 The following year mayor Hackett sought a final
resolution on the corridor. He organized what would become the Mayor’s Midtown
Corridor Redevelopment Project driven by a Citizens’ Committee made up of “business
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persons, neighborhood representatives, experts in development industry, and
representatives of various governmental agencies” to study and recommend “land use,
design, and redevelopment strategies to the City Council.” 29 Hackett appointed Janis
Richardson and Steve Anderson to this committee as EHDA’s representatives and set
them to work devising a plan for the abandoned I-40 Corridor.
The EHDA-Citizens’ Committee relationship allowed EHDA to develop corridor
infill guidelines that influenced the city’s final plan. While EHDA had many wants in its
guidelines, it emphasized two core requirements. First, in order for the neighborhood to
return to its pre-freeway state, redevelopment had to utilize existing single-family lots
and keep the infill for single family homes. The bulk of the land in the corridor before
freeway construction began was zoned for single family homes and EHDA wanted to
make sure no new duplexes or multifamily dwellings made it into the final
recommendation.30 Second, residents believed Evergreen’s “neighborly attitude” was
“promoted by it’s [sic] open street pattern of single family homes facing the street.” This
pattern “encouraged people to socialize on their front porches and walk the neighborhood
along the convenient well-lighted sidewalks.” Any attempts by the city to alter
neighborhood streets to facilitate high volume traffic would devastate this quiet,
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residential community. 31 Luckily for EHDA, the project’s goals and objectives fell in line
with its wants and desires and the Citizen Committee’s final product reflected this. 32
The Citizen Committee’s “Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment Report”
provided guidance to the Memphis City Council that steered infill development within
the I-40 Corridor. The plan pushed commercial development to Evergreen’s western
border on Cleveland Street and used single-family attached homes as a transition zone
between the commercial area and Evergreen proper. The area between McLean
Boulevard to the east and Garland Street to the west was to be single family homes with
detached garages. The existing commercial area on Overton Park Avenue remained but
was to be buffered from the surrounding residences with a mason wall and evergreen
trees. Homes would be built on existing lots so as to use the powerlines already in place
and to preserve mature trees. The plan also recommended a number of covenants that
would preserve the neighborhood’s urban canopy, limit all single family dwellings to two
stories, and most importantly, mandate that any “new Construction…demolition,
removal, or addition to buildings which now or here after exist on a lot shall be in
compliance with” the Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment plan and the Evergreen
Historic Conservation District (below). 33 The City Council adopted the Citizen
Committee’s plan on November 7, 1989, after “approximately three hundred Midtown
residents packed the chamber awaiting the vote” and later adopted the Land Use Control

31

Pfannes to Merrill, April 9, 1989, Box 4, Folder 10, EHDAC.

“The Mayor’s Midtown Corridor Redevelopment Project: Goals and Objectives,” Box 18,
Folder 19, EHDAC.
32

33
Memphis and Shelby County Office of Planning and Development, “Midtown Corridor West
Redevelopment Report,” October 1989.

204

Board’s zoning recommendations that allowed for redevelopment to officially begin.34
The EHDA had only one question left: “what were these homes supposed to look like?”

The Evergreen Historic Conservation District
In order to repopulate Evergreen with new “old” houses, EHDA sought to
implement historic conservation zoning. Faced with the possibility of suburban-style
residential development within Evergreen, this sort of regulation was exactly what the
neighborhood wanted. EHDA used Nashville’s historic preservation laws as a template to
create, administer, and enforce conservation zoning in Memphis. Conservation zoning
was a classification that protected “designated areas from demolition of architecturally
important buildings, constructions of incompatible new buildings, and construction of
incompatible new additions onto existing homes.”35 Janis Richardson claimed that
EHDA’s goal was to ensure that the structural aspects of new construction fell in line
with the existing homes. Since “almost all of our houses had front porches,” Evergreen
residents wanted “the front entry to be visible versus in a suburban house where their
garage faces front, we wanted garages in the back.” Uniform setbacks and the scale of
houses were important to maintaining the neighborhood’s atmosphere: front doors could
not be adjacent to the sidewalk nor should any buildings be any taller than existing ones.
“We were after things that once they were done, they really couldn’t be undone,”
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Richardson continued, “If you build a new house, you’re not going to tear it down and set
it back five more feet.”36 Conservation zoning was the answer.
EHDA moved quickly towards becoming a Historic Conservation District. In
March, 1987, Janis Richardson reached out to the Memphis Landmarks Commission
(MLC) about Evergreen becoming a local conservation district. 37 In June 1988, Cathy
Bruner, an urban planner on the MLC staff, met with EHDA board members to outline
the steps necessary to apply for historic conservation district status. 38 First, the EHDA
board appointed a committee comprised of four architects that lived in Evergreen to
develop design guidelines. These guidelines only applied to a home’s exterior that faced a
public right-of-way, “new construction should be consistent with existing buildings along
a street in terms of height, scale, set back, and rhythm of existing buildings,” and did not
apply to a home’s interior, nor “routine exterior maintenance, such as painting and reroofing.”39 Second, EHDA formed another committee “charged with informing property
owners about the Conservation District status.”40 This committee published several
articles in the neighborhood newsletter, The Mid-Memphian, and in the Commercial
Appeal. It also mailed every household and absentee property owner an information flyer
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that announced a public meeting where residents would hear about the proposed district
and provide opportunity to ask questions and provide feedback before EHDA formally
moved forward. On September 29, 1988, approximately 150 people attended EHDA’s
general membership meeting to hear about becoming a historic conservation district. A
straw poll revealed that the neighborhood was behind the idea and the MLC approved
EHDA’s conservation district application in November 1988, with the earliest possible
approval on January 31, 1989.41
Despite this swift progress, Evergreen’s historic conservation district soon ran
afoul of builders, architects, and Memphis City Council members who believed that MLC
oversight on the I-40 Corridor would hold up construction. 42 In order for developers to
begin construction on new homes in the I-40 corridor, they would have to get a
Certificate of Appropriateness (COA) from the MLC. A COA was the MLC’s formal
approval that new construction, demolition, or relocation of structures within the
conservation district met the district’s design guidelines. To obtain a COA a new owner,
designer, and builder had to read the district’s guidelines and study the “area around the
newly purchased property, noting height, setback, rood form, materials and other design
qualities of surrounding buildings and area” before meeting with MLC staff to discuss
ideas for the new building. During this process MLC staff suggested options to ensure an
applicant’s application would pass muster on the first try. 43 If approved, MLC staff would
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forward the application to the commissioners for further review. When commissioners
did return applications to builders with suggestions to make their application fit in with
the surrounding area, the MLC came under criticism. During its fourteen-year existence
the Landmarks Commission only rejected two of the 175 applications it reviewed,
outright. One was a “New Orleans-style building with wrought iron balconies that was
totally inappropriate for Memphis,” submitted by developer Tony Bologna. The other
was a façade redesign of the Pepperite Printing building downtown submitted by architect
and Memphis City Council member Tom Marshall who later withdrew his application. 44
In response to this rejection, Bologna and his partner Henry Turley accused the MLC of
being a “censor board” that interfered with economic development for “obscure, totally
subjective reasons.” Turley declared that he had proposed that his firm discontinue
working in historic districts since “the return is not worth the risks.”45
On August 22, 1989, the Memphis City Council unanimously approved an
amendment to the city’s landmarks ordinance that stripped the MLC’s enforcement
power in historic districts. Developer Tony Bologna drafted the amendment. City Council
member Tom Marshall introduced it and whipped the votes. He claimed, “the Landmarks
Commission had become overly bureaucratic and caused unwarranted delays and
expensive design changes for large developers and low-income homeowners alike.” MLC
chair William H. Gaskill refuted this claim. He stated, “no projects were ever stopped,
killed, or significantly delayed during my 11 years on the Landmarks Commission…we
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are modern architects who are pro-development…not a bunch of nuts trying to preserve
everything.”46 Commercial Appeal reporter Wayne Risher noted that this turn of events
was “heady stuff for unpaid members more accustomed to discussing…architectural
minutiae” and pointed to the paradox of the City Council disempowering the MLC, the
very members of which they approved.47
Historic preservationists and the MLC accused Tom Marshall of conspiring to
bring down the MLC as retribution for rejecting his application. The following week City
Council member Florence Leffler called for a vote to reverse the council’s amendment.
She claimed that “a large segment of the public thinks something shady went on.”
Council Member Jack Sammonds, who represented Evergreen, claimed “there has been a
groundswell of support from my constituents to overturn what we did last week.”48 The
EHDA circulated a flyer calling on all residents to pack the City Council chambers for
the meeting on August 29, 1989 to voice their concerns. 49 Approximately 300 people
from Midtown and downtown neighborhood associations showed up. Nancy Jane Baker
remembers “the fire marshal having a conniption fit in the lobby there were so many
people. They finally got a speaker…outside so everybody that had to go outside could
hear.”50 In an 8-1 vote the city council reversed itself from the week prior and received a
standing ovation from those in attendance. This reversal placed the MLC back in control

46

Hirschman, “Landmark votes to push development.”

47

Wayne Risher, “Riff over power tosses historic panel onto stage,” Commercial Appeal, August

29, 1989.
48

Joey Senat, “Challenges spur petition for new landmarks vote,” Commercial Appeal, August 29,

49

Important Notice, Box 19, Folder 3, EHDAC.

50

Nancy Jane Baker and Cindy Buchanan interview with author, January 26, 2018.

1989.

209

of infill oversight. Mayor Hackett believed the City Council made the right decision and
a political cartoon in the Commercial Appeal the next day confirmed what the MLC and
preservationists knew—Tom Marshall’s failed coup against the MLC left him with egg
on his face.51 Despite preservationists’ victory in getting the MLC’s power restored, the
City Council moved to eliminate its role in the Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment
Project.
On the surface this battle appeared to stem from the MLC’s rejection of Tom
Marshall’s downtown redevelopment project. However, it was actually a city-level
political quarrel over governing authority. Even though the City Council returned power
to the MLC, its members still had grave reservations about the MLC’s overview process
for corridor redevelopment. For the Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment project to
work as EHDA intended, Evergreen had to be a historic conservation district, and that
required MLC, not City Council, oversight. At the October 24, 1989, City Council
meeting, members asked question after question that undermined the MLC’s authority:
“what are the powers of the Landmarks commission and where does that authority come
from?”; “what is the avenue of appeal of an action of the Landmarks Commission?”; “if
an individual brings a project before the Landmarks Commission and it is not approved,
what can that individual do quickly, other than go to court?” 52 These questions, and OPD
Director Cindy Buchanan’s answers revealed how much—or how little—authority the
City Council wielded over the MLC and, if they approved Evergreen’s conservation
district, the redevelopment process. As a result, the City Council delayed making any
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formal decision on Evergreen’s historic conservation district designation until it could
sort out the overall redevelopment process.53
The Commercial Appeal highlighted this tension between the city council, Mayor
Hackett, and the MLC. It saw a clash between the overtly political City Council and the
relatively apolitical MLC: MLC supporters believed the Landmarks Commission, staffed
with pro-preservation experts and volunteers, could keep architectural decisions at the
forefront and would be “less likely to be swayed by such political factors as who
contributes the most to whose campaign funds.” 54 The newspaper warned the City
Council to learn from Mayor Hackett’s past mistakes. Earlier in his administration he
tried to politicize the Brooks Museum of Art by installing a mayor-appointed director,
bypassing the museum board, since the Brooks was a branch of the city government. The
museum objected to the mayor inserting city politics into the installation’s management;
Mayor Hackett eventually backed down. Now the City Council was doing the same thing
to the MLC. If it did not learn from past mistakes, then it would likely face “a hostile
crowd of citizens” and the “traditional animosity between developers and regulators”
over historic properties “will be unleashed.” This would “not be a pretty sight, and not
the sort of forum for calm, level-headed decision-making.” The Appeal believed
“civilized communities should be able to find a way to protect their heritage without
being considered anti-development.”55
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In response to repeated delays and rising tensions, EHDA organized a campaign
to push through its historic conservation district approval. On October 26, 1989, EHDA
held a special meeting of its board members to devise a strategy to force the City Council
to approve Evergreen’s historic conservation district and MLC’s role in the corridor
redevelopment. EHDA acknowledged the City Council’s core issue was not with the
merits of conservation versus preservation, but with its own authority in the
redevelopment process. It needed “to build a coalition of seven [votes] on the council that
will be there for us on all corridor plan and conservation status issues” and opted to “use
friendly persuasion with the council and avoid further antagonizing them.” 56 EHDA
launched a green ribbon campaign to spread awareness and garner public support for the
Evergreen’s conservation district. It circulated approximately 2,500 green ribbons and
displayed them on hundreds of cars throughout Midtown on trees in the I-40 corridor to
show support for historic preservation. Roberta Anderson stated the “response has been
good so far, and people are calling to get more ribbons to pass out to other people.” 57
EHDA parlayed this success into a phone bank on the Sunday afternoon before the City
Council’s November 7, 1989, vote on Evergreen’s conservation district, as well as a
caravan to the meeting.58
EHDA’s persistent activism forced the Memphis City Council to approve the
MLC as the regulatory authority on the I-40 Corridor redevelopment. At the November 7,
1989, meeting, Evergreen residents and their allies packed the City Council chambers and
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forced the council to unanimously back the Evergreen Historic Conservation District.
Architect and advocate Carson Looney claimed that “tonight the City Council responded
to the political process” but “deciding what kinds of houses to build in a historic area
should not be left up to the political process.” 59 The conservation district went to the
Land Use Control Board next. Its application was approved, and then returned to the City
Council for final approval. On January 23, 1990, the Memphis City Council approved
Evergreen’s historic conservation district and design guidelines for construction that
dictated what the new “old” homes were supposed to look like. Irma Merrill believed this
meant “the new houses in our neighborhood will be just as charming and just as beautiful
as the ones that are already there.” 60 With Evergreen’s historic conservation zoning in
place, the Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment plan complete, and rights of first
refusal for former corridor landowners amended, the city of Memphis and Evergreen
could finally get underway populating the former I-40 corridor with new “old” houses.
Evergreen could now “move, in the words of Robert Penn Warren, ‘out of history, into
history, and the awful responsibilities of time.” 61
New “Old” Houses in Evergreen
On April Fool’s day 1990, the Evergreen neighborhood prepped for surgery. The
state of Tennessee offered approximately 235 parcels of former I-40 corridor land for
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purchase. Former landowners had ninety days to express interest and begin the purchase
process. However, after the ninety-day window the City of Memphis purchased the
remaining parcels then auctioned them off to buyers at ten percent above the sealed price.
The city sold the lots in phases to prevent flooding the market. 62
The Mid-Memphian put Evergreen residents’ fears at ease by outlining the design
and construction guidelines developers would have to follow. All new construction
within Evergreen were to be single family homes, framed within one year of purchase,
and the lots could not house livestock, noxious trades, or contain radio or television
antennas. Builders had to use their best efforts to preserve all trees on the property. These
new structures also had to conform to the “Evergreen Historic Conservation District
Design Guidelines, Including the Midtown Corridor West Redevelopment Area.” “These
guidelines will be used to encourage the construction of four-square, bungalow, and
eclectic homes,” focusing primarily on the street-facing facades, “including roof line and
slope, doors, windows, the location of garages, appearance of porches, and similar
elements,” with the goal of “knitting the neighborhood back together again.” 63 By August
27, 1990, Mayor Hackett marked the first lot to be sold at the corner of Overton Park
Avenue and Evergreen. 64 “It is actually happening!” declared The Mid-Memphian,
Evergreen and Midtown’s neighborhood newspaper. The I-40 in-fill was about to begin.
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To ensure the corridor lots would be redeveloped, EHDA undertook an
advertising campaign to “sell” Evergreen to developers. On February 7, 1990, at the
Racquet Club in East Memphis, Kevin Pfannes, a real estate attorney, relator, and EHDA
member, gave an address to Lamda Alpha, a society of real estate development
professionals on the benefits of building new “old” homes in Memphis’s Midtown
neighborhoods. Pfannes claimed that development in Evergreen was part of a national
trend; from Memphis to Chicago to Phoenix, “the older sections of town were being
renovated and reborn.” He called on his audience to work with the neighborhood: “talk to
us, walk our streets, look carefully at our homes…observe what exists and you will see
what works and what sells.” By doing so, you will “get your plans approved faster, the
house will sell more quickly and your profits will be more likely if you build a house that
fits in with and enhances the quality of the neighborhood.” 65 Relator Martin Palmer
agreed with Pfannes’ remarks and believed there was ample demand for Midtown homes.
While developer Stewart Austin was still concerned with MLC’s bureaucracy, he liked
“the plan and thinks it will work.”66 Despite some ongoing reservations, real estate
developers were excited to build new houses in the I-40 corridor.67
One of the first new “old” houses built in Evergreen actually predated in-fill
development. Builders Grady Stratton and Peter Pieraccini of Pieraccini Stratton Inc.
built a late nineteenth century Victorian home at 1830 Galloway Avenue in the spring of
1989. They were relatively new to the construction game but had been working in the
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Midtown area since they began. The company liked Midtown and wanted to build there,
but “found that people want to come to midtown but can’t find what they want.”
Pieraccini Stratton Inc. planned to fill that gap. Their Victorian home on Galloway
Avenue demonstrated that new “old” construction under the MLC’s regulatory authority
was possible. Before construction they met with the Landmarks Commission to discuss
the plans. Once finished, they presented a copy to the MLC. They also met with Irma
Merrill, the EHDA president, and upon her approval began construction. Peter Pieraccini
remarked “it’s better for us if everybody’s happy and there are no complaints.” 68 After
touring the home Hazel Fath commented that, “New homes can, and should, be built on”
the old I-40 corridor land “so that when completed no one will be able to say” that “this
house is new and that one is old.” This modern Victorian did just that. 69
Even though developers were on board, EHDA realized that they needed to “sell”
Evergreen and Midtown to prospective home buyers too. Key to this campaign was
improving the area’s image. Midtowners understood that outsiders viewed the area as
unsafe. John Branston realized that Midtown needed a marketing arm similar to the
Chamber of Commerce “since we don’t do a very good job of telling our story to
outsiders.”70 “Our image depends largely on word-of-mouth and whatever publicity
Midtown gets in the media,” the Historic District Alliance (HDA) concurred. This
approach allowed outsiders to label Midtown with what they saw on the news. The HDA
noted that a “single shooting at…Snowden School, is far more likely to generate publicity
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than the 179” other school days. 71 Faced with this reality Branston asked, “when was the
last time you heard about violent crime in Germantown or Cordova?” 72 As a result,
Midtown area developers, neighborhood associations, and EHDA’s own Sue Williams
developed a chamber of commerce-type organization called “Midtown is Memphis” to
promote the area.73 In the campaign’s first publication, it called Midtown “the geographic
center and the heart of Memphis” and pointed to the “seven historic neighborhoods
studded with architectural masterpieces…and the tallest trees in Memphis.” Institutions
and amenities like Overton Park, the Zoo, the Brooks Museum, Memphis College of Art,
Rhodes College, and Christian Brothers University anchored the area. It was home to
“restaurants from A (Anderton’s) to Z (Zinnie’s).” “Midtown is a look, and a unique
sense of community. It’s a diversity of ages, occupations, and ethnic groups.” In short,
“Midtown is Memphis.”74 Prospective homeowners liked what they heard.
Jackie and Dennis Morlok bought the first new home built at 316 North Avalon in
the old I-40 corridor because it was exactly what they wanted. Both Dennis and Jackie
worked at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital downtown. He was the Director of
Finance and Administration for the American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities
(ALSAC), St. Jude’s fundraising arm, and she was an inpatient nurse. They decided
Evergreen was the best location, but it took them a while to decide on the neighborhood.
They looked at homes in Cordova, Germantown, and North Mississippi, but quickly
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realized they would have to make that commute to and from work every day. Dennis said,
“why be so stupid [and] waste forty minutes each way everyday of our lives when we
have it all here in Midtown…Why go anywhere else?” 75
The Morloks turned to builder Jeff Curry of Curry homes to make their dream of
Midtown homeownership come true. Curry, an Iowa transplant by way of Houston,
brought his own enthusiasm to building new “old” homes in the corridor. He was very
excited about the opportunity to build Craftsman-style homes to fit modern sensibilities.
“We’re trying to fit the houses into the area but in today’s market, to add the amenities
that Midtown people expect” like plenty of bathrooms, larger closets, custom master
baths, central heat and air, hardwood floors, and cove molding. But “we’re not copying
but filling in the existing spaces with new homes that meld in with the existing ones.”
Curry worked with the MLC throughout the design process and followed the
conservation district design guidelines. Curry purchased the lot at 316 North Avalon on
September 9, 1991 and submitted his design guidelines to the MLC in time for the
November 7, 1991, meeting. After some minor changes his design was approved, and
construction began that winter.76
Breaking ground on the first new “old” home in the corridor required an official
ceremony. On a chilly, damp, and blustery November day, Mayor Hackett, OPD director
Cindy Buchanan, and the EHDA president were in attendance to mark the beginning of a
new era for Evergreen. Mayor Hackett formally recognized everyone that made this
project possible. Buchanan presented framed photographs of the fifty-six-acre corridor
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redevelopment plans to EHDA, and EHDA members presented an official door plaque to
the builder Jeff Curry to place on his new creation, a reimagination of an early twentieth
century four square, as soon as it was complete. 77
This new “old” four square blended into its surroundings as if it was always there.
The front façade included a full porch that ran the length of the house and included such
details a wood one-over-one windows, a front door with a transom, columns, and wood
molding. The interior, however, included a mix of old and new. Upon entering the foyer,
stairs to the second floor were on the left, with the dining room on the right. The master
bedroom, which included a custom-made bathroom, was to the left, but Curry hid the
entryway behind the stairs so as to “keep the entire area as private as the owner wishes.”
The living room included a fireplace on the east wall. Off the living room to the right was
the kitchen and breakfast nook that had a “decided Craftsman look” with glass front
cabinets and a black and white tile floor. Beyond the kitchen was the rear exit onto a
wooden deck. Upstairs included four rooms, one of which could be a den or playroom,
and a full bathroom. Curry paid attention to detail. The foyer, living room, and dining
room all had oak hardwood floors, with the bedrooms carpeted. All rooms had deep
baseboards and cove molding in a combination of natural wood and painted surfaces. The
Mid-Memphian’s writer Hazel Fath was so impressed with Curry’s work and the
Morlok’s desire to move there that she credited each with taking the “first step toward
making Evergreen whole again.”78

77

Ibid.

78

Ibid.

219

After this first project was completed, new “old” homes sprouted up like weeds.
Jim and Linda Russell’s eclectic home at 1792 Autumn was approved by the MLC in the
summer of 1992, along with Ralph Gagliano’s Queen Anne cottage at 1756 Overton Park
Avenue.79 David Harlow relocated from Germantown to a four square in Evergreen at
1800 Autumn Avenue in 1992 to help “preserve historically unique neighborhoods.” 80 J.
Partick Riceci relocated from Idaho to Memphis and bought a new “old” home in the “socalled corridor.”81 Sandra and Melvin Burgess worked diligently with their builders John
Griffin and Mike Todd to construct a new Mediterranean-influenced brick four square at
363 North Avalon.82 And so it went.
By the mid of 1990s, Fath believed the end was in sight. As of December 31,
1994, sixty-nine new homes were completed and occupied, twelve were under
construction, with ninety-four designs approved by the MLC. 83 Driving through the
neighborhood shortly before Halloween she counted forty-five homes “where families
were celebrating the holiday in houses that have been built in the past two years.” She
saw pumpkins and goblins in peoples’ front yard awaiting trick or treaters. An “airplane
Bungalow at the corner of Overton Park and Angelus had a row of orange paper sack
luminarias lining the walk, waiting for the touch of a match.” 84 She also noticed that
another new “old” corridor home recently had a housewarming party. “At the curb,
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waiting to be picked up,” she observed, “was a pile of Champaign cartons!” 85 Another
trip around the block during holiday time revealed a variety of Christmas decorative
motifs. “Most chose to go with an old-fashioned theme that is appropriate to the style of
homes”: green garland, wreaths, red ribbons, and bows. Janis Richardson remembers that
the first-year people moved into the new corridor houses, neighbors got together and
walked up and down the street singing Christmas carols. The next year, they did it on a
horse drawn float.86 As opposed to years past, when Fath “believed that the vast
[corridor] wasteland would be with us forever,” it “seemed there were more homes that
were lighted, decorated, sharing their joy of being part of a happy community than ever
before.”87 She concluded, “It felt like I was driving through a ‘neighborhood’ once
again.”88
The Vollintine-Evergreen Community Association’s Origins
The Vollintine-Evergreen Community Action Association (VECA) materialized
like so many other neighborhood organizations: its residents banded together and
responded to a crisis.89 Founded in 1970, Vollintine-Evergreen residents and local clergy
united to combat white flight and blockbusting. 90 During an era of white exodus from the
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cities to the suburbs, inner-belt neighborhoods like Vollintine-Evergreen were
undergoing rapid demographic change. 91 While Vollintine-Evergreen bordered the white
Evergreen neighborhood to its south, it was surrounded by historically black
neighborhoods to the north (New Chicago), east (Hyde Park), and west (Klondike). As a
result, when the neighborhood’s white residents fled to the suburbs, black Memphians
slowly moved into the neighborhood. Faced with this reality, about 150 VollintineEvergreen residents came together at a community meeting at McLean Baptist Church
and founded VECA, whose purpose was “to cooperatively maintain and enhance a
healthy biracial community.”92 At its core, VECA’s white residents embraced integration
to protect their homes. If they did not, the white space they fought so hard to create
would turn from white to black seemingly overnight.
VECA’s main tool in combatting white flight was The Evergreen News, a
monthly newsletter (later reduced to six issues a year) that served as the voice of the
association. Its articles sought to assuage whites’ fears about the neighborhood’s black
residents. For example, in its first issue the newsletter rooted VECA’s pro-diversity
stance firmly in the neighborhood’s past. In his article “Diversity a Tradition,” resident
Rick Thomas pointed to Vollintine-Evergreen “as a popular place for immigrants from
foreign countries to settle.” He emphasized the area’s English, German, Russian, Polish,
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Italian, and Greek families, with their various languages and religious beliefs. Written
during the era of white flight, he noted that many of their accents and diets may have left
the area, but “names like Wunder, Levitch, Tumminello, Bacopulos, and Lansky, still
common in the neighborhood remind us of the diverse cultures that have lived side-byside.”93
The newsletter also included a monthly “Meet the Neighbors” segment which
sought to make the foreign familiar. The column introduced an individual or family to the
VECA community. Sometimes it focused on life-long residents like the dulcimer-playing
Mary Faith Grymes, a young white woman who had attended Snowden Junior High and
Central High School and was a student at Southwestern College. She aspired to become a
flight attendant for Pan American Airlines and travel around the world. 94 Other times it
focused on returnees like Marvin Rattner. His profile highlighted a Vollintine-Evergreen
resident come full circle—while born and raised in the neighborhood he attended the
University of Tennessee where he earned a law degree, before moving to New York City
and receiving his master’s degree in accounting from New York University. Rattner
eventually found his way back to Memphis and was a founding partner at an integrated
law firm, whose first client was the Memphis chapter of the NAACP. 95 The Evergreen
News might have also been where white residents had their first meaningful introduction
to the neighborhood’s black residents. For example, Modeane Thompson was the first
black person introduced to the wider neighborhood when her profile appeared in the
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newsletter. Her profile followed the standard template: family introduction, her path to
Vollintine-Evergreen, and general interests. However, many readers might have been
surprised to learn she was a member of VECA’s steering committee and a liaison to
many of the area’s black residents. While her introduction emphasized her community
work, her husband Harry A. Thompson was most proud of her cooking. He bragged “that
her ‘soul food’ and dishes such as lobster thermidor, canard a l'orange and especially her
black beans in wine sauce top[ped] anything he has eaten anywhere.” 96
Each profile sought to turn a stereotype into a person. If an older resident came
upon Grymes playing her dulcimer in the park, she was not a pot-smoking hippie but a
well-educated musician with global ambitions. For a George Wallace-voting Cold
Warrior, Rattner was not an American-hating Jew communist but a dedicated member of
the community. For the remaining white residents, Modeane Thompson was not a threat
to their home value, but a mother, chef, and neighbor. Resident Joe Hough believed The
Evergreen News was the “most important thing about VECA” and Southwestern
Professor Fred Neal claimed this publication was responsible for stitching the
neighborhood together “into a cohesive community.” 97
While VECA sought to massage white residents into staying in the neighborhood,
fighting blockbusting required a more forceful approach. Longtime resident and former
VECA president Mary Wilder remembers real estate agents’ tactics that preyed on white
home owners’ fears of black people:
first [you] have an African-American agent come on the street…knock on the doors and
say, “Are you interested in selling your house? I’ll pay cash for your house.” Of course,
“No, no, no. I don’t want to sell my house.” They’ll do this for a week or two. Then they’ll
96
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wait a couple of weeks, let things ferment, and a white agent comes down the street and
knocks on the door and says, “Are you interested in selling your house? I’ll buy it for cash.
Here’s my card.” You get like six listings in a minute. 98

This approach inspired panic selling by white residents. Seemingly overnight, this solidly
white neighborhood could turn black. If effective, white homeownership would topple
like dominoes with the panic driving the selling price lower and lower. Then the real
estate agents would sell the same homes to black buyers at a higher price, typically with
unfavorable terms.
In 1971 the real estate committee went on the offensive. First, they sent the
attorney general a report on real estate agents’ questionable practices, essentially creating
a paper trail for possible litigation. Next, it began working directly with the real estate
industry. VECA members went to the real estate board’s ethics committee and was able
to get it to change their certification requirements. In order for real estate agents to get
certified they had to go through an ethics course which VECA member Chuck Scruggs
taught. Whenever reports of firms using scare tactics surfaced, VECA sent them a letter
stating it was monitoring their agents. In one extreme case, The Evergreen News outed a
blockbusting agent by name, who was promptly fired. Real estate committee chair Joe
Hough believed that monitoring the agents’ tactics was the most effective method to
combatting blockbusting. 99
VECA’s first iteration was successful in turning residents into grassroots activists
to combat white flight. They were able to slow the exodus of white residents while at the
same time welcome black residents to the neighborhood. That most black families
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entering Vollintine-Evergreen were well-educated and employed in professional trades
likely helped assuage whites’ concerns and help stabilization. 100 VECA was so effective
that in 1976 NBC News visited Memphis to report on “one of the few successfully
integrated communities it could find in the country.” 101 However, like so many volunteer
community organizations, after VECA resolved these initial crises it fell into a period of
inactivity. However, VECA re-emerged in 1987 around a new mission: historic
preservation.102
VECA’s Historic Preservation Campaign
In the late 1980s, while working on the neighborhood newsletter, Mary Wilder
believed a new project would reenergize VECA and get its residents involved in
neighborhood redevelopment. During the late 1980s, Vollintine-Evergreen still wrestled
with blighted homes, commercial/industrial rezoning within its borders, and declining
property values.103 However, approaching these issues “from a standpoint of
deficits…could beat “you down if you’re a home owner.” Instead, she believed they
should focus on what was good about the neighborhood. Emphasizing the reason
someone moved to Vollintine-Evergreen was the first step to combatting these issues:
“You bought your house because you liked the architecture, it’s cute, you like your
neighbors coming out of their house to tell you four problems. You like that sense of
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community. How do you build on that? How do you start creating that sense of pride and
value?” Wilder believed getting the neighborhood listed on the National Register of
Historic Places was the perfect project for her community. “We can do this,” she thought,
but VECA would have to lay some groundwork before this movement got any traction. 104
VECA began its historic preservation campaign by re-introducing the
neighborhood’s history to its residents. Using The Evergreen News, it circulated bits and
pieces of published material based on the Metropolitan Inter-Faith Association’s history
of Vollintine-Evergreen.105 The first articles focused on the neighborhood’s places of
worship and schools, but quickly moved on to a four-part series titled “We’ve Got Style”
that introduced residents to the history of the different architectural styles found in the
neighborhood: the Queen Anne, Tudor, Bungalow, Spanish Deco, and Four-Square.106
Each article followed a similar format. First, it explained how a particular style made its
way to Vollintine-Evergreen. Next, it gave the reader a descriptive overview. For
example:
The Tudor style was popular from 1890-1940 and was loosely based on a variety of English
building styles. The style features a steeply pitched roof and one or more cross gables. It
uses a mix of materials, often brick or stone on the lower floor, stucco or concrete on the
upper floor, and a half-timbering effect. If the brick rises above the first level, it is
considered a Tudor “influenced” and not a true Tudor. There is usually a massive brick or
stone chimney, often with brick pattern-work, topped with decorative chimney pots. 107
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An image or drawing accompanied the description, along with an address where one
could find an example within the neighborhood. The author also included personal stories
with their architectural descriptions. Instead of simply stating bungalows had a screenedin porch, she alluded to the “fond” memories her parents had “as children of sleeping on
the veranda on hot summer nights, or on pallets in the living room next to the open front
door.”108 Each article ended with a call for Vollintine-Evergreen to be a historic district
and it solicited volunteers to serve on the Historic Preservation Committee. By the end of
1991, VECA generated enough interest in historic preservation that its campaign began in
earnest.
At VECA’s first Historic Preservation Committee Meeting held on February 10,
1992, the committee laid foundation for the work ahead. Committee co-chairs Linda
Nichols, Bette Ackerman, Mary Francis Pitts, and Claudia Rutkauskas reached out to the
Community Foundation of Memphis, a non-profit that provided money to communitybased initiatives and received a $1,817 grant to get the campaign off the ground. 109 Mike
Kirby, a Rhodes College Professor, along with Russ Sims, a student intern, designed the
campaign’s survey form that the committee used to catalog all the homes within the
VECA area, and managed the housing survey database. Charlotte Swailes created a map
that the committee used to track their work. The committee, along with the Memphis
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Landmarks Commission and Memphis Heritage Inc., a historic preservation non-profit,
also developed a training manual used to teach volunteers how to conduct the survey. 110
The training sessions for the historic preservation campaign drew volunteers in to
VECA’s orbit, creating neighborhood activists out of residents. This was where most
people had their first active involvement with the campaign. Historic preservation
training gave volunteers the tools necessary to conduct the survey. The training events,
led by Linda Nichols, were relatively small affairs and contained no more than ten
volunteers per session. During training they learned how to identify the neighborhood’s
different housing styles. Nichols instructed her volunteers to think of the house like a
Christmas present; you had the box (or the house plan/shape) and the wrapping paper (the
decorative motif). For example, one of the neighborhood’s most common plans was the
bungalow. She taught them to identify a bungalow by looking for its “horizontal lines,
low extended eaves, and a dominant porch.” 111 Once a volunteer identified the type of
home, they moved on to its architectural features. How many windows did the house
have? Were they casement windows that opened out, or double hung windows that slid
up and down? How many panes did the windows have? Since bungalows all had large
porches, how many piers (supports) did it have? Were they boxed piers with clean lines,
or turned piers, also known as columns? Were they made of stone, wood, or brick? 112 The
campaign generated so much interest that at the first training session, held during
VECA’s Heritage Day celebration in October of 1992, ten people officially attended the
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class but approximately fifty people hung around and observed the session. Armed with
their new architectural knowledge, VECA unleashed its historic preservation volunteers
to conduct the survey.
The survey work allowed VECA resident volunteers to become intimately
acquainted with their neighborhood. The average survey crew comprised seven or eight
volunteers and each person would inventory their own street or block. During their
personal time they would walk up and down their street inventorying each home as they
saw it from the sidewalk, sometimes taking photographs for reference. 113 For example,
one volunteer described 914 Willett St. as:
c. 1933. Tudor English Cottage. Weatherboard, with Brick 1 Story; Asphalt Shingle
Complex Hip Roof; Recessed Porch; Center Solid Wood Entry Door; Paired 1/1 Double
Hung Windows. (C) No Garage. 114

While this description appears simple on the surface it required the volunteer to
understand the neighborhood’s different floor plans, architectural features, and building
materials—no small feat when inventorying 3,141 different structures.
The progress was slow and steady. The section north of Jackson Avenue between
Watkins Street and Springdale was not finished until February 1994, with the area south
of Jackson Avenue to North Parkway just underway. Part of this slow pace was due to the
sheer number of homes being inventoried, but the Historic Preservation Committee also
spot checked the volunteers’ work. After volunteers turned in their survey forms, Mary
Wilder and Dottie Sacritz would spend a couple of hours two to three days a week
proofing each person’s data. As Wilder points out, “the biggest and most important thing
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about them is consistency. A hip roof is a hip roof is a hip roof…Dottie and I stood in
front of every house in this neighborhood.” 115 Being able to accurately identify the types
of houses in Vollintine-Evergreen and their architectural features was an integral part of
filling out the survey form. Each home had to contribute to the era in question,
approximately 1900 to 1946. Any less than eighty percent conformity would result in
VECA being denied a place on the National Register of Historic Places. One
preservationist had a rule when determining whether or not it contributed to the district:
“if the original owner stood in front of that house today, would they recognize it?” 116
Once a committee member verified the data, volunteers entered the survey into a database
to use in the nomination form.117
Vollintine-Evergreen residents’ heavy lifting on the survey made the VollintineEvergreen Historic District nomination possible. Judith A. Johnson, a historic
preservation consultant, turned VECA volunteers’ data into a cohesive National Register
of Historic Places Registration Form. The nomination consisted of two main parts. First,
Johnson used the volunteers’ database to create a property by property inventory of the
entire Vollintine-Evergreen neighborhood. Second, she wrote a narrative that placed
Vollintine-Evergreen within a historical context. Once completed, VECA sent their
nomination on to the State Historic Preservation Office in Nashville for review, and once
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approved they forwarded it to Washington, DC. 118 The National Park Service placed the
Vollintine-Evergreen National Historic District on the National Register of Historic
Places on April 12, 1996, making it the largest historic district in Tennessee. 119
VECA’s historic preservation campaign was responsible for re-energizing a lagging
community association by providing its residents with a reason to work together. Within
months of beginning the historic preservation campaign VECA noted it had brought
approximately 100 new volunteers to the organization. Reflecting on the campaign, Mary
Wilder remembered:
going down the street [and] this old guy is on the porch. I said, “You know why we’re
here?” He goes, “Oh, yeah. You’re doing the nomination, you’re doing the history of the
neighborhood.” He totally does the spiel…He’s read his newsletter, obviously his
neighbors are talking about it. It did what we wanted it to do. It reenergized that whole
thing of we are important, we have something of value.

The historic preservation campaign encouraged residents to invest themselves in the
neighborhood by learning about their neighborhood’s history and in turn learning about
each other. What began as a grassroots effort to gain historic designation status quickly
developed into something bigger; it was the neighborhood’s first big step towards a
grassroots urban revitalization campaign.

From Volunteer Organization to Community Development Corporation
Following Vollintine-Evergreen’s successful nomination to the National Register
of Historic Places, VECA transformed the historic preservation campaign into a
grassroots neighborhood rehabilitation initiative. Despite VECA’s successes, abandoned
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and poorly maintained properties still threatened Vollintine-Evergreen’s viability. To
combat this continued problem, VECA sought a Neighborhood Preservation Initiative
(NPI) grant. An NPI grant would provide the community association with funds to
“identify and shape the factors influencing the neighborhood’s appeal among family and
community-oriented home owners,” which “entailed stabilizing and rehabilitating the
neighborhood’s housing stock, strengthening its identity and marketability, and
sustaining its quality of life.”120 The VECA board of directors held several meetings with
residents to identify initiatives; given the neighborhood’s buy-in with the historic
preservation campaign, people came out of the woodwork with suggestions. 121 At the top
of their list was forming a community development corporation to purchase and
rehabilitate at-risk property in the neighborhood, and to increase recreational
opportunities such as transforming the former Louisville & Nashville (L&N) railroad
rights of way in to a greenline. Working through the Plough Community Foundation of
Memphis, VECA applied for a grant with the Pew Charitable Trust for neighborhood
preservation and revitalization. VECA submitted their grant proposal on July 5, 1994 and
prepared for a Pew site visit the following month.122
When representatives from the Pew Charitable Trust visited the VollintineEvergreen neighborhood on August 5, 1994, VECA volunteers descended upon the
committee to sing the neighborhood’s praises. VECA rented a rubber tire trolley to take
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Pew representatives on a tour of the neighborhood. As Mary Wilder drove them around
Vollintine-Evergreen she made several stops along the way. First, she stopped at the old
L&N railroad tracks and picked up two people who explained the neighborhood’s desire
to convert it into a green space with a system of walking and bike paths, along with a
community garden.123 She picked up another volunteer who explained the National
Register of Historic Places nomination and VECA’s future plans to expand the
designation to other subdivisions. Then another person hopped on and discussed the need
to beautify Jackson Avenue. While the Pew Foundation representatives heard residents’
wants and needs, they also saw both the progress VECA had made and how far it still
needed to go. The tour’s final stop was at the predominately black Vollintine Hills
subdivision behind the old Baron Hirsch synagogue and current Gethsemane Garden
Church of God in Christ (COGIC) north of Vollintine. Wilder remembered “twenty
people pour[ing] out of this house like a clown car” and “They just launch into how it’s
the best neighborhood, and it’s all African American.”124 Reflecting on their association
with VECA, one resident hammered home the neighborhood’s cultural values: it “does
not aggressively fight racism or strive for diversity as much as this is the way we live.
People in Vollintine-Evergreen do not fight for diversity as much as they live for it.” 125
On October 3, 1994, the Community Foundation of Greater Memphis notified VECA it
had been awarded a $975,000 three-year grant.126
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Winning almost one million dollars in grant money was a major coup for VECA,
but it required a series of organizational changes before it could put the money to use.
First, VECA had to transition away from a volunteer organization to a community
development corporation (CDC) with an elected board and permanent office in the
neighborhood. According to historian Andrew Hurley, CDCs were the “archetypal
organizational vehicle for executing neighborhood planning agenda.” 127 They were the
bottom-up response to top-down urban renewal schemes, like freeway construction.
While CDCs mirrored traditional community associations in many respects, they took an
active role by engaging in private investment. Next, VECA hired Steve Lockwood, who
had a background in construction, as the full-time director of the CDC.128 VECA also
hired Mary Wilder as the grant coordinator. She was responsible for monitoring the
grant’s progress and liaising with the Community Foundation of Memphis and the
national NPI staff.129 Creating the CDC and professionalizing the staff allowed VECA to
undertake community development at a larger scale.
VECA’s new CDC used NPI funds to stabilize the neighborhood by acquiring and
rehabilitating Vollintine-Evergreen’s numerous blighted properties. VECA canvassed the
neighborhood identifying maligned homes and then sent letters to landlords asking if they
would consider selling their property to the CDC. While the CDC did not plan on
purchasing all rental property in the neighborhood, it hoped to acquire and renovate
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empty homes and those in the worst condition. 130 For example, in 1995, VECA purchased
ten run-down duplexes on Watkins Street at the neighborhood’s western boundary for
$15,000 a piece. It converted each duplex into a single-family home with four bedrooms
and two bathrooms and sold them for $48,000 each. But these homes were not available
to anyone; VECA’s strategy sought to extend homeownership to low income people.
Qualified buyers could make no more than eighty percent of Shelby County’s median
income, approximately $30,000. Even though rehabilitation “costs produced a loss of
$8,457 per unit,” David J. Wright, Director of Urban, Metropolitan, and Workforce
Studies at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government claimed, “the project
upgraded a major gateway into Vollintine-Evergreen and put the neighborhood and its
CDC on the redevelopment map.”131 VECA believed this rehabilitation strategy would
encourage nearby home owners to reinvest in their own property since selling renovated
homes on streets with blighted property next door would hinder its ability to sell homes
in Vollintine-Evergreen.
The CDC developed three strategies to work in conjunction with housing
restoration. First, Ruth Gibson, VECA’s secretary, took on the added role of providing
home ownership training to Vollintine-Evergreen residents. CDC director Steve
Lockwood believed this training would “assist new, inexperienced home owners in
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learning the skills needed to remain successful home owners.” 132 Part of this education
placed low income homeowners in contact with state funds for a low interest home repair
program—its second strategy. Only homes within VECA were eligible and loans could
repair serious housing code violations such as “bad roofs, faulty wiring, faulty plumbing,
and other problems that threaten health and safety or could result in loss of community
housing stock.”133 Preference was given to large households, the elderly, and people with
disabilities. Loans averaged around $10,000, with a three percent interest rate, and a five
to ten-year repayment schedule—monthly payments averaged between $70 and $120
dollars a month.134
VECA’s third strategy utilized Vollintine-Evergreen residents to enforce local
housing codes. Previously, VECA relied on observations by block club members and
volunteers to approach the offending party to resolve the issue. The problem was that a
volunteer organization did not have any teeth to enforce, let alone follow-up, on problem
properties. However, after VECA became a CDC with a full-time staff, it had the
personnel to receive and log housing code complaints from residents during business
hours and refer them to the office of code enforcement to make a formal complaint.
VECA staff members would then use the complaint log to follow up with local
government officials to see if the offending property owner responded to the complaint.
VECA also sent letters to offending property owners. It believed that getting people to
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comply with the law instead of repeated complaints was the most effective way to ensure
property upkeep. While not a housing code violation, the parking of cars in people’s front
yards also drew VECA’s ire. In May of 1996, an article in the Vollintine-Evergreen News
understood that people’s cars were important, “but our neighborhood and homes are more
important. Parking on the front lawn can ruin the yard, depreciate the value of the home,
affect the value of the homes surrounding the offending homeowner, and create an
atmosphere that makes the community seem devalued and unsafe.” The article listed
what people could and could not park on their property and in front of their house and
encouraged residents to report parking offenders to the Mayor’s Citizens Service Center.
Whether policing home owners, absentee landlords, or renters, VECA’s three-pronged
approach towards its housing stock ensured Vollintine-Evergreen was an attractive place
to live.135
Despite VECA’s revitalization campaign, real estate agents continued to push
homebuyers towards Memphis’s eastern suburbs. For example, a study of real estate
advertising in the early 1990s revealed that “integrated areas had fewer company ads,
fewer open houses mentioned, fewer school notations, fewer favorable descriptions, and
fewer directions provided. In short, these major real estate companies had drastically
reduced their…efforts in substantially integrated areas.”136 One Vollintine-Evergreen
resident remembered “A young couple bought a house on my street and their agent…very
actively tried to get them not to buy a house on my street. I mean, they had to battle this
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woman to buy the house they wanted.” 137 This frustrated another resident so much that
they “drove around and found the house myself.” 138 In the face of such resistance,
VECA’s home rehabilitation program developed into an all-out campaign to sell
Vollintine-Evergreen to prospective homebuyers. Since the CDC had been rehabilitating
and selling homes in the neighborhood since 1995, it leveraged the contacts it made with
contractors and held the Old Home Expo, a housing renovation trade show at the
Snowden School gym on May 22-23, 1999.
VECA used the Expo as an opportunity to introduce prospective home buyers to
experts on home renovations. These included vendors of floor and wall coverings, wood
repair, doors, cabinets, counters, stained glass, and roofing materials. Additionally, the
show held demonstrations for do it yourselfers.139 By bringing in people who had done
home repairs themselves, the Expo showed attendees that repairs were simple enough for
the average person. For example, Mary Wilder and her husband had recently bought an
apartment building in the neighborhood and showed attendees how to “open your
windows up and change your weight so you could make your windows work…They
showed them how to pop the windows open, change your weight boxes out” and “put in
chains.”140 This was all well and good, but just selling services to prospective home
buyers was not enough. VECA realized that it had to show attendees renovated homes.
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As a result, several residents put their homes on display during the Expo’s historic home
tour.
VECA used the Vollintine-Evergreen Historic Home Tour to show off the
neighborhood’s architectural merits by shuttling prospective home buyers to renovated
homes. Expo goers boarded a trolley and went around the neighborhood visiting a
selection of renovated historic homes. For example, Margaret and Bob Legett’s
Craftsman Bungalow at 1877 Crump Avenue demonstrated how “easy” one could build
upon a historic home. After moving into this house sixteen years prior, they added an
upstairs bedroom and a much-needed new bathroom beneath the stairs. All together the
Legetts enhanced their home’s square footage by 1,000 square feet. On 1900 Jackson
Avenue, Dillie and Randall Paxton displayed their 1928 Tudor cottage. Randall, an
architect by training, believed home renovations should be “seamless, virtually
undetectable from the original home” and set out to open up his home’s cloistered floor
plan. For example, the core of his house (a living room, dining room, and library
combination at the center of the original floor plan) had been separate rooms. During
renovation, he removed all the doors that opened into the center of the house and the wall
between the living and dining rooms. Additionally, he turned the wall that led into the
library into a “large open arch echoing the one leading from the foyer to the living room.”
For Paxton, this blending of form and function maintained the integrity of the original
structure while updating it for contemporary uses.141 One resident stated that “There are
styles that are very different. They accommodate people with different tastes.” 142 And if
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you liked a historic home but wanted to update the structure, renovations to modernize its
interior were within homeowners’ reach. Essentially, Vollintine-Evergreen had
something for everyone.
The home tour also introduced visitors to the neighborhood’s solid housing stock.
Most of the homes were built with wood from old growth forests, which was much harder
and more durable than farm-raised pine. In fact, when Mary Wilder added an addition to
her current home “[Construction workers] were having fits because they were breaking
their nail guns.”143 Additionally, the homes north of Jackson Avenue around the former
Baron Hirsch synagogue were architect-built. They included exterior aesthetics like halftimbering and cut limestone, and interior touches like “red gum cherry walls, walnut
wood work, and…soapstone carved fireplaces.” 144 Their quality spilled over into another
important selling point associated with Vollintine-Evergreen: affordability. One VECA
activist claimed, “There are other neighborhoods with very attractive housing, but they
weren’t and aren’t as affordable as [Vollintine-Evergreen].”145 Since the average home
size is modest by today’s standards (1,600 square feet) and the property values do not “go
through big heaves,” Vollintine-Evergreen became known as “the neighborhood of
attainable and affordable historic homes.” 146 The Old Home Expo hoped to convince the
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1,000 people who attended the event that purchasing and renovating a historic home in
Vollintine-Evergreen was a smart home buying choice. 147
The historic preservation campaign and Neighborhood Preservation Initiative
provided the Vollintine-Evergreen neighborhood a solid foundation to build upon at the
turn of the century. VECA continued to push for neighborhood improvements in order to
increase Vollintine-Evergreen’s livability and desirability. Its first major coup was
purchasing the abandoned L&N railroad bed that bisected the neighborhood and turning
it into a greenspace owned by VECA and maintained by neighborhood’s residents. Not
only did this increase the amount of parkland in the neighborhood, it later became a site
of community engagement. For example, the greenline is the site of the annual
Vollintine-Evergreen Art Walk. This festival features local artists, a silent art auction
(with proceeds going to the greenline), musical acts, and food trucks. It brings
neighborhood residents together in a spirit of cooperation. 148 The neighborhood’s
commercial district on North McLean Boulevard between Faxon Avenue and Snowden
Avenue has also rebounded. What began as façade improvement soon gave way to
encouraging preferred merchants to locate their businesses within Vollintine-Evergreen’s
borders. Initially, VECA hoped to land a bank branch in the neighborhood—that failed—
but in 2008 Café Eclectic opened at the corner of Faxon Avenue and North McLean
Boulevard. During family outings to Overton Park in the early 1980s, Proprietor
Catherine Boulden felt the neighborhood could use a place where “place where parents
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can enjoy a good cup of coffee and children can get a scoop of ice cream” after a day in
the park. Three weeks after she opened her café she was “trying to work out the last
kinks” but was “grateful that the neighborhood has embraced us immediately.” 149
VECA volunteers are still the driving force behind these positive developments. A
few years after the initial historic preservation campaign, VECA, with its volunteer
historic preservationists, surveyed and added two more sections of Vollintine-Evergreen
to the National Register of Historic Places.150 The housing committee still combats blight
where it can. For example, when the City of Memphis declined to take action against an
offending property, volunteers took it upon themselves to clean up the site and board-up
the doors and windows.151 Volunteerism is so integral to VECA’s operation that it
bestows the Margaret Dichtel Award annually to a “Vollintine-Evergreen resident and
VECA member who embodies the principles of neighboring and community action.” 152
Taken together, VECA’s revitalization efforts and residents’ volunteerism have
made Vollintine-Evergreen a desirable place to live. Realtor Garnette Stephens has been
selling the neighborhood since she moved there in 1987. As a resident and a realtor, she
is well-suited to inform prospective homebuyers on the neighborhood’s merits. As she
points out, Vollintine-Evergreen is in close proximity to the city’s big employers: the
Medical District, which houses the University of Tennessee Health Science Center,
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Downtown, home of St. Jude and AutoZone Corporate Headquarters, Rhodes College,
Christian Brothers University, and the University of Memphis are all within fifteen
minutes. She also emphasizes the neighborhood’s proximity to the zoo and Overton Park,
the Greenline, Overton Square, and the neighborhood’s walkability and bike lanes along
with historic homes, updated with modern amenities. Midtown’s housing market has
become so hot that she has encountered several multi-offer situations in the past two
years. This tight market is due to the fact that no one is leaving the area. VollintineEvergreen, along with the rest of Midtown, has become a place where people want to
live. As she points out, her clients are not buying a house, they are buying a lifestyle. 153

Conclusion
Historic preservation provided the Evergreen and Vollintine-Evergreen
neighborhood an inroad to direct involvement in urban planning at the neighborhood
level following the Overton Park freeway route’s demise in the early 1980s. In
Evergreen, residents first wielded historic preservation legislation in the 1980s as a way
to fight off any future attempts by the State of Tennessee to use the abandoned I-40
corridor for road projects. This early preservation work morphed into a movement to
reunite the northern and southern half of the neighborhood by directly engaging in citylevel urban planning. By working with the Hackett administration, EHDA played an
integral role in getting the corridor land released by the State of Tennessee for
redevelopment, devising land-use guidelines, and becoming a historic conservation
district, which regulated what could be built on the corridor land. By facilitating
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construction of new “old” houses, EHDA reversed the destruction the interstate brought
thirty years prior. VECA, conversely, used a historic preservation campaign to reenergize
its residents to take on blight within the neighborhood. The volunteer nature of its
application for the National Register of Historic Places got its residents invested in what
was good about their surroundings. As a result, this volunteer organization became a
community development corporation and used a Pew grant to buy, rehabilitate, and sell
homes to low-income Memphians with the purpose of turning them in to neighbors. In
the process, VECA created the only integrated neighborhood in Memphis.
Evergreen and VECA’s historic preservation campaigns may have brought these
neighborhoods back to life, but their genesis was rooted in their residents’ desires to
protect white space. From the late-1970s through the mid-2000s, other Midtown
neighborhoods followed suit and placed their homes on the National Register of Historic
Places: Annesdale Park (1978), Stonewall Place (1982), Central Gardens (1982), Hein
Park (1988), Cooper-Young (1989), Vollintine-Evergreen Avalon (1997), VollintineEvergreen North (1997), Idewild (1999), Speedway Terrace (1999), Galloway-Speedway
(2004), and Vollintine Hills (2007).154 While these historic preservation campaigns united
neighbors in the face of crisis to protect their homes, they also erected a color line that
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closely mirrored the boundaries of their respective historic districts. Based on the 2010
census data, Memphis ranks as one of the most segregated cities in the United States. 155
Of the city’s 464,889 residents 409,687 (63.3%) are black and 190,120 (29.4%) are
white. However, as revealed by the census tracts that overlap with Midtown’s historic
districts, the numbers are almost the inverse—the area contains 22,494 (54.5%) white
residents and 15,229 (35.3%) black residents, with the bulk of the white people
concentrated in the neighborhoods surrounding Overton Park and Central Gardens to the
south.156 These numbers are even more stark when one looks at a visual representation of
this data: Midtown, Memphis, is an island of white in a sea of black. Freeway
construction may have brought white Midtowners together to protect their homes, but
historic preservation made imaginary boundaries very real. And the policing of their
neighborhood boundaries and Overton Park from unwanted construction or unwanted
people continues to influence their politics.
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Epilogue: Save the Greensward!
The Citizens to Preserve Overton Park’s successful anti-freeway activism of the
mid-twentieth century inspired continued grassroots environmental political activity in
the aughts. In 2008, a new iteration of the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park (CPOP)
organized in response to the Memphis Zoo clear cutting four acres of trees in Overton
Park’s north-east corner. For Naomi Van Tol Overton Park was a quotidian part of her
life. Several times a week she took her two-year-old daughter to play on the playground,
wandered the Old Forest trails, or visited the zoo. On one of these visits she noticed
backhoes and bulldozers knocking down trees. Van Tol was “shocked” the zoo took such
an action. Couple this with the fact it had another seventeen acres of the Old Forest
fenced-in, with an eye towards expansion, her fellow conservationists became wary of the
zoo’s intentions. Van Tol believed outward zoo development was anathema to Overton
Park and the greater Midtown area. “We think the zoo has plenty of space to improve and
expand within its current boundaries,” she argued. “They don't need to keep moving
outward. It's a very suburban model.” Van Tol and others believed it was time to revive
CPOP.1
Much like the original CPOP, this version responded to impending destruction in
a similar fashion. First, it recreated a political organization that quickly claimed 60
members. Next, it catalogued the zoo’s effect on the forest. CPOP member Roy Barnes
used Google Earth images to chart the forest’s destruction. “People won't be able to hide
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—it will be obvious what's happened,” he said. “If the fence means [they] own it, [they]
control it, now they've shown the danger of what that power is.” CPOP members then
sought to raise public awareness about the issue. It hosted a public meeting at Rhodes
College, an institution integral to CPOP’s earlier activism, and hoped to convince the zoo
to tear down the fence and let the public use this park land. Van Tol linked their work to
that of CPOP’s anti-freeway warriors: “We're paying tribute to the people who worked so
hard to protect what we have today...We're finishing their work.” While their activism
has not to this day resulted in the removal of the zoo’s fence in the Old Forest, this
chapter of park protection sought to save it from destruction. But instead of danger
coming from without, this aggressor came from within. 2

Save the Greensward
By 2014 Overton Park had a resurgence. Mirroring an urban trend across the
country, people had been moving to the Midtown area in droves since Evergreen and
Vollintine-Evergreen successfully launched their historic preservation campaigns in the
1980s and 1990s. With the help of the Overton Park Conservancy (OPC)—a non-profit
that oversees the park’s day-to-day operation, maintenance, and capital improvements—
Midtown’s anchor saw increased use. 3 As a result, the conservancy has installed and
maintained Overton Bark (dog park), the Rainbow Lake Playground and art installations
such as the Old Forest gateway on East Parkway. It had repaired sidewalks, installed
demarcated pedestrian crossings at all entry points, and improved bus stops by installing
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covered benches. It also brought numerous social and educational events to the park: the
Latino Memphis Festival, a Day of Merrymaking Family Festival, Palestine Fest, the
Margarita Festival, Persian Festival, and rugby tournaments, along with an urban forestry
fellowship to study the Old Forest’s flora and fauna. 4 OPC also collaborates with Rhodes
College to bring the Overton Park Community Farmers Market, which provides a
“platform for our community members to support a local food economy…along a local
food corridor in Memphis…[and] that is accessible to all Memphians from which all can
benefit” to the East Parkway Pavilion every Thursday afternoon. 5 A revitalized Levitt
Shell brings thousands of people in to the park during the summer and fall for its free
concert series.6 The Memphis Zoo, the park’s biggest and most consistent money maker,
charges forward with its mission to offer Memphians and people from the Mid-South
region the finest in curated wildlife education and entertainment as evidenced by its
newest addition, the Zambezi River Hippo Camp and Winnie the baby hippo.7
In a survey conducted by OPC in the spring of 2014, Memphis got a clear picture
of who used the park and why. Of the respondents, 82.56 percent were white, between
the ages of 25-43, and resided in the Midtown area. They visited Overton Park once a
week, with the Levitt Shell, Old Forest Trails, and the Rainbow Lake playground serving
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as the biggest draws. The main problem they saw? Parking.8 With all the natural,
educational, cultural, and recreational institutions and activities, it was only a matter of
time before the two biggest entities, the Zoo and OPC, found themselves pitted against
one another in a classic NIMBY turf war over the Greensward. The beef: should it be
used for recreation or parking?
The Memphis Zoo’s increased patronage since the mid-1970s, a direct outgrowth
of its ever-expanding exhibition offerings, led to the practical problem of parking.9 In
recent years the City of Memphis permitted zoo patrons to park on the Overton Park
Greensward approximately sixty days of the year. During this period Midtown’s
renaissance was just beginning, and the presence of these cars did not appear to elicit
outrage from park-goers and area residents. However, since 2014 a grassroots
organization called Save the Greensward emerged to push back against the Zoo for using
their park as a parking lot. They claim “Zoo officials have repeatedly refused to work
with our community on long-term solutions that would benefit our park AND our zoo.
Instead, they demand exclusive control of more of our parkland.” Activists want “the
Overton Park Greensward restored as a calm public space, not a chaotic private parking
lot. We are sick of the noise, dust, fumes, and destruction. We want the cars and trucks
to GET OFF OUR LAWN now and forever.”10
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Their politics took several forms. Since Memphis is a music town, it is perhaps no
surprise Greensward advocates turned to song to voice their displeasure. Local musician
Jeff Hulett penned a pro-Greensward ballad titled “Get off our lawn” that emphasized the
Greensward’s role as a public green space, not a parking lot.11 Another supporter created
a Spotify playlist loaded with anti-car anthems like Joni Mitchell’s “Big Yellow Taxi”
and a song that suggested losing one’s home in Elvis Presley’s version of “Green, Green
Grass of Home.” Some engaged in passive protest such as proudly wearing a bright green
shirt with “Save the Greensward” emblazoned in bold white letters or placing a sign in
one’s yard that made the same statement. Others confronted the zoo head on. In the
spring of 2016, protesters held a “Greensward Play Date” on the northern part of the
greensward where Zoo overflow parking typically ended up. Organizers intended for this
event to highlight the Greensward as a place for play and relaxation, with the hope that
their removal would provide a sharp juxtaposition to the people parking on it. However,
this play date quickly turned into a direct-action protest with some people laying down on
the dirt path, blocking cars from entering.12 As tension between the zoo, its patrons,
protestors, and the OPC began to escalate, the Memphis City Council stepped in to put
the issue to rest.
On March 1, 2016, in a 11-1 vote, the Memphis City Council handed control of
the Greensward over to the Zoo. This decision elicited several responses from different
constituent groups. First, was the inevitable conflict between Greensward activists and
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the City Council. Hinting at more direct action to come, Sherman Willmott demanded the
council “stop the hillbilly parking immediately.”13 Pointing to his past park activism, Bill
Stegall told the council of his protests against I-40 construction through Overton Park
when he was fifteen, but “now I’m 60 years old. I’m too old for civil
disobedience…Please don’t put me in that position.”14 Zoo president Chuck Brady
claimed this decision would not mean any practical changes for the Greensward, “other
than that we’ve been designated the manager of that area.”15 This comment pointed to
another conflict: Overton Park land management by two non-profits. The Memphis Zoo
and OPC each believed they had management rights over the Greensward—the zoo,
based on precedent (and this decision) and OPC because of its 2011 Overton Park
management agreement with the City of Memphis. This gray area was the reason the City
Council got involved. Worth Morgan, district 5 Councilmember, of which Overton Park
is a part, claimed this entire debacle was the city’s fault. He saw “this resolution as
something that’s trying to clarify that issue…We don’t want to spend the city’s
resources” on something the council has the power to act on.16 Memphis Mayor Jim
Strickland acknowledged the council “has control over city-owned property,” but hoped
that upcoming mediation sessions between the zoo and OPC would ultimately resolve the
issue.17
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Former City Councilwoman Barbara Swearengen Ware and current
councilmembers Berlin Boyd and Patrice Robinson pointed to a different issue:
Greensward activists were perceived as well-to-do white people pushing forward a smalltime political agenda when the city had bigger fish to fry. Ware invoked past civil rightsera struggles when she pointed to the relationship between zoo access and parking.
Hearkening back to the Zoo’s segregated past, she pointed to a time when black residents
could only visit the park one day a week. The Greensward was “not just a one community
issue…We need to make sure that whatever this world-class zoo needs it gets.”18 In
linking these two issues together she castigated Greensward activists as hindrances to
black education. In a city with gross wealth and educational disparities, she wanted to
make sure black children and families had access to one of the city’s best educational
institutions, Greensward be damned. Pointing to issues such as violence, poverty, and
infant mortality, councilmember Berlin Boyd incredulously declared that “to argue about
who has the rights over the Greensward” was inconceivable. He continued, “I just can’t
imagine this argument.” He also pointed to corporate sponsors throwing money at big
institutions in well-to-do parts of the city, like Midtown, but he could not find money for
Frayser, Nutbush, or Douglass, predominately black areas.19
Greensward activists responded angrily to these accusations by redirecting them
towards class-based issues. Mary Norman chastised Boyd and city attorney Allan Wade
for “painting us as indifferent to unrelated issues simply because we rallied to prevent
this landgrab from sneaking through.” For her, racism “was a red herring, meant to divert
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attention from solving the real issue…in biased terms worthy of Fox News.” The real
culprits were the rich white people associated with the zoo and the city council members
in their pockets who benefited the most from playing the race card. To her, they answered
to the people who funded their campaigns, as evidenced by the throngs of Greensward
supporters who voiced their concerns over and over again, only to be defeated in an 11-1
vote.20 Memphis Flyer editor Bruce VanWyngarden called on Greensward critics to come
to Overton Park on the weekend and “you’ll see that the users are diverse—old, young,
black, white, Hispanic—a classic city park crowd.” In his eyes the Greensward debate
was not “a white people crusade,” but an effort to keep public land public, and not the
domain of a private entity like the Memphis Zoo.21
While the Zoo and OPC met with mediators to resolve the Greensward issue,
activists returned to their direct-action protests, drawing them into conflict with the
Memphis Police Department. At the end of March 2016, Greensward protesters used their
standard tactics: sign waving, slogan chanting, frisbee throwing, and obstructing the drive
onto the Greensward. However, this time the police department met them with a show of
force. The police dispatched officers on horseback and had a police helicopter watching
from above. Memphis Congressman Steve Cohen believed this to be “way, way too
much.” The police had the “cavalry, and the Air Force, and then they had some artillery.”
But he gave protesters credit for staying calm and bringing attention to the issue. He
called on all parties to remain calm and let the mediation between the Zoo and OPC work
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out.22 On May 30, 2016, the Greensward protests continued, and the police made their
first arrests. In the past, the Memphis Police Department waited out the protesters or
directed cars to park elsewhere, but this time Fergus Nolan and Maureen Spain were
arrested for blocking the driveway that led onto the Greensward. Barnes was charged
with disorderly conduct and Spain for criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, obstructing a
highway or passageway, reckless endangerment, and resisting official detention. On a
Facebook post, Barnes stated Greensward activists “have a bias for action” and that
“applying pressure to power is our mission.” If we don’t save it, “they will pave it.”23
Taking a less combative, educational approach, the Free Parking Brigade sought
to “channel their anger and frustration over the council vote into something positive.”24
On peak zoo days where cars would typically park on the Greensward, volunteers
encouraged visitors to park for free on city streets in the nearby Evergreen neighborhood
or across the street at Snowden School. For example, on one of these busy days from
10:00 AM to 12:45 PM Brigade volunteer Gordon Alexander directed approximately
1,000 visitors (in his estimation) to free parking on city streets. Since most of them were
from out of town, the Brigade used the opportunity to inform zoo patrons about the
Greensward debate. “When told,” he claimed, most “were horrified that the zoo would
park vehicles on the grass.”25 This approach sought to mediate some of the more
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aggressive “fringe elements” associated with the Greensward protests. Luckily for those
involved, the City of Memphis, Memphis Zoo, and OPC reached a compromise.
Mayor Jim Strickland offered a compromise plan that sought to mediate the zoo
and OPC’s concerns. While formal mediation between the two ultimately failed, his plan
was a by-product of those talks. It built upon an OPC traffic study commissioned and
completed in the spring of 2016 that phased in incremental changes over several years. 26
Mayor Strickland’s plan suggested creating on-street parking on North Parkway,
converting the General Services Administration lot on East Parkway to parking,
reconfiguring the Zoo’s parking lot to create 200 more spaces, and generating a shuttle
system to ferry zoo patrons from far away parking areas to the zoo’s entrance. The
Memphis Zoo pushed back on Strickland’s plan, immediately calling it more of the same,
while the OPC and some Greensward supporters backed it for the most part. 27
On July 19, 2016 the Memphis city council approved a modified parking plan that
solved the Greensward controversy. Councilmember Bill Morrison added 415 new
parking spaces to the zoo’s existing lots, but it came at the expense of 2.4 acres of the
Greensward. The OPC felt “this loss deeply” but acknowledged “that a permanent
resolution to this issue required compromise from all parties. What Overton Park gains in
return is the permanent protection of approximately one-third of the Greensward that’s
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been used for parking for decades.” 28 The plan also gave the zoo latitude to continue
parking cars on the Greensward until the plan is finished; with construction set to begin
in November, 2018, parking could continue until 2020 or beyond. 29 Greensward advocate
Hunter Dempster was furious. This “win” cost him and his allies 150 trees. 30 Larry J.
Smith lashed out against “those who favor giving up the Greensward to the zoo without a
fight.” He believed “they are a symptom of a bigger problem. They are part of a long
tradition of political behavior in which cowardly but power-hungry people position
themselves as leaders, then bow to threats and intimidation, then sandbag and deflate the
efforts of others, then reframe the outcome as a necessary compromise and a success.” 31
This plan may have struck a middle ground that the Zoo, OPC, and area organizations
supported. But some Greensward activists shifted their messaging. What began as a
movement to “Save the Greensward,” they now demand everyone to give #NotOneInch.

Conclusion
The current Greensward debate demonstrates that Overton Park is still integral to
Midtowners’ daily lives. Every day, residents can be found meandering the shaded trails
in the Old Forest, helicoptering over their young children at the playground, working on
their backswing at the golf course, admiring Carrol Cloar’s paintings at the Brooks
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Museum of Art, attending the farmers market, catching one of Levitt Shell’s many free
concerts throughout the year, or smoking pot on the Greensward. It is perhaps no surprise
that their activism peaked around the same time white Memphians returned en masse to
the Midtown area. This influx of people slowly pit the zoo, which until recently had a
monopoly on the park’s usage, against park-goers who visited more frequently and in
higher numbers. The city’s parking plan should allow the conservancy and zoo to provide
optimal services for their patrons without infringing on each other’s space. But this
resolution will not address city councilmembers Ware and Boyd’s racial critique on the
activists’ politics and the city’s response.
The Save the Greensward campaign is an environmental issue by and for white
Midtowners. Their attachment to Overton Park is rooted in the nearly 100 years of history
that preceded their activism. Midtown emerged at the turn of the twentieth century as a
white space with Overton Park as it’s anchor. As Jim Crow Memphians invested their
money and themselves in the neighborhoods that surrounded it, they also turned the park
into their backyard. During the freeway battle of the interstate era, the Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park’s (CPOP) attachment to Overton Park provided its members
motivation to stay and fight freeway construction. Their successful anti-freeway
campaign made it possible for white Midtowners to stay in Memphis’ inner-city and
recruit new homeowners during a time when most white Americans around the country
fled for the suburbs. As a result, the Save the Greensward protesters either lived through,
or likely participated in, CPOP’s anti-freeway activism of the 1960s and 1970s (as
evidenced by Bill Stegall), or they developed their own ties with Overton Park by

258

relocating to Midtown during the 1980s onward as part of Evergreen and VollintineEvergreen’s own redevelopment campaigns.
Today the Midtown area is largely a bastion of white liberals who advocate for
diversity but work to keep low-income residents—which in Memphis largely means
African Americans—out of their neighborhoods. For example, the Lea’s Woods
neighborhood to the east of Overton Park organized in response to a planned
development by Makowsky Ringel Greenberg, a development firm who wants to build a
190-unit apartment complex on abandoned I-40 corridor land at the corner of Sam
Cooper Boulevard and East Parkway. Seemingly overnight Midtown was littered with
bright red signs demanding to “Keep Midtown Our Town!” and “Protect Midtown's
Historic Standards.” These residents were worried about their neighborhood’s historic
character, but Carl Schneider, a community organizer for the nonprofit Stand for
Children, argues that “historical standards have perpetuated racism and segregation and
economic inopportunity” in Memphis. “Demographically, our city is predominantly black
and Midtown is predominantly white and there are implications when you say ‘our’
town,” he said. For Schneider, keeping “Midtown Our Town!” was “overtly racist.”32
Both Greensward activists and Lea’s Woods anti-development campaigners’
activism is steeped in a long history of white Memphians protecting white spaces. While
the greensward debate appears resolved, even if the Lea’s Woods anti-development
campaign is ongoing, if liberal white Midtowners want to make the case that their
activism benefits everyone, they need to make non-Midtowners and the city’s black

Tom Bailey, “Dueling yard signs: Whose is ‘our’ Midtown,” Commercial Appeal, July 10,
2017, https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/money/business/development/2017/07/10/dueling-yardsigns-whose-our-midtown/463695001/, accessed on August 25, 2018.
32
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residents care about the park. As long as Midtowners believe Overton Park is their
backyard, they will continue to erect barriers for outsiders and give #NotOneInch.
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